The French merchant marine, in addition to a number of smaller boats, lost: Kangaroo, 2,493 tons; Emma Laurans, 2,152 tons. One Belgian steamer of 2,360 tons, the Keltier, also was sunk.

Of neutrals, the Dutch lost the Kediri, 3,781 tons; the Norwegians the Rakiura, 3,569 tons; Modum, 2,942 tons; Meteor, 4,211 tons; Manpanger, 3,354 tons; the Greeks, Salamis, 3,638 tons; and the Danish, Michail Ontchonkoff, 2,118 tons.

The balance of the boats destroyed in December, 1916, was made up of vessels of less than 2,000 tons, among which there were Russian, Swedish, and Portuguese boats as well as ships belonging to the nations already mentioned. One American-owned was also included, the John Lambert, of 1,550 tons, owned by the Great Britain & St. Lawrence Transportation Company.

On December 4, 1916, a German submarine sank in the Mediterranean the former Anchor liner Caledonia, a steamer of 9,223 tons. The German version of this occurrence was as follows:

"On December 4, 1916, in the Mediterranean, the British liner Caledonia attempted to ram one of our submarines without having previously been attacked by the latter.

"Just before the submarine was struck by the steamer's bows it succeeded in firing a torpedo, which hit and sank the Caledonia. The submarine was only slightly damaged.

"The captain of the steamer, James Blaikie, was taken prisoner by the submarine."

In January, 1917, the toll exacted by mines and submarines was especially large. The New York "Journal of Commerce" gave on February 6, 1917, the following figures: 154 vessels of 336,997 tons. Of these 87, of 229,366 tons, belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 67, of 107,631 tons, to neutrals. No American boats were included.

On January 1, 1917, a German submarine sank the British transport Ivernia in the Mediterranean while carrying troops. Four officers and 146 men as well as 33 members of the crew were reported missing.

The British battleship Cornwallis was sunk on January 9, 1917, likewise in the Mediterranean. Thirteen members of the crew were reported missing. The Cornwallis, which was launched at Blackwell in 1901 and completed in 1904, had a displacement of 14,000 tons, length of 405 feet, beam of 75-1/2 feet, and draft of 26-1/2 feet. Her indicated horsepower was 18,238, developing a speed of 18.9 knots. She carried four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch, ten 12-pounder, and two 3-pounder guns, as well as four torpedo tubes. The complement of the Cornwallis was about 750.

Two days later, January 11, 1917, the British seaplane carrier Ben-Machree was sunk by gunfire in Kasteloxizo Harbor (Asia Minor). There were no casualties.

Among the larger boats (above 2,000 tons) sunk during January, 1917, were the following:

British: Apsleyhall, 3,882 tons; Holly Branch, 3,568 tons; Baycraig, 3,761 tons; Lesbian, 2,555 tons; Andoni, 3,188 tons; Baynesk, 3,286 tons; Lynfield, 3,023 tons; Manchester Inventor, 4,247 tons; Wragby, 3,641 tons; Garfield, 3,838 tons; Auchencrag, 3,916 tons; Port Nicholson, 8,418 tons; Matina, 3,870 tons; Toftwood, 3,082 tons; Mohacsfield, 3,678 tons; Tremeadow, 3,653 tons; Neuquen, 3,583 tons; Tabasco, 2,987 tons; Matheran, 7,654 tons; Jevington, 2,747 tons.

French: Tuskar, 3,043 tons.

Japanese: Taki Maru, 3,208 tons; Chinto Maru, 2,592 tons; Misagatu Maru, No. 3, 2,608 tons.

Russian: Egret, 3,185 tons.

Norwegian: Britannic, 2,289 tons; Older, 2,256 tons; Fama, 2,147 tons; Esperanca, 4,428 tons; Bergenhus, 3,606 tons; Jotunfjell, 2,492 tons; Myrdal, 2,631 tons.

Dutch: Salland, 3,657 tons; Zeta, 3,053 tons.

Greek: Evangelos, 3,773 tons; Demetrios Goulandris, 3,744 tons; Aristotelis C. Ioannow, 2,868 tons; Demetrios Inglessis, 2,088 tons; Tsiropinas, 3,015 tons.

Spanish: Valle, 2,365 tons; Manuel, 2,419 tons; Parahyba, 2,537 tons.

Toward the end of January, 1917, the severity of submarine warfare was noticeably increased. Day by day the number of vessels sunk grew larger, and some of them were of especially large tonnage. On January 28, 1917, a French transport, carrying 950 soldiers to Saloniki, the Amiral Magon, was sunk in the Mediterranean with a loss of about 150 men.

Then came on January 29, 1917, the official announcement that the British Government had decided to lay new mine fields in the North Sea in order to cope more successfully with the ever-growing submarine menace. According to this announcement the British Government warned all neutrals that from this date the following area in the North Sea was to be considered dangerous to shipping:

The area comprising all the waters, except the Netherlands and Danish territorial waters, lying southwestward and eastward of a line commencing four miles from the coast of Jutland in latitude 56 degrees N., longitude 8 degrees E.

As a result of this new policy it was announced by Lloyd's that eleven vessels of about 15,000 tons were sunk on the first day of the blockade. During the first week of the blockade, February 1 to 8, 1917, according to British figures, which, however, were claimed by German officials to be much lower than the actual figures, there were sunk 58 vessels of 112,043 tons, of which 1 was American, 20 belonged to other neutrals, 32 to Great Britain, and 5 to the other belligerents.



PART VI—THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS



CHAPTER L

THE OLD MENACE

A welcome period of quiet in the submarine controversy with Germany followed the settlement of the Sussex case recorded in the previous volume. But neither the Administration nor the country was deluded into resting in any false security. The dragon was not throttled; it merely slumbered by the application of a diplomatic opiate. While the war lasted the menace of its awaking and jeopardizing German peace with the United States was always present.

The achievements of the Deutschland, a peaceful commercial submarine which inaugurated an undersea traffic between the United States and Germany, provided an interesting diversion from the tension created by the depredations of her armed sisters. After safely crossing the Atlantic and finding a safe berth in an American port in the summer of 1916, she showed such hesitation in setting out on the return trip that doubts were general as to whether the dangers of capture by alert Allied cruisers were not too great to be risked. The attempt nevertheless was finally made on August 2, 1916, when she darted under water after passing out of the three-mile limit at the Virginia Capes and was successful. She arrived at Bremen on August 23, 1916, with a cargo of rubber and metal, and apparently found no difficulty in eluding the foes supposedly in wait for her on the high seas. When she left her Baltimore berth, so the story went, eight British warships awaited her, attended by numerous fishing craft hired to spread nets to entangle her. Near the English coast dense fogs aided by obscuring the vision of her foes' naval lookouts, and in rounding Scotland to reach the North Sea she had to evade a long line of warships and innumerable auxiliary craft extended far north.

Germany found occasion for exultation in her return without mishap. The blockade was broken. Berlin was bedecked with flags and the whole country celebrated the event as though Marshal von Hindenburg had won another victory. The Deutschland again left Bremen on October 10, 1916, and found her way into New London, Conn., on November 1, 1916, leaving for Germany three weeks later with a rubber and metal cargo said to be worth $2,000,000 and a number of mail pouches. She was reported to have arrived safely off the mouth of the Weser on December 10, 1916.

A repetition of the Deutschland's exploits was looked for from her sister undersea craft, the Bremen, about whose movements the widest speculation was centered. She was reported to have left Germany for the United States on September 1, 1916, but did not appear, nor was any trace of her seen en route. She never arrived, and became a mystery of the sea. A story circulated that she had been captured by a British patrol boat in the Straits of Dover and thirty-three of her crew of thirty-five made prisoners, the remaining two having been killed when the boat was caught in a steel net. The British admiralty preserved its customary silence as to the truth of this report. Her German owners finally acknowledged their belief that she had been lost probably through an accident to her machinery. At any rate a life preserver bearing the name Bremen was picked up off the Maine coast about the end of September, 1916.

