p-books.com
by Victor LeFebure
by J. Walker McSpadden
Previous Part     1  2  3  4  5  6
Home - Random Browse

The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in principle, but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled?

Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions production to factories or works approved by the Allied and Associated Governments. "All other establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall be closed down."

True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants, have a dual function for peace and war. But their recent vital use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope of the above clause. Are they still equipped for war purposes? Very drastic action will have been necessary by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer. Has that action been taken? If not, the I.G., a second Krupp, remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent. of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous. Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168?

Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army, must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless." The most formidable examples of such excess production were, and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs of the German Army. Why, then, should they be left. intact?

What is the authorised equipment of the German Army? In the first place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden by the Treaty. The plants in question are therefore all in excess of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless. At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month. Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment? If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty.

The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell. Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available, could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production of little more than one day!

Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need?

Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by the Treaty. It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants, or in special plants of the same type. Germany's great advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly. The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are given below, under (A) and (B) :

A B C Country. Dye Production, Home Dye Dye Production, 1913. Consumption. 1918, Tons Tons Tons Germany 135,000 20,000 135,000 (probably more) Switzerland 10,000 3,000 12,000 France 7,500 9,430 18,000 U.K . 4,500 31,730 25,000 U.S.A 3,000 26,020 27,000 Other Countries 3,000 72,820 4,000 —— —— —— Total 163,000 163,000 221,000

The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed. If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war raison d'etre unless the feeble production of other countries had even further diminished.

Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption? There is an increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum. Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly. Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives.

There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants. There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them. In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon. Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use, the claim could not be supported before neutral experts. The Treaty provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants. Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this critical disarmament measure. The need may justify Treaty exemption for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect is not so overwhelmingly important. The matter demands examination. We can hardly conceive that this has not been done. Are our missions equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter? In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G. munition plants. Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument.

The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubtedly demand the same critical examination. These plants were built almost entirely for war purposes, for the production of ammonia to be oxidised to nitric acid. Ammonium nitrate also resulted. These substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, as a matter of fact, their production in these very plants was the chief factor which enabled Germany to continue the war beyond 1915.

Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, the plants should "be destroyed or rendered useless." Here, possibly, strong arguments will be advanced by Germany for the retention of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil. The argument is strong, for the impoverishment of German soil has been such as to demand, theoretically, enormous tonnages of ammonium sulphate. But it is vital, for the stability of peace, that this unique capacity for producing explosives must not remain the monopoly of any one country. It is the expressed intention of certain governments outside Germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise. If, then, we admit the immunity of these German plants from the Treaty, for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow Germany to use this privilege as a military advantage.

In other words, if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions. In the first place, the plants to evade the Treaty clauses must be proved necessary for German agriculture. Secondly, the products of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other. As far as we know, no attempt has been made to apply the Treaty to the nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead of being mainly used for agriculture on German soil, have served as a deliberate weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries.

Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full demands of German agriculture were met, the plants built and projected leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use. According to the Frankfurter Zeitung of November 23rd, 1919, the total consumption of nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as follows:

Tons Source and Nature Tons Calculated as Nitrogen Chili Saltpetre 750,000 116,000 Ammonium Sulphate 460,000, 92,000 Norwegian Nitrate 35,000 4,500 Calcium Cyanamide 30,000 6,000 Haber Ammonium Sulphate (by Fixation) 20,000 4,000 ———- Total 222,500

The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the capacity of the finished Haber plants to be equivalent to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum, and the total consumption of the old German Empire was thus less than the amount available from one source alone, i.e. nitrogen fixation by the Haber process. But other pre-war German sources of nitrogen, expanded by the war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota. We can therefore very safely assume German capacity of above 400,000 tons of nitrogen per annum, approximately twice the pre-war consumption. It is exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually consume such a quantity. In any case, a large excess is now deliberately used to recapture world chemical markets, and this, as explained above, should be dealt with under the Treaty even if special immunity be afforded the capacity required for home purposes. We are indeed entitled to ask, what is being done on this vital matter?

Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind into Germany. Considered from the point of view of chemical munitions, this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation. Far from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves Germany the greatest potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world. Further, it is not improbable that countries outside Germany may encourage her in munitions production for export. Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in December, 1914: "Supposing our War Minister had been in the last few years buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness, and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp's of Essen. Gentlemen, I think he would have been lynched about three months ago."

