CHAPTER XL

MONASTIR FALLS

A glance at the map will show that Monastir was now practically in the hands of the Allies, that it would be impossible for the Germans and Bulgarians to hold it any longer. As has already been explained, the plain or valley near whose head it stands is a broad, level region which here penetrates the mountainous interior of this portion of the Balkan Peninsula. To the eastward it is bounded by low, rolling foothills, which gradually rise into high, rocky mountains or heights. On the west there are no foothills: the mountains rise abruptly, stretching south almost to Kastoria. The railroad, after leaving Banitza, in the foothills, swings around into the plain, but under the shadows of the high ridges on the western side. Up toward the head of the plain these mountains curve slightly inward. About ten or fifteen miles below the point where they meet the rolling foothills, thus forming the head of the valley, the city of Monastir lies, some of its outlying suburbs being plastered up against the base of the mountains.

An army occupying the heights above would absolutely dominate the city; its artillery could pound it to a wreck within a few hours.

It was along these heights on the western edge of the plain that the French and the Serbians had advanced, driving the Bulgarians and Germans before them. Just at Monastir these heights are especially high and jagged, and the Bulgarians and Germans might very well have held out here against the enemy for a much longer period. But the foothills over on the eastern side of the plain had been passing into the hands of the Serbians operating in that region. These forces were now passing to the northward of the city, though the marshy plain still intervened. They were advancing toward the head of the valley. Should they succeed in reaching this point, where the highway to Prilep passed, they would cut off the retreat of the Bulgarians.

But there was still another road by which the Bulgarians might have retreated: the highway leading through Resna to the upper part of Lake Ochrida. Had this been open they might have risked the blocking of the Prilep road. But, as was later indicated by the reports, the Italians had by this time advanced above Koritza and were not only in touch with the Russians operating around Kastoria and the lower part of the Prespa and Ochrida lakes, but they were skirting the western shore of Ochrida and threatening to advance on Monastir by this very highway. Thus the Bulgarians were threatened from two directions—by the Italians, who were turning their right flank, and by the Serbians, who had broken through their lines in the foothills east of the Monastir plain. There is probably no doubt that they could have held off all frontal attacks from the heights above Monastir. Thus they were squeezed, rather than driven, out of the city.

On the night of the 18th the German and Bulgarian forces in the city quietly withdrew and retreated along the Prilep road to the head of the valley. At 8 o'clock the following morning, on November 19, 1916, exactly a year since the Serbians had been driven out of the city by the Austrians and Bulgarians, the Allied forces marched into the Macedonian city, and an hour later the flag of King Peter once more floated above the roofs. Apparently the Bulgarian retreat had been too long delayed, for before reaching the head of the valley they were cut off by the Serbians and only escaped after heavy losses, both in killed, wounded, prisoners, and materials. At the same time the Serbians effectually closed the road, taking several villages and all the dominating heights.

From a military point of view the fall of Monastir was not of vast importance; it was of about the same significance from a tactical aspect as Bucharest. But from a moral and political aspect it was of immense importance. Though only populated by some 50,000 of mixed Turks, Vlachs (Rumanians), Greeks, a few Serbs and Bulgarians, the latter predominating, it was the center of the most Bulgarian portion of Macedonia. Throughout the outlying districts down to Kastoria, over to Albania, and up to Uskub, the population is purely and aggressively Bulgar. Here the simple peasants were persecuted by the Greek Church for fifteen years preceding the First Balkan War and by the Serbians afterward; by the one on account of their religion, by the other on account of their nationality. Here, too was the center of the revolutionary movement against the Turks, and here the people rose time and time again in open insurrection, only to be quenched by fire and blood. Nowhere in the Balkan Peninsula has there been so much oppression and bloodshed on account of nationality. For these reasons Monastir has a deep sentimental significance to every Bulgarian. No part of Macedonia means so much to him. Its possession by the Serbians after the Balkan Wars did more, probably, to reconcile the country to King Ferdinand's otherwise hateful pro-German policy than anything else. As is now well known, Ferdinand stipulated that this city should not only be taken from the Serbians, but that it should belong to Bulgaria, before he entered the war on the side of the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise it is quite likely that the Teutons would not have considered it worth while to advance so far south. Its recapture by the Serbians and their allies must, therefore, have had a corresponding depressing effect in Bulgaria.

On the day following the evacuation of Monastir the Italians appear for the first time in the reports of the fighting in this region. They had obviously come in contact with the Bulgarians on their extreme right and were pressing them back, thus forcing the whole line to retire. The French, too, made some advance along the eastern shore of Lake Prespa, while the Serbians took five villages in the foothills at the head of the plain. The main forces of the Bulgarians and Germans were making their stand about twelve miles north of the city, well up in the hills and crossing the Prilep highway.

For some days following bad weather again settled down over the Monastir section of the Macedonian front, and though it did not stop the fighting, it rendered further progress on the part of the Allies very difficult. But in spite of the brilliant victories announced by the dispatches from Berlin and Sofia, these very reports indicated, by the changing localities of the skirmishes that the Germans and Bulgarians were still being pressed back. By the end of the month the Serbians northeast of Monastir had advanced as far as Grunishte. In the northwest the Italians were fighting in the mountains about Tcervena Stana. Reporting on the last day of the month, Berlin announces that "this was the day of hardest fighting." The Germans and the Bulgarians had now reached their next line of defense and were making desperate efforts to hold it.

Meanwhile, over on the right of the Allied front, between Doiran and the Vardar, violent fighting had been going on during the past few weeks, and though the Allies seemed to make some slight progress here and there, none of these gains were of a significant nature. Here the Bulgarians seemed to be holding their own completely. Possibly it was not Sarrail's object to attempt any real advance over in this section; merely to keep the enemy engaged there and prevent his rendering too much aid to the harried Bulgarian right wing. His main offensive, if he really had contemplated a real advance, had evidently been planned for the Monastir route into Serbia. That all the Slavic troops, the Russians and Serbians, were placed over in this section gives, besides, some little color to this supposition.



CHAPTER XLI

GREEK FIGHTS GREEK

In Greece the same old situation continued. In the beginning of the month there had come the first clash between the volunteer soldiers of the Provisional Government and the troops of the king. The Greek troops at Larissa had not yet had time to remove to southern Greece, in accordance with the demands of the Allies, when on November 2, 1916, a body of volunteers of the Provisional Government marched overland to Katerina, a town twenty-five miles northeast of Larissa, where a garrison of royalist troops was stationed. Whether the insurgents really attacked the garrison, or whether the royalist force withdrew peacefully, was not made clear, but the fact was that the volunteers entered the town and took possession. Following this incident, it was stated from Athens on the 12th that King Constantine had given his permission that any of his officers in either the army or navy might join the forces of the Provisional Government, provided they first resigned from the regular establishment. On this date Germany entered her official protest against Greece handing over her ships and much war material to the French admiral. In connection with this report it was stated that Germany herself, on taking the forts and towns in eastern Macedonia, had seized 350 cannon, 60,000 rifles and $20,000,000 worth of ammunition. In the light of these facts, naturally Germany's protest was not taken very seriously. Indeed, it seems only to have suggested to the Allies that they complete what Germany had so well begun, for on the 18th Admiral Fournier presented a demand to the Greek Government that it surrender all arms, munitions, and artillery of the Greek army, with the exception of some 50,000 rifles. The reason given was that the equilibrium had been disturbed by Germany's seizure of so much war material. This demand the Greek Government refused to concede five days later. Admiral Fournier thereupon declared that the Greek Government had until December 1, 1916, in which to make its decision.

On the 26th the Provisional Government, through President Venizelos, formally declared war against Germany and Bulgaria. On this same date the Allied representatives protested to the Greek Government against the continued persecution of the adherents of the Provisional Government, and warned it that these must stop. At the same time several prominent Venizelists in Athens were advised that they would be fully protected, among them the mayor of the city.

On December 1, 1916, when the ultimatum regarding the surrender of the arms and ammunition of the Greek forces expired, a crisis was again precipitated. The day before a transport with French troops appeared in Piraeus Harbor and preparations were made to land them. At the same time the Greek Government took control of the telegraphs and the post office, expelling the French officers in charge. During the day Admiral du Fournier notified the Greek Government that the first installment of war material must be delivered that day. The reply was a definite refusal. Thereupon troops and marines were landed from the transport and ships at Piraeus. Again large mobs assembled in the streets, and on the Allied troops marching into Athens a number of the demonstrators fired on them with revolvers. It was even reported that royalist troops took part in these disorders and made organized attacks on the French troops. Three Greek officers and twenty-six soldiers were reported killed, while the Allies lost two officers and forty-five marines. Apparently the Venizelists also took part in the rioting and the street fighting against the royalists, for General Corakas, head of the recruiting bureau for the Provisional Government in Athens, was arrested on a charge of inciting guerrilla warfare in Athens and using his room in the Hotel Majestic as a point from which to fire upon Greek soldiers. Mayor Benakas of Athens, a sympathizer of the Provisional Government, was also removed from office.

On the following day, the disorders still continuing, the Entente Powers declared an embargo on all Greek shipping in their ports.



CHAPTER XLII

FIGHTING IN THE STREETS OF ATHENS

On December 4, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil, War Trade Minister, said in the British House of Commons that the situation was more serious than it had ever been before. Despite assurances from the Greek king that no disturbances would be permitted, a "most treacherous and unprovoked attack was made on the Allies' detachments landed by the French admiral on Friday." The British Government, Lord Cecil continued, considered the responsibility of the king and Greek Government to be deeply involved in this matter and Great Britain was considering, in conjunction with her Allies, immediate steps to secure a radical solution of the situation which had arisen. During these troubles the Greek ministers at Paris and London and the consuls at London and Manchester resigned, stating that they could no longer identify themselves with the present Government of Greece.