As the summer of 1916 advanced American contemplation of this agreeable trade relation with blockaded Germany by means of a commercial submarine service was abruptly switched to a review of the manner in which that country was observing its undertaking not to sink unresisting vessels without warning. A certain communication credited to Admiral von Tirpitz was circulated in Germany urging a return to his discarded sea policy. This was nothing more nor less than the pursuit of unrestricted and ruthless submarine warfare, the espousal of which by him as Minister of Marine, in conflict with the milder methods favored by the German Chancellor, forced his resignation earlier in the year. Of course such a change would mean an immediate clash with the United States and the ending of diplomatic relations.

President Wilson had been watching Germany's behavior since May, 1916, when she pledged her submarine commanders to safeguard the lives on board doomed vessels. Three months' probation, according to American reports, failed to show any evidence that she was not living up to her promise; but British reports cited a number of instances pointing to an absolute disregard of her undertaking with the United States. She had hedged this promise with a condition reserving her liberty of action should a "new situation" develop necessitating a change in her sea policy, and the question arose whether she was not trying to create a new situation to justify such a change. Concurrent with the new Von Tirpitz propaganda, at any rate, came a recrudescence of submarine destruction without warning, mainly in the Mediterranean. This activity lent weight to a fear that the kaiser and Von Bethmann-Hollweg were yielding to the pressure exercised by the Von Tirpitz party. Germany regarded her submarines as her chief weapons for damaging the Allies; but she was embarrassed by the problem of how to operate them without clashing with American interests. Her policy at length shaped itself to a careful discrimination in raiding Atlantic traffic and avoiding attacks on liners altogether.

The leader of the German National Liberals, Dr. Ernest Bassermann, echoed the Von Tirpitz cry, in an address to his constituents at Saarbruecken. The most ruthless employment of all weapons, he urged, was imperative. Besides Von Tirpitz, High Admiral Koester, Count Zeppelin, and Prince von Buelow shared this view. He told the world, which he was really addressing, that the submarine campaign had not been abandoned, but only suspended solely on account of the American protest. It was not clear that there had really been any cessation of submarine activity, though some abatement had undoubtedly followed the undertaking with the United States.

The manifest unrest in Germany provoked by the curb placed upon her submarines by President Wilson caused the eyes of Washington to be fixed anxiously on the uncertain situation. It was solely a psychological and mental condition, but of a character that seemed premonitory of an outbreak on Germany's part. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, in a cryptic remark to the Reichstag on September 28, 1916, succeeded in aggravating American concern, though he may not have so intended. "A German statesman," he said, "who would hesitate to use against Britain every available instrument of battle that would really shorten this war should be hanged."

There was no obvious reference to the United States in this utterance; but the German press seized upon it as a pretext for an attack on American neutrality. The connection was provided by the coincidental death of an American aviator named Rockwell, who, with a number of compatriots, had served the Allies on the French front. The point made was that the active part American airmen were taking in the ranks of the Allies, combined with the enormous supply of war materials furnished by American firms, indicated the futility of abiding by concessions made to the United States controlling the submarine war. The United States was charged with taking advantage of restricted submarine activity to cover the participation of American citizens as aids to the Entente and to expand its war trade. Being simultaneous and couched in the same key, the press outbursts bore every indication of a common inspiration, probably official.

"Moderation in the use of Germany's undersea craft," said one group of journals in effect, "merely serves to further American assistance to the Entente Allies in men and munitions."

Another paper, the "Tageszeitung," characterized the American policy as one in the pursuance of which President Wilson Was making a threatened use of a "wooden sword," and called for a policy of the utmost firmness against that country.

It was intimated from Washington that if any faction in Germany—in this case the Pan-Germans—succeeded in reviving submarine methods whereby ships were sunk without warning or without safeguards against loss of American lives, the submarine crisis with Germany would be reopened with all its possibilities. At the same time no serious importance was attached by official Washington to the German clamor for more frightfulness.

It was true that the Pan-Germans were making a powerful onslaught for the overthrow of the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who was the only obstacle to a return to ruthless submarine warfare. Moreover, as perceived by the "Berliner Tageblatt," "tension in the atmosphere of imperial politics has reached such a high point that a discharge must follow if the empire is not to suffer lasting damage." But Washington looked for development on the high seas, not in the political arena of Berlin, where the sound and fury of words did not afford a safe barometer of governmental action.

By the end of September, 1916, a "lull" in German submarine activity was reported, due, according to Lord Robert Cecil, to a shortage in submarines. But reports showed that between June 1, 1916, and September 24, 1916, 277 vessels, sixty-six of which were neutral, had been sunk by submarines, fifteen of them without warning, and with the loss of eighty-four lives. The abatement really took place in June and July, 1916, following the American agreement with Germany in May, 1916. The "lull" may therefore be measured by these figures: Vessels sunk in June, 57; in July, 42; in August, 103; in September (to the 24th), 75.

The only real lull was a cessation in attacks on liners. The British view, based on the allegation that fifteen vessels had been sunk without warning causing a loss of eighty-four lives, was that German frightfulness was already in full swing despite Berlin's promise to the United States. The American attitude, however, was that so long as American lives were not lost on ships sunk without warning the United States had no ground for intervention. Hence Germany could apparently sink vessels with impunity so long as the noncombatant victims belonged to other nationalities.

The agitation in Germany to break the undertaking with the United States was thrashed out between the adherents of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Pan-Germanists without shaking the Chancellor's strength. He had the support of Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the navy chiefs, who, in frowning on an unbridled submarine warfare, successfully imposed the weight of their authority against any change. The subject divided the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, the question being whether its discussion should be permitted in open session. The outcome was that the committee decided, by a vote of 24 to 4, to smother the agitation by refusing to permit its ventilation in the open Reichstag.



CHAPTER LI

THE U-53'S EXPLOITS

While the German Budget Committee was thus occupied a new and startling turn was given to the situation by the unheralded appearance at Newport, R. I., on October 7, 1916, of a German submarine, the U-53. Rising out of the water in the afternoon, it remained long enough for its captain to deliver a missive for Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, pay a call on Admiral Knight, the American commander there, ask for news of the missing Bremen, and obtain a sheaf of New York newspapers for information regarding Allied shipping. Then it left the port, whither it had been piloted, and disappeared under the waves. The visit, standing by itself, was an interesting episode; but it proved to be much more than a mere social call.

The next day revealed the real object of the submarine's presence in American waters. Off Nantucket it appeared in its true guise as a raider of shipping and sank five vessels—three British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian. Having thus brought the submarine war to the very threshold of the United States, causing a reign of terror among held-up shipping along the Atlantic seaboard—a state of mind which, while it lasted, meant a virtual blockade of American ports—it disappeared and was not again heard of.

There was no doubt that the exploits of the U-53 were intended as a demonstration to test American feeling as to whether Germany could attack on this side of the water munition and other vessels bound for Allied ports. It appeared a bold attempt to create a new precedent by overriding one laid down in 1870 by President Grant, who ruled that American waters must not be used by other nations for belligerent purposes. Outside the three-mile limit, however, German submarines could operate with the same impunity as in the Arctic Ocean, so long as they observed the requirement of giving warning and allowing people on board the intercepted vessels time to save their lives. But the manifest point was that the waters outside the three-mile limit were contiguous to the American coast, and provided highways for American shipping, coastwise and foreign. The proximity of German submarines, even though they confined their attention to Allied shipping to and from American ports, constituted too great a menace to the free movement of the American mercantile marine.