We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days! Knowing the true war significance of the I.G. as a second Krupp, if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries, that warning may become a prophecy.

Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous materials in Germany.

Has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control? With such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production, need Germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace? Once engaged in war, what is the value of the prohibition? True, failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of the Treaty. But a similar breach of International Convention is already involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 171: "The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc."

It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties be actually incurred for the existing breach, why Article IV would be a serious deterrent for the future.

A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this Treaty Article, and the actual operation of other Articles which should support it.

The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference to chemical warfare. They issued a special edict against its use. This alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures of general application to the means of production of the different types of weapon. Have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic action under the Treaty? It is to be feared that they and other war chemical plants of the I.G. have received undeserved immunity.

Where lies our help apart from the Treaty? World peace depends upon disarmament. True peace must come from a radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals. The forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers. But a League of Nations can forward the cause by wise measures of disarmament, and this implies limiting war producing capacity. The weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry. There must be a redistribution of capacity, for while Germany retains a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions, which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas, and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration and sustenance, disarmament will be a hollow farce.

The League of Nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production of certain munitions. But organic chemical factories must survive for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity. They cannot be inspected and controlled, as we have shown, and there is only one sound solution. The obstacle to peace must be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories. We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country. It now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created and wielded it with such success. Redistributed, this dangerous productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength to a League of Nations, and will invite a national sense of security, so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime. This has only one meaning, the establishment of dye industries in Allied countries. This may clash with certain political schools of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of the organic way in which production links up with national defence. But let there be no misunderstanding. The refusal to support this critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues. Political principles responsible for such opposition no longer merit the name; they have become a fetish.

Our armies repelled the German chemical attack. They stood and fell unprotected before the early German clouds and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas. The awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more than rest contented with the sacrifice. It is an imperative and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the race, and to the Empire, that, faced once again with modern war, we should be able to say, "every possible precaution was taken." But the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic chemical industries are fostered on Imperial soil.

But what of chemical warfare itself? It is a growth, malignant or otherwise, according to our creeds, which will continue until very definite steps be taken to suppress it, with all war. Therefore, urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely essential until the web of peace is strongly organised, which cannot be until the immediate menace of the monopoly in production is removed. But even then, until the general peace is fairly implanted, we must be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous enemy. Research and training in chemical protection must be continued, and this can only be ensured by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare. "The Struggle for the Initiative" has at least established this.

Each nation and any League of Nations must seriously face the question of the establishment of elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisations. It seems to me that the logical course of thought and action is as follows. If guarantees are forthcoming, internationally, removing this grave German chemical warfare threat through her manufacturing monopoly, then the need for a definite chemical striking force and organisation will be greatly reduced. National safety is itself a corollary of world disarmament. But if satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming it would be consistent with national safety to limit the chemical warfare equipment of each nation to what would actually represent a scientific military brain. So long as national ministries for war or defence exist, they must possess even under the most stringent disarmament conditions, fully accredited within their regular staffs, an individual or individuals with scientific and military training, who represent knowledge, vision, and the power to expand in chemical warfare. What would be said of a great nation not equipped to think for the future on naval or artillery questions? Technical naval and military minds have evolved for these purposes. We are not slow to judge and act on the value of a new ship, tank, or machine-gun. The chemical arm is even more specialised and demands the same combination of scientific and military thinking and training. Whatever international disarmament decisions may be forthcoming, unless they seriously dismember the Defence Ministries, we should ensure that the pre-war position is corrected and that our staff conception and organisation covers the chemical weapon.

One alone of the Allied and Associated Powers was able to see the chemical menace with clear and unprejudiced vision. This was America, for she not only entered the war less hampered by traditions than the rest, but at a period when the chemical war was in full blast. More than a quarter of all her casualties were due to "gas," and no other arm produced as many in her ranks. As a result, we see America establishing an independent peace Chemical Warfare Service, as sister service to the Infantry and Artillery. This can only be interpreted as a frank realisation of the place of chemical warfare and of the need for serious international guarantees in the present situation.

Let us take a balanced view of the facts, realise the unique significance of chemical warfare and chemical industry, for war and disarmament, and act accordingly.