By the following day the Allied forces had been compelled to withdraw under the protection of their ships at Piraeus. Meanwhile, it was said, the Greeks were intrenching on all the heights around the city. All the citizens of the Allied nations had left the city and had taken refuge in Piraeus. The diplomatic representatives of the United States, Holland, and Spain entered a protest against the treatment being accorded the Liberals. To this the Greek Government replied as follows:

"The Royal Government from the first day had in view only the reestablishment and maintenance of order in the trouble on Friday and Saturday caused by revolutionary elements. This was done completely with as little damage as possible.

"If, contrary to the orders given, there was some excess of tension and indignation on the part of the population and the troops, who saw in a movement so tragic for the fatherland agitators taking advantage of the unhappy events of the day to take up arms against the country and try to overthrow the established government, this must be taken into consideration. This exasperation was particularly aroused by the bombardment of the Royal Palace and the neighborhood thereof, in this, an open city, at the very moment when, an armistice having been concluded, it was hoped that peace would finally reign. Nevertheless, the Royal Government is decided to punish every person guilty of committing illegal acts and exceeding instructions, and a severe investigation will be begun to this end so soon as acts of this nature are brought to the attention of the Royal Government. In this connection the Foreign Minister considers it his duty to recall to your attention that by his note of November 28 he warned the neutral powers of the tragic position in which the Greek nation was placed as a result of measures taken against Greece and of the consequences which the French admiral's insistence on obtaining Greek war material might well have."

A further explanation of the Greek point of view, with special reference to the street fighting in which the Allied troops were engaged, was contained in a note sent to the United States Government, on December 9, 1916. This communication was, in part, as follows:

"Please bring to the knowledge of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Royal Government, with two letters and several oral declarations, had informed the French admiral of the impossibility of delivering the war material they were summoned to give away. Despite these warnings the admiral decided to land a certain number of detachments which in several columns proceeded from Piraeus to the capital, which was under military control. The detachments occupied some of the outskirts and repulsed the royal army, which only at that moment decided to defend themselves without any orders. After the morning skirmishes between the Allied detachments and our troops, a truce was decided upon, at the request of the admiral. Despite the armistice, however, and after firing had ceased, the Allied warships bombarded several parts of the city and fired not less than thirty-eight shells, seven of which were directed against the Royal Palace. There can, under these conditions, be no question of treachery or of an unprovoked attack."

After the fighting and rioting had continued for some forty-eight hours, quiet and order seem to have been reestablished in Athens. Then followed a period of secret conferences between members of the Greek Government, the king and the representatives of the Entente Powers, the details of which were not made public. On December 16, 1916, it was announced from Paris that Greece had accepted unreservedly the conditions of the Allies. Regarding the disorders of the first few days of the month, the Greek Government declared its desire to give every legitimate satisfaction and proposed arbitration. A hope was expressed, at the same time, that the Allies would lift the blockade which had been in force ever since the disorders. Further details were not given out; until the end of the month calm again prevailed in Greece. But as yet there was no indication that permanent settlement of the difficulties was in sight.



CHAPTER XLIII

THE SERBIANS CHECKED

With regard to the military activities of the Allies along the Macedonian front, little more need be said for the period ending with February 1, 1917. Having been ousted out of the Monastir Plain, the German-Bulgarian troops were now defending a new line which seemed more advantageous to them. Apparently fighting continued, sometimes with furious determination on both sides, but the results were negligible. The terrain was now somewhat similar to that in France, and the situation seemingly became similar. The opposing lines faced each other deeply intrenched. Neither side could seriously drive the other back. By this time the Serbian capital had been reestablished in Monastir and the Serbians could make the claim that they were again fighting on native soil, though the Monastir district outside the city never gave birth to one Serbian.

Considering the whole period covering the half year ending with February 1, 1917, it may well be said that, whatever his reasons, General Sarrail's activities have deeply disappointed the friends of the Entente. Reviewing the results of the entire half year's fighting along the Macedonian front, no results worthy of mention are visible save the capture of Monastir, and even this is almost entirely limited to its political value. From a military point of view, the Bulgarians have held their own with forces obviously inferior in numbers to those of the Allies. Naturally, in such a country the advantage is always with the defensive. It is significant that throughout the half year there are few dispatches indicating strong counterattacks on the part of the Bulgarians.



PART IV—AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT



CHAPTER XLIV

THE FALL OF GORITZ

Next to the Trentino the Isonzo was the part of the Austro-Italian front which had seen most fighting in the past. From the very beginning of the war it was there that the Italians had made their most elaborate efforts. Not only did the territory, difficult though it was ever there, allow the use of larger numbers and make possible more extensive operations, but success on the Isonzo front held out a greater promise than anywhere else—possession of Trieste.

In spite of heroic efforts on the part of the Italian troops, however, so far not a great deal had been accomplished. It was time that the Italian lines were well in Austrian territory. But in midsummer, 1916, they were still not much farther advanced than soon after the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Austria. The Austrians so far had resisted all Italian attempts to take Goritz, an important town on the Isonzo, about twenty-two miles northwest of Trieste. With Goritz in the hands of the Austrians Trieste was safe. For it could not be approached by the Italians as long as this important position threatened the flank and rear of any army attacking Trieste along the seashore.

For considerable time little activity had been reported from the Isonzo front. In fact, during the beginning of August, 1916, nothing but occasional artillery engagements occurred anywhere on the Austro-Italian front. On August 4, 1916, however, signs of renewed Italian activity on the Isonzo front became noticeable. On that day a vigorous attack was launched against Austrian positions on the Monfalcone sector, the most southern wing of the Isonzo front. This sector was about ten miles southwest of Goritz and fifteen miles northwest of Trieste.

Goritz was protected by three strong positions, Monte Sabotino to the north, Podgora to the west, and Monte San Michele to the south. The second of these had been in possession of the Italians for some time, but was of little use, though only just across the river from Goritz, because it was exposed to murderous fire from the Austrian positions on Monte Sabotino. To the south of Monte San Michele and north and east of Monfalcone there stretched the Doberdo and Carso Plateaus. These were elevated flatlands of a rocky character, very much exposed. They were bounded on all sides by hills, the western slopes of which rose almost directly out of the Gulf of Trieste. Before Trieste itself could be reached these plateaus had to be crossed.

Following their initial successes of August 4 and 5, 1916, the Italians extended their operations on August 6, 1916. Stubborn fighting took place in the region of the Goritz bridgehead, on Monte Sabotino and Monte San Michele, as well as near Monfalcone and the Doberdo Plateau. The Italians, as may be seen from the following description of the special correspondent of the London "Times" who observed the attack, preceded the general attack with an elaborate artillery bombardment.

"From 7 o'clock yesterday morning until 3.30 in the afternoon a fearful bombardment swept the Austrian positions from Monte Sabotino to Monfalcone such as has never been equaled even in this desolate zone. Gray-green clouds veiled the entire front, contrasting with the limpid atmosphere of a perfect day. All the hillsides on this side of the Isonzo were covered with new batteries, which belched forth an unceasing rain of projectiles on the surprised Austrians on the rocks of Sabotino, whose summit (2,030 feet) completely dominates Goritz. The Carso, the possession of which by the Austrians has been a deciding factor in many memorable struggles, was completely hidden by smoke until 3.30 in the afternoon. The general attack had been arranged for 4 o'clock, but the waiting troops on the Sabotino by 3.30 could endure restraint no longer. Their commander ordered the cessation of the bombardment and ordered the advance.

"Since October 23 last year the Italian line on the Sabotino remained unchanged. The southern side of the mountain sloping down to the Pevmica was honeycombed with elaborately constructed caverns, drilled out of the solid rock by the Italians. During these months each cavern was made to contain an entire company of infantry.

"Recently, unknown to the enemy, a tunnel 850 feet long, which reached to within 90 feet of the Austrian trenches had been added to the engineering exploits of the Italians; 800 men were assembled in this tunnel. At a given signal they led the attack, supported by first-line troops and strong reserves, thanks to this intricate system of galleries on Sabotino's crest. The attack was watched by countless observers, who, on other mountains, were hanging breathless on the result of this hour's work. Innumerable patches of scrubby undergrowth had been set on fire by the Italians to prevent their serving Austrian snipers and were now wrapped in low-hanging clouds of black smoke. Between these black patches the Italians crept ahead when the signal came. The assault of the Austrian positions was of incredible rapidity. So much so that the first positions were carried by the time the enemy turned on his curtain of fire. The first, second, and third lines of trenches were carried in twenty minutes, after which the Austrians began a terrific bombardment of their old positions. The redoubt on the summit fell within an hour and the chase went on along the crest and down the sides, straight to the Isonzo, the pursuers everywhere gathering up prisoners in droves. San Mauro (one and one-fourth miles south of Sabotino) was taken by 6 o'clock, after which the work of intrenchment began."

In spite of the most stubborn resistance the Austrians had to give way gradually. On August 7, 1916, the Austrian troops on Monte Sabotino were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Isonzo. At the same time the positions on Monte San Michele were evacuated and the Italians thereby were put in full possession of the Goritz bridgehead. Their attacks of August 5, 6, and 7, 1916, had netted them territory for which they had been fighting for months, besides about 10,000 prisoners, some 20 guns and 100 machine guns and considerable war material of all description.

