"I thanked M. Klobukowski, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighboring states of their engagements toward us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic."

M. Davignon telegraphed to all the Belgian Legations abroad:

"The Minister of War informs me that [Belgian] mobilization has been ordered, and that Saturday, August 1, will be the first day."

He telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris, that the British Minster had reported Sir Edward Grey's inquiry to France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality, and now formally states that he presumes—

"that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other powers will respect and maintain it.

"I thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

"I stated that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganization, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

"In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilize our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

"Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me."

He telegraphed to the same ministers that the German Minister, Herr von Below Saleske, had been informed of Belgium's military measures, and that it was explained to him

"a consequence of our desire to fulfill our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust toward our neighbors."

The German Minister was reminded of instructions his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had given to his predecessor, Herr von Flotow.

"In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

"The [Belgian] Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

"Since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow [German Secretary of State] had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

"Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed."

SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1914

Austria. On the following day Count Szapary, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "I first warned M. Sazonof," said the count, "that in interpreting my instructions to him I must leave out of account the new condition of affairs in Vienna created by the general Russian mobilization. I then said that it was a mistake that Austria had declined further negotiations with Russia.

"Your excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.

"I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the good will of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London. I replied that your excellency, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your excellency."

Germany. The German White Book states:

"As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, the kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5 p. m.

"The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Count Pourtales] was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. [He so declared at 5 p. m.] However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

"Thus Russia began the war against us.

"The French Prime Minister [M. Viviani] gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1 at 1 p. m., which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

"On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities."

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Lichnowsky at London:

"Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, August 3, at 7 p. m., in case England's assent is received by that time."

Lichnowsky answered that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked him

"whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this."

At 5.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed that Grey had just read to him the following unanimous declaration of the British Cabinet:

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

"On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The minister said he would make inquiries; he also recognized the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides."

At 8.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed:

"My communication of this morning is canceled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous."

At 7.10 p. m. Ambassador Pourtales presented at St. Petersburg a note repeating the ultimatum of July 31, and closing:

"Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it necessary to answer*] this demand, and having shown by this refusal [this attitude*] that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your excellency as follows:

"His majesty the emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

"* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note."

Russia. A secret telegram was sent to Russian representatives abroad announcing Germany's ultimatum delivered at midnight, and stating the German Ambassador's reply to the inquiry if it meant war: "No, but we are very near it."

Ambassador Benckendorff telegraphed from London that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that no great power would open hostilities before the formula for a peaceful settlement of the disputes, accepted by Russia and offered to Germany, had been considered. Later he telegraphed that France had agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but that Germany had stated she could give no definite answer to the question.

Ambassador Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szecsen] yesterday visited Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] and declared to him that Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of Kriegszustand, mobilization is in reality being carried out."

Later he telegraphed that, hearing from St. Petersburg of the German order of general mobilization, President Poincare had signed the order for French mobilization.

"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has just visited Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilization issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the powers. He added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg."

Great Britain. George V sent the following telegram to William II:

"Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned."

Upon receipt of the telegram from the German Kaiser of August 1, King George replied that there must be a misunderstanding in regard to the suggestion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made to the German Ambassador, respecting avoidance of conflict between Germany and France, while the possibility remained of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia.

"Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side."

King George replied to the letter of President Poincare of July 31, assuring him of cooperation of their two Governments in the interest of peace.

"I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one."

Grey sent a personal message from King George to Nicholas II in which he appealed to the czar to remove the misunderstanding that had evidently produced the deadlock between Russia and Germany, and offered his assistance in reopening the conversations between Russia and Austria.

The Czar replied to King George that attempts at peace had been that afternoon rendered futile by Germany's declaration of war, which was wholly unexpected by him, since he had given William II "most categorical assurances that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued."

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you."

Ambassador Bertie, telegraphing from Paris, reported an interview that morning between the French Political Director and German Ambassador Schoen.

"M. Berthelot pointed out that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

"The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up."

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna that a general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet had been ordered. Minister Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:

"Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs [Davignon] said that they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the Hamburg authorities had detained British merchant ships on unknown grounds, and instructed him to request the German Government to order their release.