A wolf at a man's door is none the less dangerous because the wolf is lying in wait for the appearance of an inmate of the man's house and not for the man himself. Informal intimations persuaded Germany that she could not safely repeat the experiment of carrying the war to America's door.

The innovation, even in its most innocuous form, was contrary to good international usage. Great Britain had previously offended in this respect by permitting her patrolling cruisers to intercept and examine merchant vessels off the port of New York. She desisted at Washington's request. But a waiting cruiser, plain to the eye, interfering with shipping to prevent communication with Germany, was a mild offender compared with an unseen submarine crossing the paths of ships and liable to err in its indiscriminate destructiveness.

Fortunately, no American lives were lost. But this was not the fault of the submarine. No question could be raised of its behavior in sinking four of the five ships, namely, the Strathdene (British freighter), bound from New York to Bordeaux; the West Point (British freighter), bound from London to Newport News; the Bloomersdijk (Dutch freighter), bound from New York to Rotterdam; and the Christian Knudsen (Norwegian freighter), bound from New York to London. The danger, happily averted, to American-German relations lay in the sinking of the fifth vessel, the Stephano, a British passenger liner plying regularly between New York, Halifax, N. S., and St. John's, Newfoundland. Among the Stephano's passengers were a number of Americans, who, like their companions in misfortune, had to seek the doubtful safety of small boats miles offshore.

The situation was saved by the presence of American destroyers in the vicinity. Their commanders and crews were actual witnesses of the sinking, and afterward interposed as life savers of the shipwrecked victims. The Balch rescued the passengers and crew of the Stephano, numbering 140, and other destroyers took on board the crews of the four freighters. The American navy in saving Germany's victims had saved Germany from facing the consequences of her behavior in jeopardizing the lives of Americans on board the Stephano. German diplomacy was even capable of pointing to the fact that the prompt relief afforded the Stephano's passengers by American destroyers was proof that the submarine commander had safeguarded their lives by relying upon the American navy as a rescuer. The irony of such a contention lay in the implication that if American destroyers had not been on the scene the vessels might have been spared.

It was a short-lived panic. The U-53 came and went in a flash; but amid the scare created by its presence President Wilson found it necessary to assure the country that "the German Government will be held to the complete fulfillment of its promise to the Government of the United States. I have no right now," he added, "to question its willingness to fulfill them."

The Administration's deliberations on the subject produced the decision that the U-53 had not ignored the German pledges. It came, saw, and conquered according to formula. It had first warned the vessels, gave enough time for the people on board to be "safely" transferred to boats, and there were American naval eyewitnesses to testify as to the regularity of its proceedings. The incident passed as one on which no action could be taken by the United States. But Germany saw that it could not well be repeated. American sensibilities had to be respected as much as international proprieties. The reproof conveyed to the British Ambassador by Secretary Lansing that "the constant and menacing presence of cruisers on the high seas near the ports of a neutral country may be regarded according to the canons of international courtesy as a just ground for offense, although it may be strictly legal," applied with double force to the presence of German submarines because of their greater danger.

Tart comments on the incident came from Great Britain, though its Government did not appear to have protested to the United States against the view that the U-53's proceedings were lawful and regular.

Lord Robert Cecil, an official spokesman, saw a ruse in the submarine's visit:

"German public opinion appears to be obsessed with the idea that the way to deal with the Allied blockade is to have a succession of sudden crises with neutrals, which may be used for striking diplomatic bargains. These bargains, in the mind of Germany, always take one form—that Germany is to refrain from violating international law and humanity in return for the abandonment by Great Britain as toward neutrals of the legitimate military and naval measures of the Allies."

In the House of Lords the United States was accused of a breach of neutrality by Lords Beresford and Sydenham. Referring to "the activities of the U-53 under the very eyes of the American navy" and to President Wilson's ultimatum which resulted in the German pledge, Lord Sydenham said:

"Even before the exploits of the U-53 that pledge was torn to shreds. Yet the Government of the United States has made no sign whatever that the sinking of neutral ships goes on almost every day. What must small neutrals think of their powerful representative?"

No life, he said, was lost because of the presence of American warships. Lord Sydenham took the position that the presence of American warships actually enabled Germany to defy what President Wilson had described as a sacred and indisputable rule of international law.

Lord Beresford expressed a similar view:

"The United States are really aiding and abetting this rather serious state of affairs. If the United States had not sent their ships, which for some extraordinary reason happened to be on the spot, to save life, the Germans would no doubt have broken the pledge to which their attention had been called. I think we are bound to take notice of a fact which does not appear to be quite within the bounds of neutrality as far as the United States are concerned."

Lord Grey, Foreign Secretary, declined to commit the Government to such an attitude. He held that the American-German undertaking was no affair of Great Britain's.

It was left for the spectator to be truly prophetic, as the later peace movement showed, in seeking a motive for the U-53's proceedings. It considered that Germany sought to force the United States to propose peace terms, regardless of whether the Entente Allies were agreeable or not:

"Thus, with unrestricted submarine warfare as a settled policy, Germany gives America warning of what is likely to happen unless the United States is prepared to declare that the war has reached a point where it is dangerous for neutrals. If the United States is willing to play this role, the Germans will hold their hands from an extra dose of unlimited submarine frightfulness."

The U-53 had no sooner gone when an exchange of communications between the American and Allied governments regarding the status of foreign submarines in neutral ports became public. The question related to the hospitality accorded the Deutschland in Baltimore and New London; but as it arose in the midst of the hubbub occasioned by the U-53, the American view appeared to determine that such craft could call at an American port like any other armed vessel, so long as it did not stay beyond the allotted time.

The Allied governments besought neutrals, the United States among them, to forbid belligerent submarine vessels, "whatever the purpose to which they are put," from making use of neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports. Such craft could navigate and remain at sea submerged, could escape control and observation, avoid identification and having their national character established to determine whether they were neutral or belligerent, combatant or noncombatant. The capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such vessels therefore required, in the view of the Allied governments, that they should be excluded from the benefit of rules hitherto recognized by the laws of nations governing the admission of war or merchant vessels to neutral waters and their sojourn in them. Hence if any belligerent submarine entered a neutral port it should be interned. The point was further made that grave danger was incurred by neutral submarines in the navigation of regions frequented by belligerent submarines.

The American answer was brusque, and resentful of the attempt of the Allies to dictate the attitude neutrals should take toward submarines which visited their harbors. The governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan were informed that they had not "set forth any circumstances, nor is the Government of the United States at present aware of any circumstances, concerning the use of war or merchant submarines which would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable to them." Moreover, "so far as the treatment of either war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned, the Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action in all respects and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a power which may be said to have taken the first steps toward establishing the principles of neutrality."

Finally, as to the danger to neutral submarines in waters frequented by belligerent submarines, it was the duty of belligerents to distinguish between them, and responsibility for any conflict arising from neglect to do so must rest upon the negligent power.

This caustic exchange of views on harboring submarines took place before the appearance of the U-53. Had the Allies deferred approaching the United States until after that event, the situation favored the belief that the submarine's behavior would have dictated a different reply from Washington. Indeed, there was a strong presumption that if another German armed submarine had the temerity to visit an American port it might have been promptly interned, not under international law, but at the behest of public opinion.



CHAPTER LII

GATHERING CLOUDS

The conduct of the country's foreign policy became hampered by the presidential campaign. President Wilson was frankly uncertain of reelection and embarrassed by the feeling that any determination he made of a policy toward Germany might be overturned by his successful opponent. So American domestic politics perceptibly intruded at this stage in the country's foreign policy.