Without loss of time they brought in heavy artillery and opened a devastating fire on unfortunate Goritz. Strong resistance was offered by the Austrians at many points, not so much now in the hope of preventing the fall of Goritz as in order to protect their retreat. In spite of this resistance small detachments of Italians crossed the Isonzo at nightfall of August 8, 1916, while their engineers threw bridges over the river at various points.

On August 9, 1916, the bridge over the Isonzo leading directly into Goritz was stormed after one of the most sanguinary battles of the entire attack. This removed the last obstacle, and Italian troops immediately occupied the city. At the same time other troops took up the pursuit of the retreating Austrians. The latter delayed these operations as much as possible by rear-guard actions and by counterattacks against the new Italian positions on Monte San Michele and against the village of San Martino, just south of the mountain.

On August 10, 1916, the Third Italian Army continued with increased pressure the attack on the San Michele and San Martino sectors, which had begun on the 9th instant, and succeeded in capturing very strong Austrian defenses between the Vippacco and Monte Cosich. The Austrians were routed completely and retired east of Vallone, leaving, however, strong rear guards on Cima Debeli and on Hill 121, east of Monfalcone.

The Italians also occupied Rubbia and San Martino del Carso and the whole of the Doberdo Plateau, reaching the line of the Vallerie. East of Goritz the Austrians were holding out in trenches on the lines of Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Marto.

The Vallone was crossed by Italian troops on August 11, 1916. The same detachments stormed the western slopes of Monte Nadlogern and the summit of Crn-Hrid and occupied Opacchiasella, on the northern edge of the Carso Plateau.

By this time the Austrians had recovered their breath to some extent. They had taken up strong positions previously prepared for them in the hills to the east of Goritz and there resisted successfully all Italian attacks. Occasional counterattacks against the new Italian positions, however, brought no results.

To the south of Goritz, too, the Italian advance came to a standstill after the Vallone Valley, separating the Doberdo from the Carso Plateau, had been crossed. Continuous fighting, however, went on along the northern edge of the Carso Plateau throughout the balance of the month of August, 1916, much of it being done by the artillery of both sides. The end of August, 1916, then, saw the Italians in possession of Goritz and their lines at some points as much as five miles nearer to Trieste. The latter, however, seemed at least for the time being safely in the hands of the Austrians, who by this time had received reenforcements and appeared to be determined to stop the Italian advance across the Carso Plateau at all odds.



CHAPTER XLV

FALL AND WINTER ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

With the beginning of fall and the slowing down of the Italian drive against Trieste after the capture of Goritz, activities on the various parts of the Austro-Italian front were reduced almost exclusively to artillery duels. Occasionally attacks of small bodies of infantry were made on both sides. They yielded, however, hardly ever results of any importance and had practically no influence on the relative positions of the Austrians and Italians.

On September 1, 1916, the Austrians made an unsuccessful attack against Italian positions on Monte Civarone in the Sugana Valley (Dolomite Mountains). Italian attacks south of Salcano and west of Lokvicza were equally unsuccessful. Especially heavy artillery engagements occurred on that day on the Trentino front and along the coast of the Gulf of Trieste near Monte Santo.

On September 2, 1916, along the coast of the Gulf of Trieste artillery and mine-throwing engagements continued in various sectors with intermittent violence. Fighting also spread to the Plava sector. On the Ploecken sector the Italians after a very violent artillery fire attacked unsuccessfully on a small front. Several attempts made by minor Italian detachments to advance on the Tyrol front were repulsed. Two attacks on Civaron failed.

On the Trentino front Austrian artillery activity continued. Villages of the Astico Valley and the Italian positions on Cauriol in the Avisio Valley in particular were shelled. On the northern slopes of Cauriol Italian Alpine troops engaged the Austrians, inflicting considerable losses. In the hilly area east of Goritz some detachments of Italian infantry pierced two wire entanglements and bombed the Austrian lines, causing supports to be rushed up. These were effectively shelled by batteries.

At the head of the Rio Felizon Valley, in the upper Bovi, during the night of September 3, 1916, detachments of infantry, Alpini, and volunteers succeeded by a daring surprise attack in capturing several commanding positions on the Punta del Forane. A violent Austrian counterattack was decisively repulsed.

On September 4, 1916, the usual artillery activity took place on the Trentino front. The Austrian artillery fire was especially intense against Italian positions on Mount Civaron in the Sugana Valley, and on Mount Cauriol in the Fiemme Valley.

A more violent attack was attempted by the Austrians on the evening of September 6, 1916, against the Italian lines on Monte Civarone in the Sugana Valley. After brisk fighting the Austrians had to withdraw, abandoning their arms and ammunition and leaving some dead on the ground.

In the Vallarsa, Adige Valley, on the evening of September 7, 1916, strong Austrian detachments after an intense bombardment attacked Italian positions between Monte Spil and Monte Corno. They succeeded in breaking through some trenches. A counterattack recaptured for the Italians the greater part of the ground lost.

On September 8, 1916, in the Tofana zone Italian troops repulsed an attack against the position in the Travenanzes Valley which their troops had taken on September 7, 1916.

On the Trentino front the activity of the artillery was more pronounced on September 9, 1916. Unimportant attacks on Italian positions on Malga Sugna, in the Vallarsa, on the Asiago Plateau, and on Monte Cauriol and Avisio, were repulsed. At Dolje, in the Tolmino sector, after preparation with hand grenades, the Austrians attempted to break through the Italian line, but were driven back immediately.

On the next day, September 10, 1916, between the Adige and Astico Valleys the Italians developed increased activity. Austrian hill positions in this sector were subjected to strong artillery and mine fire. On the Monte Spil-Monte Testo sector the advance of several Italian battalions was repulsed.

On the same day the coast front, the Carso Plateau, and the Tolmino bridgehead were shelled strongly by Italian artillery. On some sectors of the Tyrol front there was continued activity on the part of patrols and the artillery. In the zone between Vallarsa and the head of the Posina Valley Italian infantry captured a strong intrenchment at the bottom of the Leno Valley. Between Monte Spil and Monte Corno they completed capture of the trenches still left in Austrian hands after the fighting of September 7, 1916. Progress was made by the Italians on the ground north of Monte Pasubio and on the northern slopes of Corno del Coston, in the upper Posina Valley. Italian batteries destroyed military depots near St. Ilanio north of Rovereto. The Austrians shelled Caprile, in Cordevole Valley, and Cortina d'Ampezzo.

On September 12, 1916, Italian Alpine troops, north of Falzarego gained possession of a position which not only commanded Travenanzes Pass, but also interrupted communications between the Travenanzes Valley and the Lagazuoi district.

This success was extended on the next day, September 13, 1916, when Italian detachments by a daring climb succeeded in taking some positions in the Zara Valley in the Posina sector and on Monte Lagazuoi in the Travenanzes-Boite Valley.

Once more, on September 14, 1916, the Italians opened a new offensive in the region of the Carso Plateau. Artillery and mine fire increased there with the greatest violence. In the afternoon strong infantry forces in dense formation advanced to the attack. Along the whole front between the Wippach River and the sea fierce fighting developed, and the Italians in some places succeeded in penetrating the Austrian first-line trenches and in maintaining themselves there. North of the Wippach, as far as the region of Plava, artillery fire was very lively, but no infantry engagements worth mentioning developed. In the Fiemme Valley artillery duels continued. Several attacks delivered by Italian detachments about a battalion strong against the Bassano ridge were repulsed.

A second attack on the Carso Plateau in the evening of September 14, 1916, carried the Italian lines forward a few more miles and enabled them to surround the height and village of San Grado. After bombarding the Austrian positions for eight hours, this height and the village were stormed on the following day, September 15, 1916.

During the balance of the month of September, 1916, only minor engagements and artillery duels occurred in the various parts of the Austro-Italian front. The only exception was a successful Austrian attack against the summit of Monte Cimone on the Trentino front southeast of Rovereto. Early in the morning of September 23, 1916, the entire summit was blown up by an Austrian mine and the entire Italian force of about 500 men was either killed or captured. Later that day the Italians captured the summit of the Cardinal (8,000 feet) at the northeast of Monte Cauriol south of the Avisio after overcoming the most stubborn Austrian resistance.

During the first half of October, 1916, activities on the Austro-Italian front presented much the same picture as during the preceding month. Outside of artillery duels and local engagements there happened little of interest or importance to the general positions. However, there were of course a few exceptions. Thus on October 2, 1916, Italian troops captured two high mountains, the Col Bricon (7,800 feet), at the head of the Cismon-Brenta Valley, and an unnamed peak more than 8,000 feet high, in Carnia between Monte Cogliano and Pizzocollima.

Various other successes of a similar nature were gained by the Italians during the next few days in this region, between the Avisio and the Vayol Cismon Valleys.

In the meantime a heavy artillery bombardment had been started by the Italians on the Carso Plateau. From day to day the intensity of the artillery fire increased. At last on October 10, 1916, the Italians launched their attack against the Austrian lines south of Goritz and on the Carso. The battle lasted all day and night. After practically all the intricate Austrian defenses had been destroyed Italian infantry captured almost the whole of the line, composed of several successive intrenchments between the Vippacco (Wippach) River and Hill 208, and advanced beyond it. Novavilla and the adjoining strong position around the northern part of Hill 208 also fell into their hands after brisk fighting. Prisoners to the number of 5,034, including 164 officers, were taken and also a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

These successes were considerably extended on the following day, October 11, 1916. Strong Austrian counterattacks availed nothing.

The Italians maintained their new positions and continued to push their advance on the Carso Plateau and southeast of Goritz, even if slowly, throughout October 12 and 13, 1916. For the balance of the month there was little activity on the Isonzo front beyond extremely heavy artillery fire, most of which had its origin on the Italian side. Occasional attempts on the part of the Italians to push their lines still farther had little success. Equally unsuccessful were Austrian endeavors to regain some of the lost ground.