INDEX {Raw OCR, needs fixed or stripped out...}

A. charcoal, 129. Aircraft, gas and, 181, 185, 229, 230, 231. Aisne, German attacks on, 77, 141. Aktien Gesellschaft fur Anilin Fabrikation, 151. Alert Gas Zone, 229. Alien Property Custodian, report of, Y9, 152, 187, 189) 190, 191, 194~ 262. Allied Gas Statistics, 82. -Missions, 86, 87-Reaction, 48. American activities, 64, 1731 174. -chemical warfare development, 105, 173P 174, 178, 273f 274. chemical warfare service, 49, 178P 3179) 274. Amidol, 203. Ammonia, synthetic, see Nitrogen Fixation. Anaesthetics, 201, 220. -local, 199, 202, 220. Anti-Gas Committee, British, 95. -Department, British, 98, 127. Armendires, bombardment of, 77. Arras, Battle of, 63-, British 1917 offensive, 61. Arsenic Compounds, 26, 28, 69, 136, 137) 139, x6o, x63- See also Blue Cross. Artillery Gas experts, 91. Asphyxiating Compounds, 25. Aspirin, 199, 208.

Austria-Hungary, gas battalion of, 47. Azo Dyes, 16o.

Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, 88, 1151P 207P 212. Bleaching Powder, x6g, 221, 222. Blue Cross, 29, 69, 74-771 89, 126, 131P 132, 136p 137, z6o, 229, 253, 258. Bn. Stuff, 42. Box Respirator, British, 69, 99,

1101P 125, x26t 176. Bribery and Corruption, x9o. British Association, General Hartley's report, 64, 123, 240.— Central Laboratory, 93,1115. -Dyes Limited, 116g, x6g. Brominated m ethyl -ethylketone, 42. Bromine, American Industry, 157) 190, 191. -French, 1157, 171P z96. -Monopoly, German, 157. Bromoacetone, 26, 41. B. Stuff, 4r. Buntkreuz, ii3q.

Cacodyl oxide, 35. Cambrai sector, attack Or', 70, 79. Camouflage chemicals, 141, 217, 218. Canadians, gas attack on, 19. Captured Documents, 52, 53t 74, 82, 128, 133, 221, 222, 229. Carnoy, attack at, 61. 27S Index

Cartridge Mask, German, 124, 3128. Castner Kellner, 169. Casualties, gas, 56, 93, X74, 182, 237-241, 274. Chaulny, 209. Chemical Advisory Committee, 96. -Exchange Association, x94, z96. -Initiative, see Initiative, struggle for. -Policy, German, z86-i8S, 200, 205. -Warfare Department, British, 96-98.—Designs Committee, 99.—Medical Committee, 97. -Organisations, 85, 215, 217, 228, 239, 264. ngliSh, 92, 9'~,—' E

103~ 105, 165.—, French, 94, 99, 100, 105.—, German, 85, 89, 102, 103, 149. Italian, iox. Policy, 88, 249p 250. Production, see Production. Research, see Research.—Service, American, see American Chemical Warfare Service. Chemische Fabrik Griesheim Elektron, iSi, 152.—Fabriken Yorm. Weilerter-Meer, x5x. Chloral Hydrate, 196, 202. Chlorine, 23, Z5, 35, 36, x55, 156, 169, 171p 217. 276

ChlormethylchIoroform ate, 64,6 9. Chloroform, z20. Chlorpicrin, 25, 158, 169. Cloud Gas attacks, 23, 46~ Szy 56, 57, 65, 215. Coloured Cross, x39. Colour Users Association, Y69. Commercial Advisory Committee, British, 96. Critical Industries, 261-z63, 272. -Range, 226, 229.

Defence, national, see Dye Industry and National Defence. Dianisidine, double salts Of, 41. Dichlor-diethyl-sulphide, see Mustard Gas. Dichlor-methylether, x63. Diethfiamine, 201. Diphenylchlorarsine, see Arsenic compounds. Diphenylcyanarsine, see Arsenic compounds. Diphosgene, 25, 29, 157, 163. Directeur du Mat6riel Chimique de Guerre, ioo. Director of Gas Services, 94, 98. Disarmament, 20, 2,, 142, 145, 150, 172t 177, 242, 245, 246, 252, 254-262, 267, 271-274. See also Limitation of Armaments. Drugs, igg-2or. Dumps, enemy, 79# 141. Dye Agency, German information system, r92, x93, 1957 197. -Industry and National Defence, 163, 171t 172t 198, 203, 204, 272. -Industry, British, 146, 168, 203 204-