"The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible."

Later Grey telegraphed Goschen that he still believed it possible to secure peace if a little respite could be gained before any great power began war. Russia and Austria had at last agreed to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to objections raised to the original Russian formula.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope the German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to, in order to avoid tension. His majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."

In following telegrams Grey sent Goschen the Russian formula as amended by himself, and the acceptance of the same by Russia.

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris information received from President Poincare of German mobilization, etc., and Russia's desire to continue pacific conversations with Germany.

"The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that reliable news had come from Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian Government,

"though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Sazonof] and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that orders for general mobilization had been given at 3.30 p. m., in answer to the German Kriegsgefahrzustand (imminence of war), which, by calling out troops up to war strength, is tantamount to mobilization.

"The Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna an account of interviews with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Count Mensdorff gave him assurances that Austria would not impair the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia, and said that, contrary to report, Austria was willing to continue conversations with Russia.

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed Grey of an interview that morning with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which M. Sazonof recounted his conversation with Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador, the evening before, in which he proposed the London conference.

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed Grey from Vienna that the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, thought that, as mobilization is too expensive to be continued long, Germany will attack Russia at once. Tension now is greater between Russia and Germany than between Russia and Austria. Russia would be satisfied, says Schebeko, with Austria's acceptance of the new formula.

"He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Count Berchtold] that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

"It is the intention of the French Ambassador [Dumaine] to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin:

"Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be August 2."

Later he telegraphed that Secretary of State von Jagow had expressed annoyance at detention of British ships at Hamburg, and promised to order their immediate release.

France. M. Viviani, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome of the two demarches made on the previous evening at Paris and St. Petersburg—"the one rather vague, the other precise and conciliatory."

"Unfortunately these [latter] arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany [in presenting her ultimatum to Russia].

"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. [Here he recounted the interview with the German Ambassador Schoen at the French Foreign Office.]

"This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported Austria's willingness to continue conversations with Russia.

"The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia."

He told of the interviews of the British Ambassador with Secretary of State von Jagow, in which Mr. Goschen vainly pleaded that Germany use her influence with Austria in the cause of peace.

"Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy."

It looks as if she desired war on her own account.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ambassadors at London and Berlin and the Minister of Brussels of his pledge to respect Belgian neutrality as given to Great Britain.

Ambassador Barrere reported from Rome an interview of the German Ambassador with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Herr von Flotow had asked the intentions of Italy in the present crisis.

"The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war."

M. Viviani reported to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople the visit to him at 11 a. m. of German Ambassador Schoen.

"After having recalled all the efforts made by France toward an honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday [in reference to Austro-Russian dispute].

"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this power had just accepted the British formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

"Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

"Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

"It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work toward an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London the situation between Great Britain and Germany, especially in regard to British neutrality and Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

"Sir Edward Grey will ask the Cabinet to authorize him to state on Monday in the House of Commons that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

"In the second place, the British fleet is mobilized, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through, will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time."

Minister Mollard presented the request from Dr. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, for an assurance that France would respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy. A similar request has been made to Germany.

M. Viviani returned the same assurance that he had given in the case of Belgium.

Belgium. M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to carry out the instructions [in case of war between France and Germany becoming imminent] of July 24; and to the Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg to carry out instructions [the same] of July 25.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day, Ambassador Szogyeny telegraphed from Berlin that no answer had been received from Russia to Germany's demand that she demobilize; that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla); and that Germany therefore regarded herself at war with Russia and had that morning given Ambassador Swerbeiev his passports.

Germany. Ambassador Lichnowsky telegraphed from London to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had given up as impracticable his suggestions as to the possibility of creating lasting British neutrality, which were made without previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of mobilization.

RUSSIA EXPLAINS HER EFFORTS FOR PEACE

Russia. M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, published an announcement respecting recent events in correction of a "garbled version" appearing in the foreign press. This recited the circumstances of the Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia and Serbia's reply of the 25th.

"Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful....