On the balance of the Austro-Italian front there was a great deal of local fighting in the various mountain ranges. The heaviest of this was centered around Monte Pasubio (7,000 feet), where many attacks and counterattacks were carried out during October 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1916, under the most difficult conditions and frequently during very severe blizzards.

With the beginning of November, 1916, the Italians once more resumed their drive against Trieste. On the last day of October, 1916, the Italian artillery and mine fire had reached again great violence east of Goritz and on the Carso Plateau. It became even more extensive and vigorous early in the morning of November 1, 1916. A few hours later the Italians began their infantry attacks against the Austrian lines, many of which had been destroyed previously by the bombardment.

South of the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road the Austrian line was occupied at several points and held against incessant counterattacks, as were likewise trenches on the eastern slopes of Tivoli and San Marco and heights east of Sober. On the Carso, the wooded hills of Veliki, Kribach, and Hill 375 east and above Monte Pecinka, and the Height 308 east of the latter, were stormed and occupied.

From Goritz to the sea heavy fighting which resulted in further Italian successes along the northern brow of the Carso Plateau continued on November 2, 1916. Here troops of the Eleventh Army Corps, which repulsed violent counterattacks during the night, took strong defenses on difficult ground east of Veliki, Kribach, and Monte Pecinka.

On the next day, November 3, 1916, the offensive on the Carso was prosecuted successfully by the Italian troops. In the direction of the Vippacco (Wippach) Valley the heights of Monte Volkovnjak, Point 126, and Point 123 a little east of San Grado were stormed. An advance of almost a mile eastward brought Italian troops to Point 291 and along the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road to within 650 feet of the latter place. On the rest of the front to the sea the Austrians kept up a bombardment of great intensity with artillery of all calibers. A massed attack was directed against Point 208, but was broken up by concentrated fire.

By November 4, 1916, the Austrian resistance had stiffened to such an extent that a lull became noticeable in the Italian enterprises east of Goritz and on the Carso Plateau. In spite of this, however, the Italians had succeeded again in advancing their lines, inflicting at the same time heavy losses to the Austrians and making almost 10,000 prisoners in four days' fighting. Their own losses were also very heavy, and undoubtedly were partly responsible for the cessation of this new drive against Trieste.

This was practically the last Italian effort during 1916 to reach Trieste. Weather conditions now rapidly became so severe that any actions beyond artillery bombardments and minor attacks by small detachments had become impossible. During the balance of November, 1916, artillery duels were frequent and sometimes very severe on various parts of the Isonzo front, especially on the Carso Plateau. Beyond that neither side attempted anything of importance, though here and there small engagements resulted in slight adjustments of the respective lines. On the other parts of the Austro-Italian front much the same condition prevailed during all of November, 1916; indeed even artillery activity was frequently interrupted for days by the severity of the weather.



CHAPTER XLVI

FIGHTING ON MOUNTAIN PEAKS

Much of the fighting on the Austro-Italian front which has been narrated in the preceding pages has been going on in territory with which comparatively few are acquainted. A great part of the front is located in those parts of northern Italy and the Austrian Tyrol and Trentino which for generations have been known and admired all over the world for their scenic beauty and natural grandeur. People from many countries of the world have used this ground which now is so bitterly fought over as their playground, and have carried away from it not only improved health, but also the most pleasant of memories. Though much of its beauty undoubtedly will survive the ravages of even this most destructive of wars, a great deal of damage has been inflicted. For in order to achieve some military ends the sky line of entire mountain ranges has been changed. Summits have been blown up, and contours of mountains which have been landmarks for centuries have been changed.

Pleasant though life is in these regions when peace reigns, they offer particularly great and severe difficulties to the fighting men. The dangers and hardships which these courageous soldiers of Italy and Austria have been called upon to undergo are not easily appreciated unless one has been on the very ground on which they do some of their fighting. The following extracts from descriptive articles from the pen of Lord Northcliffe, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, and some special correspondents of the London "Times" give a most vivid picture of actual conditions in the Austro-Italian mountains in war times.

Speaking of his visit to the Cadore front, Lord Northcliffe says in part:

"In discussing the peculiarities of the hill fighting as contrasted with the fighting on the road to Trieste his Majesty the King of Italy, who has a fine sense of words, and who has spoken English from childhood, said: 'Picture to yourself my men 9,000 feet up in the clouds for seven months, in deep snow, so close to the Austrians that at some points the men can see their enemies' eyes through the observation holes. Imagine the difficulties of such a life with continued sniping and bomb throwing!'

"The illustrated newspapers have from time to time published photographs of great cannon carried up into these Dolomite Alps, but I confess to having never realized what it means. It never occurred to me what happens to the wounded men or to the dead. How do supplies and ammunition reach these lonely sentinels of our Allies?

"Here food for the men and food for the guns go first by giddy, zigzag roads, especially built by the Italians for this war. They are not mere tracks, but are as wide as the road that runs between Nice and Mentone, or the Hog's Back between Guilford and Farnham. When these have reached their utmost possible height, there comes a whole series of 'wireways,' as the Italian soldiers call them. Steel cables slung from hill to hill, from ridge to ridge, span yawning depths and reach almost vertically into the clouds. Up these cables go guns and food, as well as timber for the huts in which the men live, and material for intrenchments. Down these come the wounded. The first sensation of a transit down these seemingly fragile tight ropes is much more curious than the first trip in a submarine or aeroplane, and tries even the strongest nerves.

"Man is not fighting man at these heights, but both Italians and Austrians have been fighting nature in some of her fiercest aspects. The gales and snowstorms are excelled in horror by avalanches. Quite lately the melting snow revealed the frozen bodies, looking horribly lifelike, of a whole platoon which had been swept away nearly a year ago.

"While there have been heavy casualties on both sides from sniping, bombing, mountain and machine guns, and heavy artillery, there has been little sickness among the Italians. The men know that doctors' visits are practically impossible. Therefore they follow the advice of their officers. Yet the men have all the comforts that it is humanly possible to obtain. The cloud fighters are extremely well fed. Huts are provided, fitted with stoves similar to those used in Arctic expeditions.

"Higher yet than the mountain fighting line stand the vedettes, sentinels and outposts whose work resembles that of expert Alpine climbers. They carry portable telephones with which they can communicate with their platoon. The platoon in turn telephones to the local commander."

Of some of the fighting and of life in the Dolomites he says:

"Of the three peaks of the Colbricon only the third, known as the Picolo Colbricon, remains to the enemy. The action which is now being developed on the Colbricon is especially interesting from the fact that the Italian advance there is not due to trained mountain troops, but to the light arm of Bersaglieri, who have there proved themselves equal to their best traditions. In the advance from the first to the second summit of Colbricon the Bersaglieri had to climb a gully at an angle of 70 degrees. At two points the wall rises perpendicularly, and the enemy was able to defend his positions by simply rolling down rocks, which carried in their train avalanches of pebbles.

"In no region of the Italian front is there greater difficulty in the matter of supply, transport, and the care of the wounded. Every stretcher bearer here finds himself continually exposed to the peril of falling over a precipice together with his wounded.

"As the sun rose the great peaks of the Dolomites stood out like pink pearls, set here and there in a soft white vapor. Coming through a Canadian-looking pine forest, with log-house barracks, kitchens, and canteens beneath one such peak, I was reminded of Dante's lines: 'Gazing above, I saw her shoulders, clothed already with the planet's rays.' But poetic memories soon faded before a sniper's bullet from a very near Austrian outlook.

"At one spot the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements were clearly visible through glasses on a neighboring summit at a height of over 10,000 feet. A few yards below in an open cavern protected by an overhanging rock the little gray tents of Italy's soldiers were plainly seen. It may be a consolation to our men on the Somme and in Flanders that the war is being waged here in equally dangerous conditions as theirs.

"The Italians have driven back the Austrians foot by foot up the almost vertical Dolomite rock with mountain, field, and heavy guns, and especially in hand-to-hand and bomb fighting. Sniping never ceases by day, but the actual battles are almost invariably fought by night.

"The only day fighting is when, as in the famous capture of Col di Lana and more recently at Castelletto, the whole or part of a mountain top has to be blown off, because it is impossible to turn or carry it by direct assault. Then tunnels sometimes 800 yards long are drilled by machinery through the solid rock beneath the Austrian strongholds, which presently disappear under the smashing influence of thirty or forty tons of dynamite. Then the Alpini swarm over the debris and capture or kill the enemy survivors and rejoice in a well-earned triumph.

"One needs to have scaled a mountainside to an Italian gun's emplacement or lookout post to gauge fully the nature of this warfare. Imagine a catacomb, hewn through the hard rock, with a central hall and galleries leading to gun positions, 7,000 feet up. Reckon that each gun emplacement represents three months' constant labor with drill, hammer, and mine. Every requirement, as well as food and water, must be carried up by men at night or under fire by day. Every soldier employed at these heights needs another soldier to bring him food and drink, unless as happens in some places the devoted wives of the Alpini act nightly under organized rules as porters for their husbands.

"The food supply is most efficiently organized. A young London Italian private, speaking English perfectly, whom I met by chance, told me, and I have since verified the information, that the men holding this long line of the Alps receive a special food, particularly during the seven months' winter. Besides the excellent soup which forms the staple diet of the Italian as of the French soldiers, the men receive a daily ration of two pounds of bread, half a pound of meat, half a pint of red wine, macaroni of various kinds, rice, cheese, dried and fresh fruit, chocolate, and thrice weekly small quantities of cognac and Marsala.