Index

Dye Industry, German, 146, 147, 153$ x86, 242, 25 -Monopoly, German, see Monopoly, German Dye. supplies to America, 197. Dyes, use in Gas Shell, 72. Edgewood Arsenal, xo5, xo6, 175-178Entressin experimental grounds,

110. Espionage, 192, 193Ether, 220. Fthyldichlorarsine, x63. Ethylenemonochlorhydrin, x64, 202. P-Eucaine, 202. Exhaustion of Stocks, forced, go. Explosives, English Production, x6g. German Production, i4q, 1150) 1151. Farben fabriken vorm. Fr. Bayer

and CO., 90, 15T, 194, 208. Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius and Briining, 87, 151Field Organisation, British, go.—German, go. -Tests, 86, xio. Flame Projector, see Flammenwerfer. Flammenwerfer, 43, 631, 72) 73Flexibility of Supply, German, 65, 138. French College of Warfare, 185. Full Line Forcing, x9o. Future of Chemical Warfare, 14-4, 183.

Gas and Aircraft, see Aircraft. -Casualties, see Casualties, gas. -Discipline, 62, 81-82, 132P 133, 140-

Gas Experts on Artillery staffs, see Artillery Gas Experts. -Mask, see Mask, gas, and Helmet, gas.—Personnel, 89.—Regiment~ go, gi.—School, German, 86, go, gi. -Shell, see Shell, gas. -Specific uses Of, 39Gaswerfer, 1918, 71Gelbolin, 221. German Dye Industry, see Dye Industry, German. Patent Policy, see Patent Policy, German. Press, 33, 54. -Production, see Production, German. Givenchy, attack near, 51, 70Green Cross, 29, 69P 77, 135, ,36, i5g.

Haber Process, see Nitrogen. Fixation. Hague Convention, 32, 33, 240Hanlon Field, experimental sta tion, 175, 2318Hartley Mission, 87, 14 149,

172, 207, 245. Heeres-Gasschule, see Gas

School, German. Helmet, Gas, X21, 122, 124- See also Mask. Hexamine, x22. Hill 6o, attack on, 40. Hindenburg Programme, 66, 89, 149. 116chst, Y7, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, x6x. Hohenzollern Redoubt, storming Of, 51. Hooge, attack on 2nd Army, 44. 277 I ndex

Hydrocyanic acid, see Prussic acid,

I.G., see Interessen Gemeinschaft. Immune Functions, 217, 2x8, 232. Imperial College of Science, 97Indigo, 28, 155t 158, 159, 165, x68, 202, 255. Initiative, Struggle for, 111, 121, 1347 273Interessen Gemeinschaft, 18, 32, 86, 89, 109P 148, 149-151, z54, 163, x86, 187, 192, 198, 200, 202, 205, 214, 258-26o, 264-267, 27P. Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, 107-Commission of Control, $5, 264.—Liaison, xo6.—Munitions Council, 107. Intensive Chemical Warfare, 66. International Police Force, 256.

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 35, 85, $9. Kalle and Co., 151, Kernmel, attack on, 77, 224, 229. K. Stuff, 41KornmandeurderGastruppen,gi, Krupp's Works, 206.

La Bassie Canal, 76. LachrymatorS, 26, 42, x18, 124, 156, 170, 2171 218. League of Nations, 2r, 127, 259, 246, 247, 255, 256, 258, 26o, 261, 262, 2631 271-273Lens, attack at, 77, 76. Le Rutoire Farm, 43, Leopold Cassella, G.m.b.H., 3151. Leverkusen, 86, go, z4g, r5lt 156-158, L59, z61, 208, 250. Levinstein Limited, x68, 16q. 278

Lewis Gun, 252. Limitation of Armament, 114, 244-248, 254, 264, 265, 267See also Disarmament. Livens Projector, 29, 6o, 41, 65, 90) IOT, 133, 175, 2x6, 227) 228, 245, 252. Longworth Bill, 178. Loos, Battle Of, 43, 50, ix8f 170Ludwigshafen, 88, 151, i56p 159# r6o, x61.