In fact, that policy was practically in suspension. Germany eagerly availed herself of the hiatus, and, satisfying herself that President Wilson would be defeated, and that his successor would adopt a different attitude to her (she had no real ground for this supposition), embarked upon a submarine activity that was in strange contrast to the moderation which the German Chancellor had stubbornly fought for in its conduct.

The point to be remembered was that Germany's pledge to President Wilson was the only curb on frightfulness. Germany rashly assumed that the defeat of President Wilson would nullify it. At any rate, his uncertain outlook in the preelection period opened the way for a submarine outbreak which would be extended with impunity owing to the Administration's hesitation in taking action that might not be sustained by the President's presumed successor, on the theory that Mr. Wilson's defeat would be tantamount to a popular repudiation of his policies.

Light was thrown on the German submarine policy by a Berlin dispatch, dated October 26, 1916, which indicated that the submarines were at least placating the extremists:

"While the silence of the German press and public on the subject of sharpened submarine warfare may be attributed in some measure to the stand of Hindenburg and Ludendorff against it, much more significant is the growing popular realization that sharpened submarine warfare is actually in force. And the public is beginning to regard it as efficient and highly satisfactory. The fact is that it is successful as never before, for it is sharpened not qualitatively, but quantitatively."

The British admiralty later reported that between May 4 (the date of the German pledge) and November 8, 1916, thirty-three vessels had been sunk by German submarines without warning, resulting in the loss of 140 lives. In the same period 107 ships, all of British registry, had been sunk and "the lives of the crews and passengers imperiled through their being forced to take to the sea in open boats while their ships were a target for the enemy's guns."

President Wilson's success at the polls, which hung in the balance several days after the election, was the signal for a change of attitude on Germany's part. The Berlin Government realized that his foreign policy had received the indorsement of a majority of American citizens, and the assurance was communicated that the German admiralty was again on its good behavior.

But many depredations had been committed which Germany would be hard put to explain satisfactorily. No less than ten pressing American inquiries regarding sunk ships were sent to the Berlin Foreign Office as soon as the President, assured that his tenure of office was no longer in doubt, returned to the consideration of foreign affairs. The submarine outbreak showed an undoubted disposition on Germany's part to violate her pledge, and if the Administration was satisfied that she had done so, its expressed attitude was that no more protests would be sent. The American answer to Germany's defiance could only be the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff from Washington and the recall of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin.

The outstanding cases on which the United States called for an adequate defense from Germany were:

The Rowanmore, British freighter, bound from Baltimore to Liverpool, sunk off Cape Clear on October 25, 1916. Two Americans and five Filipinos were on board. No lives were lost.

The Marina, a British horse carrier, bound from Glasgow to Newport News, sunk without warning off the southwest coast of Ireland on October 29, 1916. She carried a mixed crew of British and Americans. Six Americans lost their lives.

The Arabia, a Peninsular and Oriental passenger liner, sunk in the Mediterranean without warning on November 6, 1916. One American was on board. No lives were lost.

The Columbian, an American steamer, sunk off the Spanish coast on November 8, 1916, after being held up for two days under surveillance by the submarine during a storm.

Germany charged that the Rowanmore attempted to escape on being ordered to stop. Her steering gear was shot away after an hour's chase, when the captain hove to and lifeboats were lowered. The crew complained that the submarine shelled the boats after they had cleared the ship. This the commander denied. The flight of the Rowanmore appeared to deprive her of the consideration due to an unresisting vessel under cruiser warfare.

The Marina carried a defensive gun, as did the Arabia. This fact alone, Germany contended, entitled her submarines to sink both vessels without warning, in addition to the commander's belief in each case that the vessel was a transport in the service of the British admiralty. The American Government was satisfied that neither vessel was engaged in transport service on the voyage in question. In the Arabia's case, 450 passengers were on board, including women and children, who were only saved because the Administration had already held that the gun's presence on a vessel did not deprive her of the right to proper warning before being sunk. Germany admitted liability for sinking the Columbian and agreed to pay for the value of the vessel and the contraband cargo she carried.

The Marina case stood out, in the view of the State Department, as a "clear-cut" violation of Germany's pledges to the United States. Her gun was not used, and no opportunity was afforded for using it. The "presumption" on the part of a German submarine commander that a vessel was a transport was a favorite defense of Germany's and disregarded the American ruling on armed merchantmen, which held that "the determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption, but upon conclusive evidence."

Berlin was looking for trouble. A period of complications in American-German relations was frankly predicted. The Administration was plainly concerned by the situation; but no decision to take action was forthcoming. Its hesitation appeared to be due to the apparent need for a further note to dispose of new interpretations Germany had ingeniously woven in her various excuses by way of evading the letter and spirit of the Sussex agreement. One view of her submarine "rights" which Germany insisted on upholding was that armed merchantmen were not legally immune from attack on sight.

Herr Zimmermann, the German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, defined anew his Government's attitude:

"As the armament of several British ships has been used for attack, and has therefore endangered the lives of crew and passengers, of course armed ships cannot be considered as peaceful trade boats."

The cases of the Marina and Arabia put the German pledges to a test. Neither vessel attempted to escape nor offered resistance, though armed with a solitary gun. The issue therefore resolved itself into these considerations:

First. Since the German submarine commanders have pleaded extenuating circumstances on which they based their presumption that the Marina and Arabia, were transports, and not passenger vessels, were these circumstances sufficient to have justified the commanders in mistaking the two steamers for transports?

Second. If there were such extenuating circumstances, were they such as to warrant the commanders in departing from the general rule laid down by the American Government in the Sussex note, calling forth the pledges given by Germany in May, 1916, in which it was guaranteed that "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance?"

Whatever intimation was made to Germany by the United States did not become public. By December, 1916, the whole question appeared to have been suddenly shelved by the peace proposals Germany hurled at the Allies in loud tones of victory, coupled with an invitation to the United States to interpose as a mediator. Peace, of course, would dispose of further friction with the United States. While the proposals were pending, moreover, American action on German violations of her submarine agreement was suspended. What was the use of a diplomatic rupture with Germany on the eve of peace? But Germany knew that her official "peace kite" was making an abortive flight. Peace she really did not expect, knowing it was not within reach; but she was anxious to preserve friendly relations with the United States, although daily flouting it in her conduct of the submarine war. Her peace move was therefore shown to have had a double edge. It postponed, but did not avert, a final crisis with the United States, and that, indeed, might well have been its initial aim in view of the foredoomed futility of its ostensible object. Certainly President Wilson espoused the peace proposal for the same reason; but, as shown in the following chapter, the efforts of both were in vain. The real climax was to come after all.



CHAPTER LIII

RUPTURE WITH GERMANY

The movement for peace was at its crest, and President Wilson was apparently sanguine that his efforts in furthering it were on the eve of bearing fruit, when Great Britain planned to extend her blockade of the German coast in the North Sea. She enlarged the dangerous area which hitherto only barred the entry of German naval forces south into the Straits of Dover and the English Channel by cutting off the German North Sea coast altogether, in order to prevent the egress and ingress of German sea raiders by the northward route and to curtail the chances of the kaiser's warships making successful forays on the English coast. The significance of this action was not seen until it became known that Great Britain had discovered that Germany, while seemingly occupied with peace, was preparing a warning to neutrals of her intention to establish a deep-sea blockade of the entire British and French coasts. By extending the mined area round the German coast Great Britain sought to counteract and anticipate the new German project, the aim of which was to starve the British Isles by a bitter and unrestrained submarine war on all ships. The British warning of the extended dangerous area came on January 27, 1917. Germany announced her new policy four days later, proclaiming that it was in retaliation of Great Britain's latest attempt to tighten her strangle hold on German food supplies. But there was overwhelming evidence—the German Chancellor himself provided it—that the German plan had been matured long in advance of Great Britain's course, and that the peace overtures had really been made by Germany in order that their certain rejection could be seized upon as a justification for the ruthless sea warfare projected.