"Members of the Alpine Club know that in the high Dolomites water is in summer often as precious as on the Carso. Snow serves this purpose in winter. Then three months' reserve supplies of oil fuel, alcohol, and medicine must be stored in the catacomb mountain positions, lest, as happened to an officer whom I met, the garrisons should be cut off by snow for weeks and months at a time."

Mr. Hilaire Belloc vividly pictures some mountain positions and observation posts in the high Dolomites as follows:

"There stands in the Dolomites a great group of precipitous rock rising to a height of over 9,000 feet above the sea and perhaps 6,000 feet above the surrounding valleys, one summit of which is called the Cristallo. It is the only point within the Italian lines from which direct and permanent observations can be had of the railway line running through the Pusterthal. In the mass of this mountain, up to heights of over 8,000 feet, in crannies of the rock, up steep couloirs and chimneys of snow, the batteries have been placed and hidden quite secure from the fire of the enemy, commanding by the advantage of the observation posts the enemy's line with their direct fire. One such observation post I visited.

"A company of men divided into two half companies held, the one half the base of the precipitous rock upon a sward of high valley, the other the summit itself, perhaps 3,000 feet higher; end the communication from one to the other was a double wire swung through the air above the chasm, up and down which traveled shallow cradles of steel carrying men and food, munitions, and instruments. Such a device alone made possible the establishment of these posts in such incredible places, and the perilous journey along the wire rope swung from precipice to precipice and over intervening gulfs was the only condition of their continued survival. The post itself clung to the extreme summit of the mountain as a bird's nest clings to the cranny of rock in which it is built; while huts, devised to the exact and difficult contours of the last crags and hidden as best they might be from direct observation and fire from the enemy below, stood here perched in places the reaching of which during the old days of peace was thought a triumph of skill by the mountaineers. And all this ingenuity, effort, and strain stood, it must be remembered, under the conditions of war. The snow in the neighborhood of this aerie was pitted with the shell that had been aimed so often and had failed to reach this spot, and the men thus perilously clinging to an extreme peak of bare rock up in the skies were clinging there subject to all the perils of war added to the common perils of the feat they had accomplished.

"Marvelous as it was, I saw here but one example of I know not how many of the same kind with which the Italians have made secure the whole mountain wall from the Brenta to the Isonzo and from Lake Garda to the Orther and the Swiss frontier. Every little gap in that wall is held. You find small posts of men, that must have their food and water daily brought to them thus, slung by the wire; you find them crouched upon the little dip where a collar of deep snow between bare rocks marks some almost impassable passage of the hills that must yet be held. You see a gun of 6 inches or even of 8 inches emplaced where, had you been climbing for your pleasure, you would hardly have dared to pitch the smallest tent. You hear the story of how the piece was hoisted there by machinery first established upon the rock; of the blasting for emplacement; of the accidents after which it was finally emplaced; of the ingenious thought which has allowed for the chance of recoil or of displacement; you have perhaps a month's journeying from point to point of this sort over a matter of 250 miles."

A special correspondent of the London "Times" describes the fighting around Monte Pasubio in the Trentino, which has already been mentioned in the preceding pages, as follows:

"When the tide of the Austrian invasion rolled back at the end of June, 1916, its margin became fixed on the crest of the Pasubio, an enormous and irregular group of mountains, of which the Italians remained in possession of the highest peak, but all the northern summits and the top of the whole central ridge called the Cosmagnon Alps remained to the enemy. It was from this ridge that they dominated the Vallarsa, and their first-line trenches were on its edge. Fifteen yards below them the Italians had burrowed in somehow and had hung on until now.

"With the oncoming of winter, however, and the avalanches their hanging on became altogether too problematic. For weeks the weather prevented action through some meteorological phenomenon. When it is fair below in the plain Pasubio is crowned with dense fogs, and vice versa. Finally, the summits revealed themselves clear against the sky. The careful preparation had passed unobserved of the enemy, and during the night of the 8th inst., with increased intensity at dawn of the 9th inst., the artillery attacked on the whole line for several miles.

"Bombs were employed in great number, and are found to be even more effective here than on the Carso, the friable rock breaking into millions of fragments under the explosion.

"In the afternoon a demonstrative attack in the Vallarsa carried the line ahead some 400 yards, and at half past 3 the principal attack carried the trenches of the crest (Cosmagnon Alps), together with the summit called Lora. The arduous mountaineering feat of arriving on the mountain's overhanging brow was accomplished on rope ladders by infantry Alpini and Bersaglieri.

"The line once brought over the crest, the battle raged furiously on the mountain top. The Austrians had constructed magnificent caverns and dugouts, and made them as impregnable as their long residence permitted. Their resistance was specially keen around the fearful natural fortifications called the Tooth, consisting of spires and slender ledges and abounding in caverns. The Tooth still remains in part to the Austrians. From the first day, the Alpini have scaled part of it and still stick there.

"One of the spectacular sights of the day was an Alpini perched on his spire of the Tooth, who kept the Austrian machine gunners from their task, pelting them with rocks every time they set to work.

"The fighting all took place on the rolling surface of the Cosmagnon Alps—closed in by the barrage fire on both sides under the dazzling sky, but with the world below completely shut off by Monte Pasubio's crown of clouds. Shrapnel and shell disappeared in the ocean of clouds."

More so than in any other war theater, fighting on the Austro-Italian front was influenced by weather conditions during December, 1916, and January, 1917. For practically its entire extent it was located in mountainous territory, most of it indeed, as we have seen, being among mountain peaks thousands of feet high.

No wonder then that there was little to report at any time during December, 1916, and January, 1917, except artillery activity of varying frequency and violence. Occasionally engagements would take place between small detachments. These, however, were hardly ever little more than clashes between outposts or patrols. These and quite frequently even artillery activity were stopped entirely for days at a time by the severity of the blizzards and gales that prevailed throughout most of December, 1916.

In January, 1917, much the same condition prevailed. Batteries everywhere were shelling each other and whatever positions of the enemy were within reach as often as the weather was clear enough to do so. On January 1, 1917, Goritz was subjected to a particularly heavy bombardment from the Austrian guns, which caused considerable material damage.

On January 4, 1917, two attacks carried out by small Austrian detachments—one between the Adige and Lake Garda and the other in the Plava sector—were repulsed. An Italian attack on the Carso Plateau resulted in an advance of about 600 feet along a narrow front. Similar small advances were made in the same region by the Italians at various times. In most instances they were maintained in the face of frequent Austrian counterattacks, though some of the latter occasionally were successful.

On January 18, 1917, the Austrians attempted, after especially violent artillery preparation, an attack against the Italian positions between Frigido and the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road on the Carso, south of Goritz. Italian gun and rifle fire, however, stopped the Austrian attack before it had fully developed. A few days later, on January 22, 1917, a similar Austrian attack, launched southeast of Goritz, was somewhat more successful and resulted in the temporary penetration of a few Italian positions. The same success accompanied a like undertaking in the vicinity of Goritz near Kostanjeoica on January 30, 1917.

On practically every day through January, 1917, there was considerable artillery activity in the various sectors of the entire front. This increased in violence in accordance with weather conditions, but generally speaking had little result on general conditions, which at the end of January, 1917, were practically the same as had been established after the fall of Goritz.



PART V—WAR IN THE AIR AND ON THE SEA



CHAPTER XLVII

AEROPLANE WARFARE

During the six months, covering the period from August 1, 1916, to February 1, 1917, aeroplane warfare at the various fronts was as extensive, varied, and continuous as at any time during the war, if indeed not more so. The efficiency of machines and operators alike became higher and higher developed. Atmospheric conditions became less and less of a factor in flying. If in spite of these facts the number of machines and flyers lost continued to be comparatively huge, this was due to the fact that the development of flying made fairly equal progress in the flying corps of the various belligerents, and that increased efficiency and independence from atmospheric conditions rather had the tendency of increasing the daring of aviators.

It is of course evident that it would be impossible within the limits of these chapters to narrate every flying enterprise undertaken. Hundred, perhaps thousands, of flights made, are never reported either officially or unofficially. The largest number of these of course had as their object chiefly the gathering of information or the more accurate direction of artillery fire.

In the following pages, however, will be found an account of all the more important independent aeroplane enterprises undertaken at the various fronts, as well as aeroplane raids made into the interior of some of the countries at war.

On August 1, 1916, an Italian aerial squadron attacked with considerable success an Austro-Hungarian plant for making Whitehead torpedoes and submarine works located west of Fiume on one of the Croatian bays of the Adriatic.

Two German aeroplanes, coming from the Dardanelles, on August 4, 1916, dropped bombs on the aerodrome of the Entente Allies, located on the island of Lemnos in the AEgean Sea, but were promptly driven off by gunfire from British ships.

On the same day, August 4, 1916, Turkish or German aeroplanes attempted a bombardment of shipping on the Suez Canal. The attack was carried out by two machines over Lake Timsah, forty-five miles south of Port Said. The town of Ismailia, on the lake border, also was bombarded. No damage was done.

Again on August 6, 1916, a bomb attack by aeroplanes over Port Said and Suez inflicted little material damage and caused slight casualties.

On the following day, August 7, 1916, an Austrian squadron made up of twenty-one aeroplanes attacked Venice. They claimed to have dropped three and one-half tons of explosives and to have caused great damage and many fires; the Italian Government, however, stated that the damage caused was comparatively small and that only two people were killed.