M2, French Mask, 135. March, 19x8, German Offensive, 17, 69, 76, 219, 224Marne, Battle of, 94, 143, 205Mask, first improvised gas, 121. See also Helmet, gas.—German cartridge, see Cartridge Mask, German.—M2 French, see M2, French Mask. resistance of, to breathing, 130, 1311 140MetOl, 203. Minist6re de I'Artillerie et des Munitions, 200. Monchy, attack at, 55. Monopoly, Germany Dye, z8, 38, 148, i8g, 198, 214, 266. Montauban attack, 55. Munitions Inventions Department, 97. Mustard Gas, 27-29, 28, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 78, 8r, 89, xig, 136t 1137, 141, 158, 170, 216, 217, 221, 224, 230, 236, 240, 2491 255, 258, 272.—Allied Production, 8o, 81, zo,4, 164Y 165, x68, 171-casualties, 69', 224#

Index

Mustard Gas, defensive use of, 229.—- first use of, 66~ 67, 215. German production, 158, 202. protection a g a i n I t, 137, 221, 222. Surprise, 66, 67, 69.

National Health Insurance Commission, 164, 201. Neglect of Chemical Industry,

171, 187New War Chemicals, see War Chemicals. Nieuport, 66, 67, 217Nitric Acid, 171. Nitrogen Fixation, 88, 171s z86, 205, 208, 211-213, 244, 26o, 265, 2671 268, 269. No-Man's-Land, fvture, 227, 229Non-persistent substances, 28, 29. Novocain, 201.

Obstacle, new type Of, 223, 229. Organic Chemical Industry, 145,

235, 2S6, 250, 251, 271Oxalic Acid, igo.

Particulate Clouds, 140, 232. Patent Policy, German, x91. Penetrants, 29. Persistent lethal substance, 225227, 229, 231. -substances, 29, 29. Phenol, German cornering of, 194. Phenylca rbyl amine chloride, 158. Phosgene, 25, 29, 64, 69, 124,141, 156, z67, 217, 230, 249. 4,delayed action," 45, 53French development of, T 70 German cloud, 44-46. Phosphorus, r75, 181-

Photographic chemicals, 189, 203. Physiological classification, 25. Poison gas, 25, 1507 151. Porton, experimental station, 97,

110'. Portuguese front, attack on, 77. Potassium permanganate, 126, 2M Price cutting policy, German, 189, 213. Production, 83, 149, 162, 163, 249, 250. critical importance of, 143Y 144, 171, 26o. statistics, 82, 83, 88. Projector, German development Of, 70) 711. -Livens, see Livens Projector. -short range, 182. Propaganda by German dye agents, igr. -,German use of, 113. Protection, 38, 90, 92, 95, 99, loop 109, 113p 114) 121, 124~ 125, 127~ 128, 176, 216, 217, 220, 221. -collective, 231, 233. -future deinclopmentS, 231. -Individual, 231, 232. -of animals, 92. Prussic acid, 26, ixS. Puteaux, American laboratory, 175, 21S.

Rechicourt, attack on French, 7(RedCross appeal toendwar, i ig. Research, 35,85, 108Y176,184,249. Respirator, Box, see Box Respirator. -drurns, 97.—XTXY 13 5. Rhincland occupation, Allied, 206. 279 Index

Royal Society, 50, 94-97. Rubber, German shortage of, x32. Russia, gas attacks against, 47, 123p 124.

St. Mihiel Battle, z82. Salicylic acid, igg, x94, igg. Salvarsan, igg. Scientific Advisory Committee, 499 95, 96. Serni-Circular Canals, 2x5. Sensitisers, photographic, 203. Service Chemique de Guerre, ioS. Shell, Gas, 30, 40, 41, 64., 136,

A3, 216.

-Falkenhayn's orders,+3.—percentage Of, 77, 79, 80, 141, 245. Smoke, future importance of, ISO, 181, 2A. -use with lethal gases, i40, 180. Somme offensive, 52,55, 6r, 64,143. Speculative element, 2115, 220. Special Brigade R.E., 52, x74. -Companies, 50, 93. Sternutatory compounds, a6, 28, 41. Stokes Mortar, 29, 52, 175. Stovaine, 220. Strategy, chemical, see Tactics and Strategy. Sulphur Black, 155. Sulphuric acid, 171, 253. Supply Department, British, iox, 105. -Organisations, ioz. Surprise, critical factor of, 31, 32, 53, 111. 113, 114, 144.