"The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded to mobilize and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

"In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilization in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

"The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four great powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

"This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the powers.

"Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia.

"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilization by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

"All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

"The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

"But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

"In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on July 31 demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on August 1, and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilization.

"On the following day, August 1, the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian representatives abroad

"that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilize by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilization.

"The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility."

Great Britain. Ambassador Goschen sent from Berlin two telegrams to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, one stating that Secretary of State von Jagow had just informed him that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and Russia were in a state of war, and the other that the reason for the detention of British ships on the day preceding was laying of mines and taking other precautions.

Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that a German force had entered Luxemburg. This was confirmed by a telegram from the Minister of State for Luxemburg, who gave details, and added:

"These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. [Paris was also informed.]"

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Bertie at Paris:

"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon [French Ambassador in London] the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that our Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did not give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point."

France. Ambassador Paleologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales was leaving the Russian capital that day, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szapary had not yet received instructions from Vienna as to the declaration of war.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople:

"This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

"You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometers which we have maintained, even since the mobilization, between our troops and the frontier."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London Sir Edward Grey's declaration of the British Cabinet as to protection of France by the British fleet.

"Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.

"The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a casus belli. It is a specially British interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany."

M. Viviani replied to M. Paul Cambon that the promise of the British Cabinet was "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."

"The help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet."

M. Viviani telegraphed to Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to protest to the German Government against the violation of the French frontier by German armed forces, as "unjustified by anything in the present situation."

"The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

M. Marcellin Pellet, Minister at the Hague, telegraphed to M. Viviani that the German Minister had called on M. Loudon, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain the necessity for the German violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg.

Belgium. M. Davignon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, that he had warned the German Minister at Brussels, Herr von Below Saleske, that the French Minister, M. Klobukowski, would publish the formal declaration made by the German Minister on August 1, respecting Belgian neutrality.

"When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain toward our eastern neighbors. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness toward Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude."

Later, the German Minister presented the following "very confidential" note to Belgium.

GERMAN DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS TOWARD BELGIUM

"Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this event Germany can undertake no obligations toward Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow stronger and more enduring."

MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914

Serbia. On the following day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, former Minister to Vienna, and now at Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia, made a long report to M. N. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, of events at Vienna from the days following the crime of Sarajevo to his departure from the Austrian capital. The points in this are:

SERBIA'S POSITION EXPLAINED

1. Constant police surveillance of the Serbian legation and menacing attitude of the public.

2. Sudden change early in July of Austro-Hungarian attitude to the Sarajevo incident. Press begins to represent it as a manifestation of Serbian intrigue which Austria must settle, and alone, with Serbia—eventually by war.

3. Assistance given by German Embassy to this press agitation.

4. Austrian financiers declare that "a settlement with Serbia" is the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary since annexation of Bosnia. Gold secretly and gradually withdrawn from circulation.

5. Austrian Minister of War, Krobatin, and Chief of Staff, Hetzendorf, break leave of absence to return to Vienna, the latter having had a conversation at Carlsbad with German Chief of Staff, Count Moltke.

6. Reserves retained after stipulated period for maneuvers had expired and their numbers augmented.

7. Noncommittal answers of Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, to interpolations concerning Serbia in Hungarian Diet.

8. Refusal at Foreign Office in Vienna to discuss Sarajevo incident with foreign representatives, or if subject was mentioned, assurances that nothing would be done against Serbia to give uneasiness to the powers, in particular Russia. Foreign ambassadors, thus assured, quit Vienna on long leaves of absence for watering places. All this indicates that Austria-Hungary was contemplating sudden action, which, when a fait accompli, would likely be accepted by the powers in order to avoid a general war.

9. German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the only foreign representative informed of note to Serbia. He knew its minutest details, and there is reason to believe he helped draft it.

10. When note was published, French, British, and Russian representatives at Vienna asked me if it were not better to accept the demands and avoid war for the present.

"I said that the note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

"The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko [then absent from Vienna,] previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues and the Austro-Hungarian Government that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. Hence the apprehension felt by the French and British Ambassadors and the Russian Charge d'Affaires, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary."