On September 5, 1916, two British aeroplanes raided the Turkish aerodrome and aeroplane repair section at El Arish, ninety miles east of the Suez Canal, dropping twelve bombs with good results. Turkish aeroplanes attacked the British machines but ultimately gave up the fight, and the latter returned to camp undamaged.

Again on September 8, 1916, three British machines bombed El Mazaar and the Turkish camp near by.

Early in the morning of September 13, 1916, a group of Austrian seaplanes attacked Venice once more. Incendiary and explosive bombs struck the church of San Giovanni Paola, the Home for the Aged, and a number of other buildings, inflicting some damage, although no casualties were reported. Chioggra also was attacked by the same machines; but here, too, the damage was rather slight.

On the same day in the afternoon an Italian air squadron of eighteen Capronis under the protection of three Nieuport antiaircraft aeroplanes attacked Trieste. Six Italian torpedo boats and two motor boats assisted them in the gulf. Numerous bombs were dropped, but these caused only slight damage, and none of military importance. One man was slightly wounded.

Austrian aeroplanes and antiaircraft batteries obtained hits on the Italian torpedo boats. At the same time an Italian air squadron appeared over Parenzo, dropping twenty bombs in a field. No damage was done.

Still another attack was reported on this day, this time by the Russians. A squadron of four Russian giant aeroplanes of the Slyr-Murometz type bombarded the German seaplane station on Lake Angern in the Gulf of Riga. The Russians claimed to have dropped about seventy-five bombs and to have started a great conflagration. They also claimed that eight German seaplanes counterattacked, but were repulsed by machine-gun fire, and that as the result of the bombing and the air fight not fewer than eight German machines were destroyed or put out of action. None of the Russian machines were reported either lost or damaged.

A German aerodrome, located at St. Denis-Westrem in Belgium, was attacked on September 22, 1916, by British machines who claimed to have killed forty Germans and to have burned two sheds and three aeroplanes. On October 1, 1916, bombs were dropped by British aeroplanes on the Turkish camp at Kut-el-Amara.

Three days later, on October 4, 1916, British aeroplanes carried out a successful bombing attack on Turkish camps in the neighborhood of El Arish. It was claimed then that recent aerial attacks on the Turkish aerodrome at El Arish had had the effect of compelling the Turks to move their machines and hangars from that place.

An Austro-German air squadron on October 12, 1916, was reported to have dropped bombs on Constanza, the principal Rumanian Black Sea port.

On October 20, 1916, a British naval aeroplane attacked and brought down a German kite balloon near Ostend. A similar machine engaged a large German double-engined tractor seaplane, shooting both the pilot and the observer. The seaplane side-slipped and dived vertically into the sea two miles off Ostend. The remains later were seen floating on the water. Both the British machines were undamaged.

Two days later, October 21, 1916, a German aeroplane approached the fortified seaport of Sheerness at the mouth of the Thames, flying very high. Four bombs were dropped, three of which fell into the harbor. The fourth fell in the vicinity of a railway station and damaged several railway carriages. British aeroplanes went up and the raider made off in a northeasterly direction. No casualties were reported.

A German seaplane was shot down and destroyed later that day by one of the British naval aircraft. The German machine fell into the sea. Judging by time, it was probably the seaplane which visited Sheerness.

Margate, a resort on the southeast coast of England, was attacked on October 22, 1916, by a German aeroplane, which succeeded in inflicting slight material damage and injuring two people before it was driven off.

The French made a strong attack on the Metz region on the same day, October 22, 1916, employing twenty-four machines. They claimed that these dropped 4,200 kilograms of bombs on blast furnaces at Hagodange and Pussings north of Metz, and also on the railway stations at Thionville, Mezures-les-Betz, Longwy, and Metz-Sablons. On the same day another French aerial squadron bombarded the ammunition depot at Monsen road (Somme). German aeroplanes dropped several bombs on Luneville. There were no victims and the material damage was insignificant. On the Somme front two German aeroplanes were brought down and three others were forced down in a damaged condition. Finally, good results were achieved by a French bombing expedition against factories of Rombach and the railway station at Mars-la-Tour.

The Germans, however, claimed that the French air raids did no damage to Metz and other points, but that five civilians were killed and seven made ill by inhaling poisonous gases from the bombs. They further claimed that twenty-two French aviators had been shot down by aerial attacks and antiaircraft fire and that eleven aeroplanes were lying behind the German lines. Captain Boelke conquered his thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth foes.

On October 27, 1916, French aeroplanes dropped forty bombs on the railway station at Grand Pre, eight on the railway station at Challerange, and thirty on enemy bivouacs at Fretoy-le-Chateau and Avricourt, north of Lassigny, where two fires were seen to break out.

On the same night ten other French machines dropped 240 bombs on the railway station at Conflans and thirty on the railway station at Courcelles. Another French machine dropped six shells on the railway line at Pagny-sur-Moselle.

The British report for the same day likewise announced that aerial engagements took place between large numbers of machines on both sides. It was reported that five machines fell during a fight, two of which were British. On another occasion one British pilot encountered a formation of ten German machines, attacked them single handed and dispersed them far behind their own lines.

On October 28, 1916, it was announced that Captain Boelke, the famous German aviator, had been killed in a collision, with another aeroplane. He was credited with having brought down forty aeroplanes.

Not until almost the middle of November, 1916, did aeroplane warfare develop its usual activity.

On the night of November 9-10, 1916, British aeroplanes dropped bombs without success on Ostend and Zeebrugge. One British machine was forced down and captured and the aviator, a British officer, made prisoner.

On the morning of November 10, 1916, a German battleplane attacked two British biplanes between Nieuport and Dunkirk. It shot down one and forced the other to retreat. In the forenoon three German battleplanes met a superior British aerial squadron off Ostend and attacked it. After a combat the British were forced to withdraw. The German machines returned to their base, having suffered insignificant damages.

Between 10 and 11 o'clock on the morning of November 10, 1916, a group of seventeen British aeroplanes bombarded the steel works at Voelklingen, northwest of Saarbruecken. One thousand kilograms of projectiles were dropped on the buildings, which were damaged seriously. In the course of the operations British machines fought several actions against German machines, three of which were felled.

On the following night between 8 and 9 o'clock eight British aeroplanes executed a fresh bombardment of these works, dropping 1,800 kilograms of projectiles. Several fires were observed. All British machines returned safely.

During the night of November 10-11, 1916, British squadrons drenched with projectiles the stations of Ham, St. Quentin, Tergnier, and Nesle, in the Somme region, and the aerodrome at Dreuze, the blast furnaces of Ramsbach, the aeroplane sheds of Frescati (near Metz), and the blast furnaces of Hagodange (north of Metz). These operations caused great damage, and several explosions and fires were observed.

A German aeroplane during the night of November 10-11, 1916, bombarded several French towns. Nancy and Luneville received projectiles which caused damage or casualties. Amiens was also bombarded on various occasions during the same night. Nine persons of the civilian population were killed and twenty-seven injured.

On November 11, 1916, five German machines were claimed to have been brought down by the British.

The following day, November 12, 1916, a squadron of British naval aeroplanes attacked the harbor of Ostend. A considerable number of bombs was dropped on the dockyards and on the war vessels in the harbor. On the same day it was also reported that two successful air raids had been carried out by aircraft operating with the British forces in Egypt. The points raided were Maghdaba and Birsaba. A ton of high explosives was dropped. Two Fokker machines were brought down by the raiding aeroplanes, all of which returned safely.

Near Saloniki two aeroplanes belonging to the Central Powers were forced to descend behind their own lines. During the night of November 14, 1916, ten British machines at various points in France carried out a series of successful raids on railway stations and rolling stock.

On the same day a Turkish aeroplane flying very high dropped several bombs in and about Cairo, Egypt, killing and wounding a number of civilians. No military damage was done and only one military casualty was incurred.

On November 17, 1916, it was reported that a French aviator had succeeded in flying across the Alps after dropping bombs upon the station at Munich, the capital of Bavaria. He landed near Venice, having flown 435 miles in one day.

London was again attacked on November 28, 1916. An aeroplane, flying very high, dropped six bombs which injured nine people and did considerable damage. A German machine, brought down a few hours later near Dunkirk, was supposed to have been the one returning from the attack on London.

On November 30, 1916, in Lorraine, three British aeroplanes fought an engagement with several German machines. One German machine was brought down in the forest of Gremecy.

On the same day on the Somme front French airmen fought about forty engagements, in the course of which five German machines were brought down.

Six French machines dropped fifteen bombs on Bruyeres. Another French air squadron carried out a bombardment of the aerodrome of Grisolles (north of Chateau-Thierry). Between 3.45 p. m. and 7 p. m. 171 bombs of 120 mm. were dropped.

That night between 9.30 p. m. and 1.10 a. m. four French machines bombarded the blast furnaces and factories of Voelklingen (northwest of Saarbruecken).

On December 1, 1916, a group of aeroplanes of the British Naval Air Service bombarded the blast furnaces of Dillingen, northwest of Saarbruecken. During this expedition one ton of explosives was dropped.

A German aeroplane was brought down during the return journey.

During December 2, 1916, Italian aeroplanes bombed Austrian positions at Dorimbergo (Fornberg) and Tabor, in the Frigido (Vippacco) Valley. On the following day, December 3, 1916, another Italian air squadron bombed the railway station for Dottogliano and Scoppo on the Carso (seven and one-half miles northeast of Trieste). Notwithstanding bad weather conditions and the violent fire of the Austrian artillery, the aviators came down low to drop a ton and half of high explosives.

Numerous air flights took place and one Austrian machine was brought down; one of the Italian machines was reported missing.