Tactics and Strategy, 215, 216, 225. Tactical classification, 25, 28. 280

Tanks, 143, 217, 227) 253P 254, 247, 248. Technik im Weltkriege, Die, 36 371 40) 417 47, 51, 57, 69, 74: 80,125,128,129,135, 136,141. Thermite shell, 175. Thiodiglycol, 159. Toxic compounds, 26. Treaty Stocks, 150. Trench Warfare Department, British, 95, 96. Re~earch Department, 96. Supply Department, 96, io5, 170Tri-chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, 64, 157. T. Stuffy 41. Verdun, gas attack at, 69. Versailles, TreatY'Of, 34,150,210, 242-244, 264-267, 270, 271. Vesicant Compounds, 27, 137) 217, 239Vested Interests, 258, 259. Vincennite, zi8. War chemicals, new, 217, 225.—Physiological classification, see Physiological classification.—Tactical classification, see Tactical Classification. Warsaw, cloud attacks, 123. White Cross shell, 225. Xylyl bromide, 41, 156. Xylylene dibromide, 41. Yellow Cross, see Mustard Gas. Yperite, 8o, z66. Ypres, first German gas attack, 23~ 31, 32, 38-first Mustard gas, 66, 217. Yser, raid by Germans, 117.

NAME INDEX

Albert, Dr., x94-x96, 197t 198-

Bacon, Colonel R. F., 218. Baeyer, Professor, 27Baker, Professor H. B., 95Barley, Major, D.S.O., 46. Beilby, Sir George, 96. Bernstorff, von, 194. Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 111, 197. Boy-Ed, Captain, 197. Bueb, Dr., 212.

Cadman, Sir John, 96. Chevalier, Medecin aide-major,

27Crossley, Professor A. W., 95,

97Curmer, General, 99.

Davies, Major David, M.P., 1172, 255, 257, 258. Davy, J., 249. Dawson, Sergeant-Major, 5z. Debeney, General, 185. Duisberg, Herr, 1+7, 208-

Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, x9g.

Falkenhayn, General, 94, 147) 148. Foch, Marshal, 175. Foulkes, Brig.—General C. H., 92.

French, Field-Marshal Sir 31t 43, 48Fries, Brig.—General A. A., 114, 17S9 177t 1791 1809 183Fuller, Colonel J. F. C., 227, 233-

Garvan, Francis P., i8q, 195, 197, 199Geyer, Captain, 136-140. Green, Prof. A. G., 168. Grey, Viscount, 256, 257. Guthrie, 249.

Haber, Professor, 35, 49, 85, 90Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 54. Haldane, Dr., 121. Harrison, Lieut.—Colonel E. F., 98, x26. Hartley, Brig.—General H., 63, 76, 98, 123, 240. Horrocks, Sir William, 95Hossenf elder, Consul-General,

197-

Jackson, Colonel L., 942 95Joyce, Colonel, 212.

Kirschbaum, Prof. F. P., 1135. Kitchener, Lord, 33, 94~ 95) 121) 237. Kling, M., i0o. Krupp, von Bohlen, Herr, 147,

259 281 Name Index

Lambert, Major, 126. Lebeau, Professor P., iot. Levinstein, Dr. H., 168. Livens, Major, 6o. Lodge, Sir Oliver, 94, Ludendorff, General, 70, 82P 90, 91) 114) 147, 149, 259.

Meyer, Victor, 27 Macpherson, Captain, z2i. McConnel, Lieut., 208. Moulton of Bank, Rt. Hon.

Lord, 5, 16q, 242) 243, 270. Moureu, M. Charles, 200.

Norris, Colonel, 206, 208, 209.

Ozil, General, 200, 105.

Palmer, Mitchell, ig, z8g. Paterno, Senator, zoi. Penna, Colonel, zoi. Pick, Dr. H., iz5, i2q, 130, 131. Pollard, Professor A. F., zz2. Pope, Sir William, z65, 191, 202.

Ramsay, Sir William, 9+. Rayleigh, Lord, 94. Runciman, W., 146-

Sachur, Professor, 35. Schmaus, Lieut. Dr., 75, Schwarte, see Technik im Weltkriege (Subject Index). Schweitzer, Dr. Hugo, 194, 195,

211. Sering, Dr. Max, zii. Stieglitz, Professor Julius, x9r,

198, 200.

Thomasl Albert, 200. Thorpe, Prof. J. F., 96, 99. Thuillier, Major-General H. F.,

94, 98P 105-

Villavecehia, Prof. zot. Vincent, Monsieur, 200.

Watson, Colonel, 95. Weiss, M., 200. Wells, H. G., izz. Wing, Major-General, 43.

282

THE END

Previous Part     1  2  3  4  5  6
Home - Random Browse