11. Expressed intention of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chastise Serbia by arms without consent of European concert. Belief expressed by German Ambassador that Russia would permit this, owing to troubles in Asia, and assurances given by him that Germany would stand by her ally in the matter.

"These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganization, i.e., before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. 'The longer the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance.' On the other hand, rumors from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign Office] did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him."

Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made a statement in the House of Commons as to the diplomatic situation, particularly of Great Britain. The chief points in it were:

1. The peace of Europe cannot be preserved, despite Great Britain's earnest and consistent efforts to that end.

2. Great Britain's good faith in this matter is proved by her actions in the Balkan crisis, where it was generally admitted she worked for peace.

3. Parliament is free to decide on attitude of Great Britain.

Here the secretary referred to the Moroccan crisis of 1906, and said that then he had taken the same attitude with respect to France.

"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

"As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister [Henry Asquith] who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. They authorized that [answer], on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose."

Here the secretary read his reply to the French Ambassador, dated November 22, 1912, which was to the effect stated. It instanced the disposition of the French and British fleets at the time as "not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war," and went on to say

"that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

The secretary said that the present crisis involved Great Britain's obligations to France in a less formal fashion.

"While we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support to France in the Morocco affairs, we were pledged to do so by a definite public agreement [the Treaty of April 8, 1904]. But no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. France is involved in it because of her obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. It is only fair to the House to say that that obligation cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know its terms.

"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. We have had a long-standing friendship with France. But how far that friendship entails obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe for himself.

"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing.

"Let us assume that out of the situation come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral, should depart from her attitude, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean where our trade routes are vital to our interests? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. We would have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the assurance that if the German fleet undertakes hostile operations against the French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power, subject to the ratification of Parliament.

"I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. It is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—of the neutrality of Belgium."

Here the secretary discussed the treaties of 1839 and of 1870 between the powers and Belgium respecting preservation of her neutrality, and cited in particular the real and written recognition by Prince Bismarck of the sacredness of this neutrality, and the speech in Parliament by William E. Gladstone on Great Britain's obligation to maintain it.

He then reported the promise he had just secured from France to respect Belgian neutrality, the evasive answer that had been given by Germany in regard to the same, and Belgium's promise to maintain her neutrality.

He then recited Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, and Belgium's appeal to King George.

"Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing, to be left alone and independent. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, and no action be taken [by the powers] to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. Mr. Gladstone said:

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guaranty. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

"If Belgium's independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

"It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it to intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

"We are going to suffer terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside, we should be in a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect.

"Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take the question very carefully into consideration, until we know how we stand.

"What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We should sacrifice our good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

"As far as the forces of the crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty [Winston Churchill] have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores.

"The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us. The country has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier.

"I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country."

France. Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels the answer the Belgian Government had given on the evening of August 2 to the German ultimatum:

"The information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the powers, and notably by the King of Prussia."

M. Klobukowski added in a supplementary telegram:

"To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Davignon] answered:

"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the powers. At a later date the Government of the king will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."

Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London:

"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to inform you that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows:

"'In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.'

"Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

"The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorized to inform the Chambers of this."

M. Paul Cambon supplemented this by a telegram stating:

"Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague [Prince Lichnowsky] came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

"The German Ambassador has sent to the press a communique saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a point d'appui. My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality."

Later M. Paul Cambon telegraphed:

"Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

"The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favor."

M. Viviani warned M. Paul Cambon that the German Ambassador Schoen was reported to have said at the Foreign Office that yesterday eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck.

"Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the [British] Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning."

German Ambassador von Schoen had a farewell audience at the Foreign Office at 6.45 p. m., at which he handed M. Viviani a letter stating that French military aviators had committed "flagrantly hostile acts" on German territory, one throwing bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg, and had openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory.

"I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter power.

"At the same time I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of your excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity."

M. Viviani formally challenged as inaccurate the allegations of the ambassador.

M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to ask for his passports.

"I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France."