Austrian seaplanes dropped bombs at several points on the Carso without causing casualties or damage. An Italian aeroplane dropped five large bombs on the floating hangars at Trieste, with excellent results.

On December 4, 1916, Austrian aircraft dropped a few bombs on Adria and Monfalcone without doing any damage.

On the Tigris front, during the same day, December 4, 1916, Turkish aeroplanes bombed successfully British camps. Six British machines immediately made an equally successful counterattack.

On December 14, 1916, a British squadron of naval aeroplanes carried out a bombardment of the Kuleli-Burges bridge, south of Adrianople.

Throughout the balance of December, 1916, there was a great deal of local air activity at many points on all the fronts. Comparatively speaking, however, no major actions occurred.

The same condition existed during the early part of January, 1917.

On January 11, 1917, an Austrian air squadron dropped a considerable number of bombs in the neighborhood of Aquieleja, southwest of Monfalcone. One Austrian seaplane was brought down by Italian antiaircraft batteries. At the same time two aeroplanes bombarded the aviation ground at Propecto and the seaplane base in the harbor of Trieste.

The Russian front reported increased aerial activity on the following day, January 12, 1917. A German aerial squadron, consisting of thirteen airplanes, dropped about forty bombs on the station and town of Radzivilov. Russian aeroplanes bombarded with machine-gun fire a German battery near the village of Krukhov.

Similar exploits were reported from many different points on the various fronts during the following week. Especially was this true of the western front. However, there nowhere occurred any major actions.



CHAPTER XLVIII

ZEPPELIN RAIDS

During the night of July 31 to August 1, 1916, a squadron of Zeppelins, reported to have numbered at least six, raided the eastern and southeastern counties of England. Sixty bombs were dropped, causing considerable material damage, but, as far as was ascertained, no casualties.

Again the following day, August 2, 1916, six Zeppelins appeared over the east coast of England. According to German claims, London, the naval base at Harwich, and various industrial establishments in the county of Norfolk were covered with a total of about eighty bombs, which caused, of course, considerable loss. Although English authorities claimed that antiaircraft guns registered a number of hits against one, or possibly two, of the Zeppelins, and that another, flying during its return trip over Dutch territory, was fired at and hit, all of the six were later reported to have returned to their home base undamaged.

Another squadron visited the east coast again one week later, August 9, 1916. There were reported to have been between seven and ten machines which dropped about 160 bombs, caused extensive damage, and killed twenty-three people. English batteries finally forced the withdrawal of the Zeppelins.

About twenty-four hours after Rumania's entrance into the war on the side of the Allies a Zeppelin, accompanied by an aeroplane, appeared during the night of August 28, 1916, over Rumania's capital, Bucharest. After a short bombardment, which caused but little damage, they were both forced to withdraw by the fire of antiaircraft guns. Before returning to their bases they bombarded three other unnamed Rumanian cities without causing much damage.

Shortly after 11 o'clock in the evening of September 2, 1916, the eastern coasts of England were again attacked, this time by a fleet of thirteen airships, the most formidable attack that had so far been launched against England.

The measures taken by the English authorities for the reduction or obscuration of lights proved most efficacious, for the raiding squadrons, instead of steering a steady course as to the raids of the spring and of last autumn, groped about in darkness looking for a safe avenue to approach their objectives.

Three airships only were able to approach the outskirts of London. One of them, the L-21, appeared over the northern district about 2.15 in the morning of September 3, 1916, where she was picked up by searchlights and heavily engaged by antiaircraft guns and aeroplanes. After a few minutes the airship was seen to burst into flames and fall rapidly toward the earth.

The ship was destroyed, the wreckage, engines, and half-burned bodies of the crew being found at Cuffley, near Enfield. The other two ships which approached London were driven off by the defenses without being able to approach the center of the city. A great number of bombs were dropped promiscuously over the east Anglian and southeastern counties, causing considerable but not very serious damage. Two people were reported killed and thirteen injured.

The funeral of the sixteen members of the German Zeppelin took place on September 6, 1916, at Potter's Bar Cemetery, and was carried out under the direction of the British Royal Flying Corps. A young member of the latter, Lieutenant William Robinson, who had been responsible for the Zeppelin's destruction, received later the Victoria Cross as well as a number of monetary rewards and civic honors. The site at Cuffley, which had been the scene of the airship's destruction, was presented to the English nation by its owner.

During the night of September 23, 1916, twelve Zeppelins again made their appearance over the eastern counties of England and the outskirts of London. Although the material damage was widespread, it was borne chiefly by small homes and shops. The toll in human life was greater than at any other raid, amounting to thirty-eight killed and 125 injured. However, two of the Zeppelins were forced down in Essex; one of them was destroyed together with its crew; the other managed to make a landing and its crew of twenty-one were made prisoners.

Two days later, during the night of September 25, 1916, a smaller squadron of about six airships attacked the northeastern and southern counties of England. Bombs did considerable damage, most of which, however, was inflicted on privately owned property. Thirty-six people were killed and twenty-seven more injured.

With the advance of autumn Zeppelin raids became less frequent. Only once during October, 1916, on the night of October 1 to 2, did a squadron of Zeppelins appear over English territory. At that time ten airships attacked the eastern coast and London. The damage again was principally to private property. Only one person was reported killed and one injured. One of the Zeppelins, however, was brought down in flames near Potter's Bar, and from its wreckage the bodies of nineteen members of its crew were recovered.

Not until the end of November, 1916, was another Zeppelin attack reported. At that time, during the night of November 27 to 28, 1916, two airships raided Yorkshire and Durham. They did considerable damage, killed one and injured sixteen persons. Both Zeppelins were brought down and destroyed and the entire crews of both perished.

One airship was attacked by an aeroplane of the British Royal Flying Corps and brought down in flames into the sea off the coast of Durham.

Another airship crossed the North Midland counties and dropped bombs at various places. On her return journey she Was repeatedly attacked by aeroplanes of the British Royal Flying Corps and by guns. She appeared to have been damaged, for the last part of her journey was made at very slow speed, and she was unable to reach the coast before day was breaking.

Near the Norfolk coast she apparently succeeded in effecting repairs, and, after passing through gunfire from the land defenses, which claimed to have made a hit, proceeded east at high speed and at an altitude of over 8,000 feet. She was attacked nine miles out at sea by four machines of the British Royal Naval Air Service, while gunfire was opened from an armed British trawler, and the airship was finally brought down in flames.

During December, 1916, no Zeppelins were apparently used actively. As far as it was possible to determine definitely, the number of German airships wrecked from the outbreak of the war up to January 1, 1917, was nineteen. Of these twelve were lost during 1916 as follows:

L-19. Wrecked in the North Sea on February 3.

L-77. Shot down by French guns near Brabant-le-Roi on February 21.

L-15. Shot down in raid on eastern counties, and sank off Thames estuary on April 1.

L-20. Wrecked near Stavanger on May 3.

Unnamed airship. Destroyed by British warships off Schleswig on May 4.

Unnamed airship. Brought down by Allied warships at Saloniki on May 5.

L-21. Burned and wrecked near Enfield, September 3.

L-32 and L-33. Brought down in Essex, September 24.

Airship brought down at Potter's Bar, October 1.

Two airships brought down in flames off the east coast, November 27-28.

Another list, based on an article published in the "Journal of the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute," yields a total of thirty-eight Zeppelins as having been destroyed since the outbreak of the war. Of this number the loss of thirty was said to have been authenticated.

Of the larger total (38) 5 were destroyed in 1914, 17 in 1915, and 16 in 1916. Of these 4 were lost in France, 6 in Russia, 7 in Belgium, 7 in England, 1 in Denmark, 1 in Norway, 1 in the Balkans, 5 in the East, and 6 in Germany.

No further activities of Zeppelins were reported during January, 1917, except that it was announced unofficially on January 3, 1917, that two Zeppelins had been destroyed at Tondern, Schleswig, by a fire due to defective electric wiring in a recently constructed double shed.

To sum up the losses in aeroplanes incurred by the various belligerents during the six months' period, August, 1916, to February, 1917, is practically impossible. Figures are available for a few months only, and they are not only unofficial, but come from all kinds of different sources, most of them very much biased.

Furthermore, there always is a wide discrepancy between figures published by adherents of the Allies and those published by the friends of the Central Powers.

As an example of this condition the following may well serve: At the end of January, 1916, an unofficial statement claimed that the Germans lost during 1916 on the western front a total of 221 aeroplanes. The French authorities immediately claimed that they had knowledge of 417 German aeroplanes which had been shot down by their aviators, and that 195 more machines were brought down damaged, of which undoubtedly a number finally were to be considered lost to the Germans. Neither statement, however, is supported by sufficient data to allow any kind of checking up. The truth, therefore, must be sought somewhere around the average between these two figures.

Equally difficult is it to arrive at any definite figures regarding the losses in man power incurred by the various aviation corps. No official figures are available except the lists of casualties published in aviation papers. These, however, cover only the French and English organizations, and even in these two cases they contain a large number of men who lost their lives not at the front, but in aviation camps in England or France while being trained.

However, that section of the French Aviation Corps containing American volunteers has been more liberal in publishing statistics. On November 3, 1916, it was announced that the flying unit of the French Corps, consisting entirely of American volunteers, had brought down between May and November a total of twenty-one German machines. At that time it consisted of twelve American members. Unfortunately it had lost previously to this date two of its members.

Kiffin Rockwell of Atlanta, Ga., had been killed in an air battle over Thame in Alsace on September 23, 1916. He had joined the Foreign Legion of the French army in May, 1915, had been severely wounded, received the Military Medal, and after his recovery had been transferred to the Flying Corps. He had participated in thirty-four air battles, and a few hours before his death had been promoted to be a second lieutenant.

Norman Prince, Harvard graduate and native of Hamilton, Mass., was severely wounded early in October, 1916. He died a week later on October 14, 1916, in a hospital after first having been decorated with the cross of the Legion of Honor. He had also received some time before the Military Medal.

On November 2, 1916, it was announced that Anthony H. Jannus, a young Washington aviator, had been killed in Russia on October 12, 1916, while flying for the Russian army.

Another young American, Ruskin Watts of Westfield, N. J., who was serving in the English Aviation Corps on the western front, was on November 2, 1916, reported as missing since September 22, 1916. No further news of his fate was known.

This meant that, as far as was known definitely, four Americans had lost their lives fighting for the Allies as members of their aviation service.



CHAPTER XLIX

SUBMARINE WARFARE

The totals of the damage inflicted by submarines of the Central Powers on the merchant fleets of the Entente Allies during July, 1916, was not officially announced until August 16, 1916. On that day an official statement was published in Berlin to the effect that German and Austrian submarines and mines had destroyed during July, 1916, 74 merchantmen belonging to England and her allies. These ships had a total tonnage of 103,000 tons.

The activity of German and Austrian submarines increased considerably during August, 1916. According to an official German statement submarines or mines sunk 126 merchant ships, belonging to England and her allies, totaling 170,679 tons gross, as well as 35 neutral merchant ships, totaling 38,568 tons. These figures, however, did not agree with figures compiled in this country. The New York "Journal of Commerce" records only 93 ships of a total tonnage of 123,397 as having been sunk in August, 1916. The same authority also announced that in the period from August 1, 1914, to September 1, 1916, there had been destroyed, 1,584 merchant ships, aggregating 2,939,915 tons.

Among the ships sunk in August, 1916, was the Italian mail steamer Letimbro. She went to the bottom of the Mediterranean on August 4, 1916, and it was claimed that many of her 1,100 passengers were lost. Other ships of more than 2,000 tons which were lost in August, 1916, were:

British: Tottenham, 3,106 tons; Favonian, 3,049 tons; Mount Coniston, 3,018 tons; Aaro, 2,603 tons; Trident, 3,129 tons; San Bernardo, 3,803 tons; Antiope, 2,793 tons; Whitgift, 4,397 tons; Britannic, 3,487 tons; Heighington, 2,800 tons; and Newburn, 3,554 tons.

Italian: Citta di Messina, 2,464 tons; Hermerberg, 2,824 tons; Siena, 4,372 tons; Teti, 2,868 tons; Nereus, 3,980 tons; Angelo, 8,609 tons; Sebastiano, 3,995 tons; Stampalia, 9,000.

Other nations: Ivar, Danish, 2,139 tons; Kohina Maru, Japanese, 3,164 tons; Tenmei Maru, Japanese, 3,360 tons; Tricoupis, Greek, 2,387 tons; Ganekogorta Mendi, Spanish, 3,061 tons; Pagasarri, Spanish, 3,287 tons.

Of vessels smaller than 2,000 tons the losses to the various nations were as follows: Great Britain, 23; France, 6; Italy, 10; Russia, 4; Norway, 9; Sweden, 6; Holland, 2; Denmark, 3; Greece, 3.

A large discrepancy regarding the total number and tonnage of Allied and neutral merchantmen sunk by mines and submarines was again noticeable in the figures published in the United States newspapers and in official statements of the German admiralty.

The latter on October 26, 1916, announced that 180 ships with a total tonnage of 254,600 had been sunk, of which 141 of 182,000 tons belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 39 of 72,600 tons to neutral nations. The New York "Journal of Commerce," on October 5, 1916, published a summary of merchantmen lost during September, 1916, which accounted only for 70 vessels of 150,317 tons, of which 25 were said to have belonged to Great Britain and 18 to neutral Norway, while France lost 4, Italy 4, Sweden 5, Denmark 4, Spain, Greece, and Holland each 2, and Belgium 1. Of all these the following were more than 2,000 tons:

British: Duart, 3,108 tons; Strathalian, 4,404 tons; Swift Wings, 4,465 tons; Kelvinia, 3,140 tons; Torridge, 5,036 tons; Strathtay, 4,428 tons; Heathdene, 3,541 tons; Llangorse, 3,841 tons; Butetown, 2,466 tons; Bronwen, 4,250 tons; Strathe, 2,500 tons; Newby, 2,168 tons; Counsellor, 4,958 tons; Lexie, 3,778 tons; Swedish Prince, 3,712 tons; Roddam, 3,218 tons; Lord Tredegar, 3,856 tons; Dewa, 3,802 tons.

Norwegian: Elizabeth IV, 4,182 tons; Polynesia, 4,064 tons; Bufjord, 2,284 tons; Qvindeggen, 2,610 tons; Furu, 2,029 tons; Isdalen, 2,275 tons.

Other nations: Antwerpen, Dutch, 11,000 tons; Benpark, Italian, 3,842 tons; Gamen, Swedish, 2,617 tons; Luis Vives, Spanish, 2,394 tons; Assimacos, Greek, 2,898 tons.

For the month of October, 1916, the New York "Journal of Commerce" placed its total figures of Allied and neutral merchantmen sunk by mines or submarines at 127 vessels of 227,116 tons, according to a compilation published on November 3, 1916. No official figures of the German Government for October, 1916, were available. Of the above-mentioned 127 vessels, Great Britain lost 38; Norway, 56; Sweden, 10; Denmark, 8; Greece, 5; Russia, 4; Holland, 3; France, Belgium, and Rumania, each 1. Of these the following were of more than 2,000 tons:

British: Franconia, 18,150 tons; Alaunia, 13,405 tons; Welsh Prince, 4,934 tons; Rowanmore, 10,320 tons; Astoria, 4,262 tons; Cabotia, 4,309 tons; Midland, 4,247 tons; Cluden, 3,166 tons; Barbara, 3,740 tons; Framfield, 2,510 tons; Ethel Duncan, 2,510 tons; Sidmouth, 4,045 tons; Crosshill, 5,002 tons; Sebek, 4,601 tons; Renylan, 3,875 tons; Strathdene, 4,321 tons; West Point, 3,847 tons; Stephano, 3,449 tons.

Norwegian: Christian Knudsen, 4,224 tons; Risholm, 2,155 tons; Snestadt, 2,350 tons; Edam, 2,381 tons; Sola, 3,057 tons; Bygdo, 2,345 tons.

Russian: Tourgai, 4,281 tons; Mercator, 2,827 tons.

Dutch: Bloomersdijk, 4,850 tons.

Greek: George M. Embiricos, 3,636 tons; Massalia, 2,186 tons; Germaine, 2,573 tons.

Rumanian: Bistritza, 3,668 tons.

More interest than ever before in submarine warfare was aroused in this country when the German war submarine U-53 unexpectedly made its appearance in the harbor of Newport, R. I., during the afternoon of October 7, 1916. About three hours afterward, without having taken on any supplies, and after explaining her presence by the desire of delivering a letter addressed to Count von Bernstorff, then German Ambassador at Washington, the U-53 left as suddenly and mysteriously as she had appeared.

This was the first appearance of a war submarine in an American port. It was claimed that the U-53 had made the trip from Wilhelmshaven in seventeen days. She was 213 feet long, equipped with two guns, four torpedo tubes, and an exceptionally strong wireless outfit. Besides her commander, Captain Rose, she was manned by three officers and thirty-three men.

Early the next morning, October 8, 1916, it became evident what had brought the U-53 to this side of the Atlantic. At the break of day she made her reappearance southeast of Nantucket. The American steamer Kansan of the American Hawaiian Company bound from New York by way of Boston to Genoa was stopped by her, but after proving her nationality and neutral ownership was allowed to proceed. Five other steamships, three of them British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian, were less fortunate. The British freighter Strathend, of 4,321 tons, was the first victim. Her crew were taken aboard the Nantucket Shoals Lightship. Two other British freighters, West Point and Stephano, followed in short order to the bottom of the ocean. The crews of both were saved by United States torpedo-boat destroyers which had come from Newport as soon as news of the U-53's activities had been received there. This was also the case with the crews of the Dutch ship Bloomersdijk and the Norwegian tanker Christian Knudsen.

On December 20, 1916, the German admiralty announced that the total losses inflicted on Allied and neutral merchantmen by submarines and mines during November, 1916, amounted to 191 vessels of 408,500 tons. Of these 138 ships of 314,500 belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 53 ships of 94,000 tons to neutral countries.

On November 13, 1916, the Norwegian steamship Older, on passage from Newport to Gibraltar, was captured by a German submarine, which placed a prize crew on board her. For a time the submarine remained in company. Eventually, however, the Older separated from the submarine, apparently with the intention of making for a German port. She was intercepted by a British ship of war, recaptured, and brought into a British port, and the prize crew were made prisoners of war.

The losses of Allied and neutral merchantmen sunk by submarines and mines during the month of December, 1916, according to the New York "Journal of Commerce," totaled 134 vessels of 251,750 tons, of which 53 vessels of 157,217 tons belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 81 vessels of 84,533 tons to neutrals.

Among the largest of these were the following British boats: King Malcom, 4,351 tons; Reapwell, 3,417 tons; Luciston, 2,948 tons; Moeraki, 4,392 tons; King Bleddyn, 4,387 tons; Couch, 5,620 tons; Tanfield, 4,358 tons; Avristan, 3,818 tons; Strathalbyn, 4,331 tons; Ursula, 5,011 tons; Bretwalda, 4,037 tons; Westminster, 4,342 tons.