The Wilson Administration, round whose horizon mirages of peace still appeared to linger, was not prepared for the blow when it came. The President could scarcely credit the news brought by a note from Germany on January 31, 1917, that she had withdrawn her pledges to the United States not to sink ships without warning. But the situation had to be faced that a crisis confronted the country in its relations with the German Empire.

Germany found occasion in her note of renunciation to link its purport with that of the President's address delivered to the Senate nine days previously. (See Part VI, Chapter LVIII, "Peace Without Victory.") In its exalted sentiments she gave a perfunctory and manifestly insincere acquiescence by way of prefacing familiar reproaches to the Allies for refusing to accept her peace overtures. In rejecting them, she said, the Allies had disclosed their real aims, which were to "dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria."

Germany was poignantly grieved by the continuance of the war, not solely because of fear of this supposititious dismemberment, but because "British tyranny mercilessly increases the sufferings of the world, indifferent to the laws of humanity, indifferent to the protests of the neutrals whom they severely harm, indifferent even to the silent longing for peace among England's own allies. Each day of the terrible struggle causes new destruction, new sufferings. Each day shortening the war will, on both sides, preserve the lives of thousands of brave soldiers and be a benefit to mankind."

Anything to end the war, was Germany's slogan. Because of the sufferings of the German people "a new situation" had been created which forced her to "new decisions." Because of the sufferings of other nations, and the Entente Powers' refusal to make peace at her bidding, she thus announced her resolve: "... The Imperial Government, in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people, is now compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal."

The Imperial Government furthermore hoped that the United States would "view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist on their part to prevent further misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life."



The "new situation" as presented to the United States was that within a barred zone Germany had drawn round the British and French coasts, extending from the Shetlands as far south as Cape Finisterre, and to the west some 700 miles into the Atlantic, and also in the Mediterranean, all sea traffic would be stopped on and after February 1, 1917, and that neutral vessels navigating the proscribed waters would do so at their own risk. The only exception made was a "safety lane" permitted for one American vessel a week with identifiable markings to sail to and from Falmouth through the Atlantic zone (the United States Government to guarantee that it did not carry contraband) and another safety lane admitting sea traffic through the Mediterranean to Athens. All other vessels would be sunk without regard to the pledges Germany made to the United States. Germany thus practically shut off American traffic with Europe in pursuance of her new sea warfare against her enemies.

The edict was extended to hospital ships on the charge that the Allies used them for the transportation of munitions and troops. The charge was denied by the British and French Governments; but frightfulness admitted of no truth nor acceptance of denials of German charges, obviously made deliberately to justify barbarities, and so hospital ships, with their medical and nursing staffs and wounded, were to be sunk whenever found by submarines.

The real attitude of Germany toward her withdrawn pledges to the United States was betrayed by the German Chancellor in addressing the Reichstag Committee on Ways and Means. He revealed that the pledges were merely a temporary expedient, made to fill up a gap until more submarines were available. It appeared that in March, May (when Germany surrendered to the American demands), and in September, 1916, the question of unrestricted warfare was not considered ripe for decision—that is, Germany was not ready to defy the United States. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg thus defined the situation:

"I have always proceeded from the standpoint of whether U-boat war would bring us nearer victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that was calculated to shorten the war constitutes the most humane policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and swift victory, I said then they must be employed. This moment has now arrived.... The moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake the enterprise."

What changes, he asked, had come into the situation? A firm basis for success had been established by a considerable increase in submarines; poor harvests confronted England, France, and Italy, who would find their difficulties unbearable by an unrestricted submarine war; France and Italy also lacked coal, and the submarines would increase its dearth; England lacked ore and timber, her supplies of which would be diminished by the same means; and all the Entente Powers were suffering from a shrinkage in cargo space due to the submarines. With the bright prospect of success afforded by the supposed plight of the Allied Powers, Germany, he indicated, was prepared to accept all the consequences that would flow from the unrestricted submarine warfare decided upon.

So was President Wilson. The German Chancellor made it clear that after Germany gave her solemn pledge on May 4, 1916, not to sink ships without warning, she had occupied the intervening months in feverish preparations to break it and to tear up the pledge like a scrap of paper and throw it to the winds. On the Chancellor's own words Germany had been convicted of a breach of faith.

The President considered the crisis for three days. There was no question of the United States tolerating Germany's disavowal of her unlawful blockade of American trade with the belligerent countries. The only questions to be decided were whether to warn Germany that a rupture would follow her first act hurtful to American life or property; to demand the withdrawal of her decree by an ultimatum; to wait until she committed some "overt act" before taking action; or whether to cease diplomatic relations without any parley at all.

The last-named course was determined upon. On February 3, 1917, President Wilson addressed the two Houses of Congress in joint session, informing them that the United States had severed its relations with Germany. The President reviewed the circumstances which led to the giving of the German undertaking to the United States following the sinking of the Sussex on March 24, 1916, without warning. He reminded Congress that on the April 18 following the Administration informed the German Government that unless it "should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." The German Government consented to do so with reservations. These the United States brushed aside, and committed Germany to the plain pledge that no ships should be sunk without warning unless they attempted to escape or offered resistance. In view of Germany's new declaration deliberately withdrawing her solemn assurance without prior intimation, the President told Congress that the Government had no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to hand Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, his passports, and to recall Ambassador Gerard from Berlin. But the President refused to believe that the German authorities intended to carry out the decree.

"I cannot bring myself to believe," he said, "that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the willful prosecution of the ruthless naval program they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now."

But in the event of such overt acts the duty of the United States was clear:

"If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded, if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in a heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understanding of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the same course."

Should Germany compel the United States to declare war, the President repudiated that any aggressive attitude would dictate such a course:

"We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people, and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it, and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people which I have sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant that we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!"

War was apparently inevitable. Submarine warfare on Atlantic shipping made certain some "overt act" offensive to the United States. The German attitude was that the new decree would be remorselessly acted upon; it could not and would not be modified; it was absolute and final; and the only security for American shipping was to avoid the prohibited zone by abandoning its trade with Europe.

Germany frankly discounted the effect of the entrance of the United States, as a belligerent opposed to her. Measuring her estimated gains from the pursuit of an unbridled sea war, she decided that they would more than outweigh the disadvantage of American hostility.



CHAPTER LIV

NOTHING SETTLED

With the Allied Powers the American Government's relations continued to be friendly under certain diplomatic difficulties, due to a group of unadjusted issues relating to the blockade of German ports, mail seizures, and the blacklist. Popularly, overwhelming pro-Ally sympathies and an enormous trade due directly to the war more than offset commercial irritation arising from Allied infractions of American rights; but while they continued they intruded as obstacles to the preservation of official amity. If the Administration was content to enter its protests and then let matters rest, its inaction merely meant that the Allies' sins were magnanimously tolerated, not condoned. The Allies, on the other hand, maintained that they were not sinning at all, that they were only doing what the United States itself had done when engaged in war and would do again if it ever became a belligerent. Diplomacy failed to reconcile the differences, and so nothing was settled.

Great Britain, as the chief offender in trampling roughshod over American privileges of trade in war time, added to her manifold transgressions, in August, 1916, by placing further curbs on neutral trade with the Netherland Overseas Trust. Under a scheme to ration the neutral countries of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland—that is, restricting their imports to their estimated domestic needs—further licenses granted to British exporters to trade with these countries were discontinued. Here was a check on British exports for fear of the surplus reaching Germany through neutral channels. A check on American exports followed by Great Britain forbidding the Overseas Trust to accept further consignments of certain commodities from the United States for Holland, and by her refusal to grant letters of assurance safeguarding the delivery of American shipments destined for the three other countries. By these devices Great Britain controlled supplies to these countries at the source. The effect was that certain American consignments predestined for Holland were stopped altogether, while the shipping companies trading between the United States and Scandinavia could not take cargoes without British assurances of safe discharge at their ports of destination. The British official view was that excessive exports from Great Britain to these countries could not very well be forbidden while permitting them from the United States and other neutral sources. The veto had to be general to be effective.

One measure passed by Congress, providing for the creation of a Shipping Board, empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid clearance to any vessel whose owner or agents refused to accept consignments offered for transport abroad by an American citizen for reasons other than lack of space or inadaptability of the vessel to carry the cargo offered. Another measure, the Omnibus Revenue Law, made similar provisions in a more drastic form, aiming specifically at retaliation for the Allies' blacklist of German-American firms, and the various blockades and embargoes in operation against American products. It provided that the owners or agents of vessels affiliated with a belligerent engaged in a war to which the United States was not a party must neither discriminate in favor of nor against any citizen, product, or locality of the United States in accepting or refusing consignments on pain of clearance being refused.

The same penalty attached to vessels of any belligerent which denied to American ships and citizens the same privileges of commerce which the offending belligerent accorded to its own vessels or to those of any other nationality. An alternative penalty, to be exercised by the President in his discretion, denied to such offending belligerents' ships and citizens the privileges of commerce with the United States until reciprocal liberty of trade was restored. A third provision aimed at penalizing a belligerent who prohibited the importation at its ports of any American product, not injurious to health or morals, by barring importation into the United States from the offending country similar or other articles.

The prevailing view was that the exercise of such reprisals by the President would virtually mean nonintercourse in trade and involve serious international complications. An isolated English impression, only of moment because it placed the aspects of the legislation in a nutshell, recognized that while it might be merely a "flourish" having a special virtue on the eve of a presidential election, the reprisals were aimed at the Allies, primarily against Great Britain, and were popular in the United States as a commercial club that could be wielded instead of having recourse to the threats that brought Germany to respect American demands. But the British official attitude as taken by Lord Robert Cecil was unmoved. "It is not likely," he said, "that Great Britain will change her blacklist policy at the request of the United States. The idea that Great Britain is adopting a deliberate policy with which to injure American trade is the purest moonshine, since outside of our own dominions our trade with the United States is the most important. Of course, natural trade rivalry exists, but no responsible statesman in this country would dream of proposing an insane measure designed to injure American commerce."

The blacklist was the last straw which provoked the retaliatory legislation. But, alone of the seemingly unadjustable disputes pending between the United States and Great Britain, it was on the blacklist issue that the latter had an unanswerable defense. The British stand left official Washington's complaint bereft of foundation under international law. The only ground on which the American protest could be justified was by contending that the blacklist violated international comity. In other words, if it was not illegal—there was no doubt of its legality—it was an incivility.

There had been the usual diplomatic exchange between the two governments on the subject prefacing a lengthy communication sent by Lord Grey—the new title of the British Foreign Secretary upon his promotion to the peerage—on October 10, 1916. Therein he repeated that the blacklist was promulgated in pursuance of the Trading with the Enemy Act (a war measure explained in a previous volume), and was a piece of purely municipal legislation. Moreover, the American Government was assured, "the Government of Great Britain neither purport nor claim to impose any disabilities or penalties upon neutral individuals or upon neutral commerce. The measure is simply one which enjoins those who owe allegiance to Great Britain to cease having trade relations with persons who are found to be assisting or rendering service to the enemy."

Nor were the steps taken confined to the United States:

"With the full consent of the Allied Governments, firms even in Allied countries are being placed on the statutory list, if they are firms with whom it is necessary to prevent British subjects from trading. These considerations may, perhaps, serve to convince the Government of the United States that the measures now being taken are not directed against neutral trade in general. Still less are they directed against American trade in particular; they are part of the general belligerent operations designed to weaken the enemy's resources."

The burden of the note was that Great Britain maintained the right, which in the existing crisis she also deemed a duty, to withhold British facilities from those who conducted their trade for the benefit of her foes. This right Lord Grey characterized as so obvious that he could not believe the United States Government seriously contested the inherent privilege of a sovereign state to exercise it except under a misconception of the scope and intent of the measures taken. It would appear that the American Government gracefully surrendered, by default, its earlier contention that Great Britain had no right to forbid her subjects from trading with American firms having Teutonic affiliations.

The American objections to detentions and censorship of mails by the Allied Powers, which were bent on preventing German sympathizers from using the postal service to neutral countries as a channel for transmitting money, correspondence, and goods for the Central Powers, brought a further communication from Lord Grey on October 12, 1916. It threw no new light on the subject, the bearings of which were dealt with in a previous volume. The American contentions, so far from being conceded, were themselves attacked in an argument intended to refute them. The Allied governments were only prepared to give assurances that they would continue to lessen the annoyances caused by the practice and were "ready to settle responsibility therefor in accordance with the principles of law and justice, which it never was and is not now their intention to evade."

Lord Grey thus defined the Allied position:

"The practice of the Germans to make improper use of neutral mails and forward hostile correspondence, even official communications, dealing with hostilities, under cover of apparently unoffensive envelopes, mailed by neutrals to neutrals, made it necessary to examine mails from or to countries neighboring Germany under the same conditions as mails from or to Germany itself; but as a matter of course mails from neutrals to neutrals that do not cover such improper uses have nothing to fear."

Germany's treatment of mails, Lord Grey pointed out, went much further than mere interception:

"As regards the proceedings of the German Empire toward postal correspondence during the present war, the Allied governments have informed the Government of the United States of the names of some of the mail steamers whose mail bags have been not examined, to be sure, but purely and simply destroyed at sea by the German naval authorities. Other names could very easily be added. The very recent case of the mail steamer Hudikswall (Swedish), carrying 670 mail bags, may be cited."

The discussion was as profitless as that arising from the blacklist. As to the blockade issue, involving interference with American commerce on the high seas, both sides appeared to epistolarily bolt, and the question remained in suspended animation. The blacklist and mail disputes acquired a similar status.



PART VII—WESTERN FRONT



CHAPTER LV

THE GERMAN RETREAT ON THE ANCRE

In January, 1917, the British forces in France captured 1,228 Germans, of whom twenty-seven were officers. The first month of the new year passed unmarked by any striking gains for either side. The Allies had maintained and strengthened their old positions, made slight advances at some points, and continued to harass and destroy the enemy in trench raids, artillery duels, and in battles in the air.

Some record of the principal minor operations in France and Belgium at this time is necessary, as every offensive movement had a set purpose and was a part of the Germans' or Allies' plans.

On February 1, 1917, in the neighborhood of Wytschaete, parties of Germans dressed in white attempted two surprise assaults on British trenches, but were rolled back with severe losses before they could get within striking distance. In these encounters the British took prisoners without losing a man or incurring the slightest casualty.

On the same date the French were engaged in lively artillery actions at Hartmannsweilerkopf and east of Metzeral. Around Altkirch and to the east of Rheims they were successful in spirited encounters with enemy patrols. In Lorraine during the night the Germans attacked trenches south of Leintrey, but were shattered by French fire. In the sector of St. Georges in Belgium a surprise attack also failed.

On the British front in the course of the same night a dashing raid was carried out against German trenches northeast of Guedecourt (Somme sector) in which two officers and fifty-six men were taken prisoners.

The British carried out another successful operation on February 3, 1917, north of the Ancre, pushing forward their line east of Beaucourt some 500 yards on a front of about three-quarters of a mile. Over a hundred prisoners and three machine guns were captured. On the same night southeast of Souchez German trenches were penetrated and twenty-one prisoners and some guns were taken. Several dugouts containing Germans were bombed and an enemy shaft was destroyed.

While the British continued to make slight gains and to harass the enemy, the French were engaged in minor operations no less successful. A surprise attack in the region of Moulin-sous-Toutvent resulted in the capture of a dozen prisoners. A similar operation in the region of Tracy-le-Val between the Oise and the Aisne was also a victory for French arms. The Germans fought with determination, but were unable to make any headway against the indomitable French spirit. The number of casualties incurred by the Germans was not known, but the French took twenty-two prisoners.

During February 4, 1917, the Germans displayed intense activity, as if determined to retrieve their frequent failures since the month opened.

Three hostile raids were attempted by strong German forces during the night and early morning of February 4-5, 1917, on the British lines on the Somme front. The Germans in each attack were thrown back in disorder, leaving a number of prisoners in British hands.

Northeast of Guedecourt during the night of the 4th the British occupied 500 yards of a German trench, capturing a machine gun and seventy prisoners, including two officers.

In the space of twenty-four hours (February 4-5, 1917) the Germans made four successful counterattacks against the new British front east of Beaucourt. The British continued the work of consolidating their new positions undisturbed by the frantic efforts of the Germans to oust them, and in raids and counterattacks captured forty prisoners, including one officer.

British airmen registered a number of victories during February 4, 1917. Three German machines were destroyed and six others driven to earth seriously damaged. Only one British machine was counted missing.

During the evening on this date the French south of the Somme defeated a German raid near Barleux, inflicting heavy casualties and taking some prisoners. Incursions into German lines in Alsace and the Chambrette and Pont-a-Mousson sectors were carried out with satisfactory results. They captured a considerable amount of war material and brought back one officer and a number of prisoners.

The British on the Somme front were now determined to push on to the capture of Grandcourt. On February 6, 1917, they occupied 1,000 yards of German trench in the neighborhood of that place. Artillery activity on both sides of the Somme front and in the Ypres sector continued during the day and night. The British brought down ten German machines in aerial battles and lost two of their own flyers.

On February 5-6, 1917, the French continued to raid German lines with good results. In Alsace near Anspach they penetrated three German positions, wrecking enemy works and bombing shelters and returned to their own lines without losing a man.

The continuous pressure which the British brought to bear on both sides of the Ancre River forced the Germans to evacuate Grandcourt on February 6, 1917. The capture of the village was regarded as important, marking a notable advance for the British on the forts of Miraumont and Grandcourt, which covered Bapaume from the west.

In Lorraine on this date the Germans succeeded in piercing a salient in the French lines, but were driven out by a spirited counterattack. Three German planes were brought down during the night, Lieutenant Huerteaux scoring his twentieth victory.



The British followed up their success in capturing Grandcourt by advances on both sides of the Ancre. On the morning of February 8, 1917, they drove the Germans out of a position of importance on the highest point of Sailly-Saillisel hill, gaining all their objectives and capturing seventy-eight prisoners, of whom two were officers. In the operations along the Ancre a German officer and eighty-two men were made prisoner.

South of Dixmude a strong German raiding party attempted to attack a Belgian outpost. They were received by such a hurricane of infantry and machine-gun fire that the field was strewn with dead, and few of the raiders succeeded in making their escape.

During February 9-10, 1917, the French and British continued to register minor successes in daring raids, bombarding enemy positions and capturing in one way or another several hundred prisoners.

An advance worthy of special note was made by British troops in the night of February 10, 1917, when they captured a strong system of German trenches on a front of more than three-quarters of a mile in the Somme line. This was on the southern front just north of Serre Hill. The German prisoners taken during this operation numbered 215, including some officers.

On the same date French raiders penetrated German trenches in the Forest of Apremont, destroying defenses and capturing prisoners. In the neighborhood of Verdun a German plane was shot down, and in other sectors French aviators during fiercely fought combats in the air brought down in flames two other machines.

North of the Ancre the British continued to make progress, occupying without difficulty a German trench some 600 yards long and taking a good number of prisoners. The Germans tried to force the British out of their recently won positions south of Serre Hill, but, caught in artillery barrage and machine-gun fire, were driven off with serious losses. On this date also the French carried out successful raids during the night on the Verdun front in the neighborhood of the famous Hill 304, and another in the Argonne which resulted in the destruction of enemy works and the capture of a number of prisoners.

The small gains made by the French and British during the first weeks of February, 1917, were not especially important in themselves, but each slight advance brought the Allies nearer to important German positions. The daily trench raids served to harass and bewilder the common enemy, and while the number of prisoners taken were few in each instance, in the aggregate the number was impressive. The British and French were not disposed to squander lives recklessly in these minor exploits, and it was only when they were within striking distance of an important objective that they operated with strong forces and the most powerful guns at their command.

The Canadians, who always displayed a special liking for trench raids, and were uncommonly successful in such operations, engaged in one on the morning of February 13, 1917, which merits description in some detail. The attack was made on a 600-yard front between Souchez and Givenchy. The Germans under the shell storm that shattered their trenches had retreated to the depths of their dugouts, and while it lasted few ventured forth to oppose the raiders. The British bombardment had been so effective that the German machine-gun emplacements must have been destroyed or were buried under debris, for only a few guns spoke out as the Canadians "went over." The Germans in the dugouts could not be coaxed out. Explosives thrown into their hiding places must have produced appalling consequences. The sturdy Canadians did not relish this kind of work, but there was no alternative. For an hour they searched the mine shafts and galleries around Givenchy and destroyed them. Some Germans in the depths were killed before they could explode certain mines they had prepared under British positions. About fifty prisoners of the Eleventh Bavarian Regiment were captured who had fought in Russia, at Verdun, and on the Somme.

Five hours later the same Canadian troops, unwearied by this strenuous experience, were carrying out another raid farther south, where they obtained good results.

On this date, February 14, 1917, the steady pressure maintained by the British forced the Germans to abandon advanced positions between Serre and the Somme and to fall back on their main fighting position.



On the following day, February 15, 1917, the troops of the German Crown Prince achieved a success of some importance. After intense artillery fire they stormed four French lines south of Ripont in the Champagne, on a front of about a mile and a half, gaining ground to a depth of half a mile. They captured twenty-one officers and 837 men of other ranks, and a considerable quantity of war material. On the same date the British carried out a successful raid southeast of Souchez, penetrating enemy positions and taking prisoners. In air combats in different sectors British airmen disposed of nine German machines and lost four of their own.

The British made important gains on both banks of the Ancre when in the morning of February 17, 1917, they attacked German positions opposite the villages of Miraumont and Petit Miraumont on a front of about two miles. North of the river a commanding German position on high ground north of Baillescourt Farm was carried on a front of about 1,000 yards. In these operations along the Ancre the British captured 761 prisoners, including twelve officers.

During the preliminary bombardment of the German positions a British artillery sergeant slipped out of the trenches with a telephone, and, establishing himself in a shell hole in a forward position, directed the gunfire which shattered the German barbed-wire defenses.

The Germans made a courageous attempt to oust the British from their newly won positions on the spur above Baillescourt Farm in the morning of February 18, 1917. Their infantry, advancing in three waves with bodies of supporting troops in the rear, were swept by the concentrated fire of the British artillery. The storm of fire shattered the attack and the German forces were rolled back in confusion. At no point were they able to reach the British lines.

During the night the British carried out four successful raids on German positions southwest and northwest of Arras, south of Fauquissart and north of Ypres, during which nineteen prisoners were taken and great damage was wrought to hostile defenses.

The British continued their successful minor operations during the succeeding days. On February 20, 1917, New Zealand troops penetrated German lines south of Armentieres to a depth of 300 yards, where they wrecked dugouts and trench works. The intense preliminary bombardment which preceded the raid had proved so destructive that the New Zealanders found the German support lines filled with dead. The raid resulted in the capture of forty-four prisoners. In an attack southeast of Ypres the British, advancing on a front of 500 yards, reached the German support line after desperate fighting. They destroyed dugouts and mine shafts and took 114 prisoners, including an officer and a number of machine guns.

The steady pressure of the British on the German positions along the Ancre since the beginning of the month brought results that surpassed Field Marshal Haig's most sanguine expectations. The Germans were forced to abandon their front on the Ancre, escaping to a new line of defenses along the Bapaume ridge. Their retreat covered about three miles and the British were able to occupy a number of German strongholds which they expected to win by hard fighting. Serre, the two Miraumonts, and Pys were occupied without a struggle. The Germans succeeded in saving their guns during the retirement, but were forced to destroy ammunition dumps and military stores. In the night of February 24, 1917, British troops, advancing south of Irles and toward Warlencourt, occupied the famous butte which had been the scene of intense fighting in the previous month.

The foggy, misty weather which prevailed at the time in this region had greatly facilitated the German retreat, as the keen eyes of the British airmen were unable to study their movements. It was surmised that some important operation was under way owing to the reckless expenditure of shells which had been going on for some days. The Germans were shooting up stores of ammunition which they found impossible to take with them in their retreat.

During February 25-26, 1917, the British continued to harass the retiring Germans, pressing forward over the newly yielded ground and forcing back the rear guards of the enemy. In these actions the Germans depended chiefly on their heavy guns mounted on railway trucks, which in case of necessity could be rushed away at the last moment.

Early in the morning of February 26, 1917, heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Bapaume, where the Germans were engaged in destructive work to prevent the British entry. Along their lines of retreat large trees had been felled across the roads, forming lofty barriers, on the other side of which great mine craters had been opened up.

Despite desperate rear-guard actions, and the strenuous efforts made by the Germans to hinder the advance, the British continued to press forward. The village of Ligny about a mile and a half west of Bapaume was occupied, as well as the village of Le Barque. North of the Ancre the western and northern defenses of Puisieux were wrested from the Germans.

On February 27, 1917, the British pushed forward all along the eleven-mile line stretching from south of Gommecourt to west of Le Transloy. The British objective at this time was a crest overlooking the high ground running between Achiet-le-Petit and Bapaume. At every stage of the British advance fresh evidences were found of the German destructive methods before retiring. The carefully built dugouts which they had so long occupied had been reduced by explosives to heaps of rubbish.

The Germans had left certain bodies of men behind with machine guns to hinder the British pursuit. As they had carefully chosen their positions they were enabled to work considerable damage. The British had encounters with some of these outposts on the 27th in the neighborhood of Box and Rossignol Woods. The Germans, having found that their machine-gun fire did not restrain the advance, tried a shrapnel barrage which proved more effective, but only delayed the pursuers for a short time.

The British troops were so elated over the fact that the Germans were retreating that they made light of the ingenious obstacles thrown in their way. The great advance continued, the British occupying Rossignol Wood, Rossignol Trench, and considerable ground to the northeast of Puisieux. The latter place was partly occupied by Germans who fought as if determined that the British should pay a high cost for possession of the village. The British had worked their way into a corner of the line, and other parties were engaged in driving out the defenders, who fought from house to house.

Southeast of the village the British line was being pushed out above Miraumont and Beauregard Dovecote. The Germans in the Gommecourt salient shelled Miraumont and bombarded the neighborhood with high explosives in reckless fashion as if eager to consume their supplies.

During the night of February 27, 1917, the German troops abandoned Gommecourt and the British took possession. Here on July 1, 1916, the Londoners had fought with desperate valor in assaulting an almost impregnable position, and in the storm of massed gunfire were threatened with annihilation.

To the northeast of Gommecourt the British advanced their line more than half a mile, and also captured the villages of Thilloy and Puisieux-le-Mont. A successful raid carried out in the night by the British in the neighborhood of Clery resulted in the capture of twenty-two prisoners.

There was sharp fighting among the ruins of Puisieux, where the Germans had to be hunted from their hiding places. After this clearing-out process the British line now ran well beyond Gommecourt on the left and down to Irles on the right. The Germans concentrated heavy shell fire on Irles, and showered high explosives on Miraumont and upon other places on the front from which they had withdrawn. The British were now less than a mile from Bapaume, in the rear of which the German guns on railway mountings were firing incessantly on British positions.

On March 1, 1917, British headquarters in France, summarizing the operations during February, stated that the British had captured 2,133 German prisoners and occupied either by capture or the withdrawal of the Germans eleven villages. Some of the positions captured were of the highest importance, to which the Germans had clung as long as they could with desperate energy, and from which the British had tried vainly to conquer. The Germans had retired on the Ancre on a front of twelve miles to a depth of two miles.

The first stage of the German retirement plan was completed on March 2, 1917, when they made a definite stand, their line now running from Essarts through Achiet-le-Petit to about 1,000 yards southeast of Bapaume. The Loupart Wood occupying high ground along this line had been transformed into a strong field fortress after German methods, and here it was evident every preparation was made for a stiff defense.

The British had an enormous task before them in building roads through the recovered ground. The Germans had carefully timed their retirement when the ground was hard, but now owing to a week's thaw most of the Somme and Ancre area was transformed into liquid mud. In addition to the difficulties presented by the terrain, the British patrols in the evacuated territory constantly encountered isolated bodies of German defensive troops who, obedient to their instructions, fought bravely to hold the positions they had been assigned to. Everything that cunning could devise was resorted to to delay the British advance. An Australian patrol discovered in one place a chain stretched across a ravine which was connected with a mine at either end.



CHAPTER LVI

THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES—FRENCH RECOVER 120 TOWNS

The British troops continued to advance in the Ancre area in spite of the difficult terrain and the desperate defense of the Germans who had been left behind in the retirement and who occupied positions where they might work the greatest damage to the pursuers. East of Gommecourt on March 3, 1917, the British gained two-thirds of a mile along a two-mile front. They were also successful east of Bouchavesnes, where they captured the enemy's front and support lines on a front of two-thirds of a mile. In these operations they captured 190 prisoners and five machine guns.

On March 4, 1917, the Germans made a violent attack on the Verdun front which was repulsed by the French. North of Caurieres Wood the Germans gained a footing in French advanced positions. They were driven out on the following day in a spirited counterattack, leaving many of their comrades dead on the field.

Thaws, fogs, and snows continued to hamper military operations in all sectors of the fighting area. On March 8, 1917, the French won a decided victory over the Germans in Champagne. Notwithstanding the snow, which rendered any military movement difficult, French troops operating between Butte du Mesnil and Maisons de Champagne carried German positions on a front of 1,680 yards to a depth varying from 650 to 865 yards. As the French crossed no-man's-land, preceded by a complete curtain of fire which raised and dropped mechanically, the German artillery was everywhere active, but their massed fire could not check the attackers' steady advance. As the French reached the first lines of German trenches the occupants offered little resistance, but came running out with uplifted hands in token of surrender. At some points, however, the Germans had converted their positions into regular fortresses, and here there was desperate fighting with grenade and rifle. The French cleared out these strongholds and made their way slowly up the slopes toward the objective. During the fight French aeroplanes circled overhead watching the movements of the Germans behind the points attacked. Not a German machine was visible, but some were hidden among the snow clouds, for the rattle of machine guns, heard at times, denoted their presence above the battle field.