M. Allize, Minister at Munich, was also instructed to ask for his passports.

M. Viviani reported to the French representatives abroad that German troops had violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich.

Belgium. Baron von der Elst, Secretary General, reported an interview at 1.30 p. m. with Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

"The minister officially informed the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

"The secretary general asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France."

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Herr von Below Saleske Belgium's reply to the German note.

"This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

"The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfill her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870 vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guaranty of the powers, and notably of the Government of his majesty the King of Prussia.

"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

"The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty toward Europe.

"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

"If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights."

M. Davignon reported this action to the Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague. To the same representatives, except the Minister at The Hague, he reported a statement made to him by the French Minister at Brussels:

"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable, that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.

"I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guaranty of the powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done."

Count Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Davignon that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed him "that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany."

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1914

Serbia. On the following day, August 4, 1914, M. Pashitch, Prime Minister, recalled the legation and consulate from Germany.

Austria-Hungary. Ambassador Mensdorff telegraphed from Berlin that Great Britain had sent to Germany its ultimatum concerning Belgium, and expected an answer to-night at twelve o'clock.

"Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

"Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to cooperate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean."

VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG EXPLAINS GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE REICHSTAG

Germany. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke before the Reichstag (Imperial Parliament). The points of his address were as follows:

1. Germany has kept the peace and protected the peace of Europe for forty-four years, yet, under the pretense that she was desirous of war,

"enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West and chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated everyone from the emperor down to the youngest soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly from its scabbard.

"The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors. Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France—a war that has been forced upon us."

2. Germany has endeavored to localize the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. All other European Governments (particularly Great Britain) save one took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in a settlement of the matter.

"Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening head."

3. Russia began to mobilize. On this, Germany declared that Russian military measures against Austria-Hungary would find her on the side of her ally, and that she would take countermeasures, coming near to actual war.

"Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

"In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg."

4. Kaiser William II telegraphed to Nicholas II asking for the Czar's assistance in smoothing over difficulties between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Before receipt of this telegram the Czar asked the Kaiser to induce Austria-Hungary to aid him in inducing Vienna to moderate her demands on Serbia. The Kaiser accepted the role of mediator.

5. Germany influenced Austria-Hungary to resume the broken conversations with Russia.

"But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilized her entire forces and that her mobilization was therefore directed against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31 that the emperor received a telegram from the czar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude toward us. But mobilization on our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July 30-31, and France, though indeed not actually mobilizing, was admittedly making military preparations.

"What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 31, we called upon Russia to demobilize as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of Europe, and informed her that in case our demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war existed.

"No answer was given, and we mobilized our forces on August 1, at 5 p. m."

6. France evaded our direct question as to whether she would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

"In spite of this, the kaiser ordered that the French frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single exception[2], was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilized at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometers on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the empire! Though war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us."

[Footnote 2: Against express orders, a patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2. They seem to have been shot down, only one man having returned.]

After this recital the Chancellor entered upon his oration proper.

"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (Notwehr), and necessity (Not) knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.

"He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (durchhauen).

"Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

"As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

"Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the emperor: 'With a clear conscience we enter the lists.' We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German nation—the entire German nation united to the last man.

"Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly."

Secretary of State von Jagow telegraphed Ambassador Lichnowsky at London:

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin to protest to the German Government against its violation of the treaty safeguarding Belgian neutrality, and to request an immediate assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with.

Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that the German Minister, Von Below Saleske, had addressed a note to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

"stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed back that Great Britain expected the Belgian Government to resist by any means in their power Germany's invasion of their neutrality, and that the British Government were prepared to join Russia and France in common action to resist the German action and to guarantee to maintain Belgian independence and integrity in future years.

Grey protested, through Ambassador Goschen, to the German Government against the continued detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg and other German ports, as in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:

"German troops have entered Belgian territory, and Liege has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed."

Grey, on the basis of this information, telegraphed Ambassador Goschen to ask the German Government that a satisfactory answer to his morning telegram be received in London by twelve o'clock at night.

"If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

As reported to Sir Edward Grey on August 8, after his return to London, Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, had an interview with Herr von Jagow on this same day, August 4.

SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN'S INTERVIEW WITH VON JAGOW

"In accordance with your instructions of the 4th inst., I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of his majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. He again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

"During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

"Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

"I then said that I should like to go and see the chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the chancellor very agitated. His excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p. m. It was apparently never dispatched."[3]

[Footnote 3: This telegram never reached the British Foreign Office.]

Mr. Goschen's report went on to relate the attack that evening on the British Embassy by a mob excited by the report in a flying sheet of the "Berliner Tageblatt" that Great Britain had declared war on Germany. The German Government repudiated the report and did all it could, by the personal apology of the secretary of state and by police protection, to make amends for what Herr von Jagow termed "the indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin."

"On the following morning, August 5, the emperor sent one of his majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:

"'The emperor has charged me to express to your excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old Allies of Waterloo. His majesty also begs that you will tell the king that he has been proud of the titles of British field marshal and British admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.'

"I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery."

At 11 a. m., August 5, Ambassador Goschen received his passports. He returned to London on the following day without molestation from the crowd, although this could not be said of the departure of the French and Russian Ambassadors. He closed his report with a compliment to the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, for assistance rendered by him in these trying times.

France. A message from President Poincare was read at a extraordinary session of Parliament, the members of which remained standing during the reading. This announced the "violent and premeditated" attack on France by Germany in "insolent defiance of the law of nations" being delivered before any declaration of war, and asking for passports by the German Ambassador at Paris. The president recounted the pacific course of Frenchmen in "burying at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation, of the wrong done their country by Germany in 1871, and in using their rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity." In particular he spoke of the efforts France had made for peace since Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. He solemnly declared

"that France had made up to the last moment supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. (Unanimous and repeated applause.)

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia; she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg; she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation (loud applause), our neighbor and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (Fresh and repeated applause.)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilization of our national forces will be methodically completed....

"In the war which is beginning France will have right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. (Loud applause.)

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (Loud and prolonged applause and cries of 'Vive la France.')

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (loud applause); she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain. (Loud applause.)

"And already from every part of the civilized world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for liberty, justice, and reason (loud and repeated applause) 'Haut les coeurs et vive la France!'[4] (Prolonged applause.)"

[Footnote 4: Lift up your hearts, and long live France!]

M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, spoke before the Chamber of Deputies. He recounted those actions of Germany in relation to the Austro-Serbian crisis on which the light of subsequent events cast a sinister interpretation. He gave the fabricated complaints against France for violating German territory presented by Ambassador von Schoen plainly to offset the true charges made by France of German violation of French territory, and declared:

"At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (Loud applause.)

"Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

"The mobilization of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigor and unrestrained enthusiasm. (Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian army, mobilized with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardor to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (Renewed applause.)

"The entire British fleet is mobilized and orders have been given to mobilize the land forces. (Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.)"

Belgium. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, reported to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, that Holland intended to institute war buoying on the Scheldt (Dutch river leading to Antwerp in Belgium). The river would be closed at night only, and navigation by day would be under Dutch pilots. Belgian lightships must be withdrawn from Dutch territory to facilitate maintenance of its neutrality.

M. Davignon presented passports to German Minister von Below Saleske. The minister intrusted the custody of the German Legation to the American Minister, Brand Whitlock. The Belgian Minister, Baron Beyens, at Berlin, asked for his passports. Before leaving he telegraphed a report of the German Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on the "infamous" violation of Belgian neutrality.

"It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory, and that she is committing a wrong against us."

Count de Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium

"that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated."

M. Davignon reported to the ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg all the important diplomatic happenings respecting Belgium from July 31 to the appeal to the powers to guarantee Belgian neutrality, which was under present deliberation.

M. Davignon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia to cooperate as guarantors of her territory and independence, and to employ concerted action to resist by force German violation of the same, and at the same time

"to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of her fortified places."

King Albert made an address to the Belgian Parliament which closed as follows:

"The army is equal to its task. The Government and myself have full confidence. The Government understands its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger violates our territory he will find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath.