October 1st, 1840 {p.322}

[Page Head: LORD JOHN'S PACIFIC SENTIMENTS.]

No progress made, everything in statu quo. The dinner at Palmerston's on Monday after the Cabinet, went off well enough. In the evening Clarendon had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, who repeated to him everything she had said to me, and seemed confident enough that Palmerston would carry his point at last. He told her, however, that if he persisted, the Government must be broken up, as at least half a dozen would resign, and that she must be aware Government could not go on if either Palmerston or John Russell resigned (putting in Palmerston out of civility). He thought he had made some impression on her. The next day they all dined at Holland House. There he had again some talk with Palmerston himself, amicable enough, but leading to nothing; to what Clarendon said about breaking up the Government, Palmerston did not reply a word. Afterwards Palmerston had a long talk with Lord Holland, but not satisfactory. Morpeth has arrived, and naturally enough was extremely embarrassed. He had supported Palmerston originally, and was not aware of any impending change of policy, or any change in anybody's opinion, and he felt that it was an extraordinary whisk round. Melbourne, of course, hopped off to Windsor the moment the Cabinet was over, and instead of remaining here, trying to conciliate people and arrange matters, he left everything to shift for itself. Having shown the Queen a letter of John Russell's, which she was not intended to see, he sent to Lord John a letter of hers, which probably she did not mean him to see either. She said, among other things, that she thought it was rather hard that Lord Palmerston and Lord John could not settle these matters amicably, without introducing their own personal objects, and raising such difficulties. She added one thing in her letter which may lead to some important consequences. She said that it was her wish that some attempt should be made to open communications with the French Government. If Palmerston chooses to give way, he may make her wishes the pretext for doing so, and yield to them what he refuses to everybody else.

I saw Guizot, who showed me a letter he had written to Thiers, telling him as far as he knew how matters stood, of the difficulties there were, and entreating him to moderate the French press. He also showed me a note from John Russell, in which, after thanking him for not speaking to him at Holland House, as it was better he should only talk to Palmerston or Melbourne, he added that he begged he would not consider that the articles which had lately appeared in the 'Morning Chronicle' and 'Observer' were approved of by the Government, and repudiated any connexion or concurrence with them. He had pronounced in the Cabinet a violent philippic against the newspapers, which was entirely directed at Palmerston, who, he knows very well, writes constantly in them, and Guizot knows this also. Guizot, therefore, if he had any doubt before of Lord John's sentiments, can have none now. An article appeared in the 'Times' on Tuesday strongly in favour of peace and harmony with France and the acceptance of the Pasha's offers. Guizot, of course, was delighted with it; but I found it had taken in other quarters, for Dedel asked me if I had read it, and said it was the true view of the question, and Ben Stanley said the same thing to me at dinner, and that he had found at Manchester and elsewhere a strong public opinion, of which he was sure Palmerston was not aware, and would not believe in if told. Dedel showed me a letter from Fagel, giving an account of a conversation he had with Louis Philippe, in which the King disclaimed any ambitious design or desire for war, but said he was determined to put France in a respectable state of preparation; very firm language. Dedel had been at Peel's, but got nothing out of him except that he did not know whether he should have made such a treaty, but as it was made we ought to abide by it. The Tories will turn this business to good account, end as it may; they have beau jeu. But what Neumann said to Dedel is anything but confirmatory of Palmerston's stories of Austrian stoutness, for he told him it would be a very fortunate thing if the Sultan would accept Mehemet Ali's new proposals.[1]

[1] [M. Neumann was the Austrian Minister in London; M. Fagel the Dutch Minister in Paris.]

[Page Head: PRINCE METTERNICH'S SUGGESTION.]

Evening.—The Cabinet went off far better than could have been expected; indeed, as well as possible under all the circumstances. Lord John had previously intimated to Melbourne that he should expect him to take the lead upon this occasion, and it seems pretty clear that Melbourne had contrived to effect some arrangement with Palmerston. Accordingly Melbourne (very nervous) began, said that the question was in the same state as when they last met, pronounced a few commonplaces, such as that the success or failure of the coercive means might by this time have been proved, only they could not yet know the event, but ended with referring to a paper delivered some time ago by Metternich, in which he had made certain contingent suggestions, of which the last and most important was, that in the event of 'inefficacite des moyens' becoming apparent some communication should be made to France for the purpose of drawing her again into the alliance (or something to that effect; I cannot recollect the exact words, but it was a peg on which a communication might be hung), and asking Palmerston if he had not got this paper.[2] Palmerston pulled it, all cut and dry, out of his pocket and read it. A good deal of talk then ensued, and some doubts and suspicions were expressed about France, which drew out Lord Holland, who said, 'For God's sake, if you are so full of distrust of France, if you suspect all her acts and all her words, put the worst construction on all she does, and are resolved to be on bad terms with her, call Parliament together, ask for men and money, and fight it out with her manfully. Do this or meet her in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and cast aside all those suspicions which make such bad blood between the two countries.' This appeal (of which I only give the spirit) was very well received, and, after some more talk, Palmerston said that though he was still convinced success would crown the efforts now making in the East, and that it was unnecessary to take any other step, yet, if it was the wish and opinion of the Cabinet that some communication should be made to France, he was ready to make it. This was, of course, very well taken, and was a prodigious concession and change from his former tone. A great deal more discussion then ensued, and the result was that Palmerston is to see the Ministers of the Conference, either separately or together, to-morrow, and to propose to them that he should make a communication to France on the basis of Metternich's suggestion. There can be no doubt of Neumann's acquiescence, and the Prussian will go with the Austrian; the only doubt is Brunnow. They all agreed that nothing could be done but with the common consent of all, and as Russia has behaved exceedingly well since the signature of the Treaty, it would be wholly unjustifiable not to treat her with perfect good faith and every sort of consideration. If Brunnow objects, and will not consent to the communication being made, another Cabinet is to be summoned to-morrow afternoon; if he acquiesces, Palmerston is to speak to Guizot immediately. If Brunnow is not consenting, Palmerston will equally speak to Guizot, but, instead of making a proposition, will say that Brunnow will apply for instructions, and that we have requested him to do so, to enable us, with the consent of all the three parties to the treaty, to make the communication to France. Such is the substance and result of this important Cabinet, which I have very roughly and imperfectly put down, and I am conscious that I have forgotten some of the details which reached me; however, I have preserved the essential parts. Lord John (to whom it is all due) said very little, Lansdowne not much; Hobhouse was talkative, but nobody listened to him; Melbourne, when it was over, swaggering like any Bobadil, and talking about 'fellows being frightened at their own shadows,' and a deal of bravery when he began to breathe freely from the danger.

[2] Metternich's paper was a suggestion which he put into the mouth of the French Minister, and which he gave Leopold, who sent it here. He said, 'If I were the French Minister, I would say so and so,' to the effect that if the means of coercion did not prove efficacious, the Allies had better consider the matter afresh in conjunction with France, who would assist in settling it.

October 2nd, 1840 {p.326}

Last night it was decided that Palmerston should call the Conference together, and propose to them to make a conciliatory advance to France. All Europe is looking with anxiety for the result of the Cabinet held yesterday; and this morning the 'Morning Chronicle' puts forth an article having every appearance of being written by Palmerston himself (as I have no doubt it was), most violent, declamatory, and insulting to France.

October 4th, 1840 {p.326}

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON DEFEATS CONCILIATION.]

I was obliged to break off, and now resume the narrative. It was resolved at the Cabinet that Palmerston should summon the Ministers of the Conference and ask their consent to his making some communication to Guizot. The Austrian and the Prussian said they would consent to whatever Brunnow agreed to. Brunnow said he could say nothing till he had consulted his Court; and he added that England could do what she pleased, but that he would not conceal from Palmerston that the Emperor would be exceedingly hurt if any step of the kind was taken without his knowledge or consent.[4] On this the Cabinet again met on Friday afternoon to hear the report; but it must have been clear enough what the result of Palmerston's interview with the Ministers would be, after the appearance of the article in the 'Chronicle.' I made the Duke of Bedford go to Lord John and tell him this ought not to be endured; and that if I were he I would not sit for one hour in the Cabinet with a man who could agree to take a certain line (with his colleagues) over night, and publish a furious attack upon the same the next morning. Lord John said he had already written to Melbourne about it, that Palmerston had positively denied having anything to do with the 'Morning Chronicle,' and he did not see what more he could do; but he owned that all his confidence in him was gone.

[4] [It is obvious that when Lord Palmerston agreed to make a conciliatory overture to France, in order to allay the storm in the Cabinet, and prevent the threatened dissolution of the Ministry, he was perfectly aware that Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur in the proposal, or would, at least, delay it so long that it would be useless. Moreover, Lord Palmerston confidently relied, and in this it turned out he was right, on the success of his naval measures against the Pasha, and of the Pasha's inability to resist them. It was this prompt success—prompt beyond all conception and belief—that averted the catastrophe of a dissolution of the Ministry or a breach with France.]

I received a note in the morning from Guizot desiring to see me, and I went. I told him that the article was abominable, but that so far from its being a true exposition of the intentions of the Cabinet, they had resolved upon the attempt at conciliation which Palmerston had himself agreed to make. I begged him to make allowance for the difficulties of the case, and be contented with a small advance; and I told him that the Cabinet were unanimously agreed upon the necessity of adhering to their engagements with their Allies, and at the same time endeavouring to bring about a rapprochement to France. He promised to make the best of it with his Government, and, making them comprehend that there was a strong peace party in the Cabinet, work in conjunction with that party here to keep matters quiet.

In the morning I went to Claremont for a Council, where the principal Ministers met; and after the Council they held a Cabinet in Melbourne's bed-room. It was not, however, till this morning that I knew the subject of their discussion. On arriving in town, indeed, I heard that Beyrout had been bombarded and taken by the English fleet, and a body of Turkish troops been landed; but this was not known at Claremont, and not believed in London. Before I was dressed, however, this morning, Guizot arrived at my house in a great state of excitement, said it was useless our attempting to manage matters in the sense of peace here while Ponsonby was driving them to extremities at Constantinople, and causing the Treaty to be executed a l'outrance. He then produced his whole budget of intelligence, being the bombardment of Beyrout, the landing of 12,000 Turks, and the deposition of Mehemet Ali and appointment of Izzar Pasha to succeed him. He also showed me a letter from Thiers in which he told him of all this, said he would not answer for what might come of it, that he had had one meeting of the Cabinet and should have another; but Guizot said he thought he would very likely end by convoking the Chambers.

I went immediately to John Russell and told him what a state Guizot was in, and showed him the papers. He said they were aware yesterday of the Constantinople news; that on receiving the propositions of the Pasha by Rifat Bey, the Conference, considering them as a refusal, had immediately proposed to Redschid Pasha to pronounce his deposition;[5] he agreed, and proposed to name a successor; they objected to this, but ultimately consented to the appointment of a provisional successor in the person of the Seraskier commanding the Turkish troops in Syria; that it was not intended really to deprive Mehemet Ali of Egypt, and the sentence of deposition was only fulminated as a means of intimidation, and to further the object of the treaty; Palmerston wrote to Lord Granville, and desired him to make an immediate communication to Thiers to this effect. Lord John admitted that it was all very bad, but seemed to think he could do nothing more, and that nothing was left but to wait and to preach patience. I went from him to Guizot, and told him what had passed; but he said, with truth, that this resolution to drive matters to extremity, and to go even beyond the Treaty, made it very difficult to do any good here, and that the public would not be able to draw those fine diplomatic lines and comprehend the difference between a provisional and an actual successor to Mehemet Ali. He was going to Palmerston, and I told him Palmerston would no doubt tell him what had been conveyed to Lord Granville.

[5] [The Conference of the Ambassadors of the Four Powers at Constantinople, in which Lord Ponsonby played the most prominent part, and laboured to drive matters to the last extremity.]

[Page Head: LORD HOLLAND'S VIEW OF THE CASE.]

I then went to Holland House, found Lord Holland alone, and he entered fully, and without reserve, into the whole question. From him I learned that Metternich has expressed his strong disapprobation of the violent steps that have been taken, and that he wrote as much to Stuermer. Holland seemed to think that there had been a great difference of opinion among the Ministers of the Conference at Constantinople, but that Ponsonby had ultimately prevailed in persuading them to depose the Pasha; that he had concealed the fact of the division of opinion which had been revealed here by Lord Beauvale's letter from Vienna. Lord Holland went over the whole case, and told me everything that had occurred in great detail, the whole, or certainly the greatest part, of which I was already apprised of. Just now I saw Dedel, who told me again that Neumann had said to him, 'Plut a Dieu que le Sultan acceptat les dernieres propositions de Mehemet Ali, car cela nous tirerait d'un grand embarras.' Neumann is a time- serving dog, for he holds quite different language to the Palmerstons, and to them complains of Holland House, and talks of firmness, resolution, &c.

October 7th, 1840 {p.329}

Dined at Holland House on Sunday. Palmerstons, John Russell, and Morpeth, all very merry, with sundry jokes about Beyrout, and what not. At night Lady Holland was plaintive to Palmerston about an article in the 'Examiner,' in which Fonblanque had said something about Holland House taking a part against the foreign policy, and they talked together amicably enough. Lady Palmerston and I had another colloquy, much the same as before. I told her what Neumann had said, but nothing would make her believe it. They have a marvellous facility in believing anything they wish, and disbelieving whatever they don't like. In fact, Lord John evidently has completely knocked under; he is unprepared to do anything more, and so ready now to go on that he had himself proposed to Palmerston that Stopford should be ordered to attack Acre. Of course, Palmerston desired no better; and it seems to have been agreed that conditional orders shall be sent to him— that is, he is to attack if he is strong enough, and the season is not too far advanced.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON TRIUMPHS.]

I dined again to-day at Holland House, and in the evening Guizot came. He told me that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than his interview with Palmerston; very civil to himself personally as he always was, but 'de Ministre a Ministre' as bad as possible. He had told him of the communication Lord Granville was desired to make to Thiers, but had not said one syllable of the disposition of the Cabinet to make an overture, nor held out the slightest expectation of the possibility of any modification. Guizot repeated how much he is alarmed, and talked of the probability of war. It is now quite clear that Palmerston has completely gained his point. The peace party in the Cabinet are silenced, their efforts paralysed. In fact, Palmerston has triumphed, and Lord John succumbed. The Cabinet are again dispersed, Palmerston reigns without let or hindrance at the Foreign Office. No attempt is made to conciliate France; the war on the coast of Syria will go on with redoubled vigour; Ponsonby will urge matters to the last extremities at Constantinople; and there is no longer a possibility of saying or doing any one thing, for the whole question of reconciliation has been suffered to rest upon the result of a communication which Brunnow undertook to make to his Court, to which no answer can be received for several weeks, and none definite will probably ever be received at all. Palmerston's policy, therefore, will receive a complete trial, and its full and unimpeded development, and even those of his colleagues who are most opposed to it, and who are destitute of all confidence in him, are compelled to go along with him his whole length, share all his responsibility, and will, after all, very likely be obliged to combat in Parliament the very same arguments that they have employed in the Cabinet, and vice versa.

Lord John has disappointed me; and when I contrast the vigour of his original resolutions with the feebleness of his subsequent efforts, the tameness with which he has submitted to be overruled and thwarted, and to endure the treachery, and almost the insult of Palmerston's newspaper tricks, I am bound to acknowledge that he is not the man I took him for. The fact is, that his position has been one of the greatest embarrassment—but of embarrassment of his own making. He consented to the Treaty of July, without due consideration of the consequences it was almost sure to entail. When those consequences burst upon him in a very dangerous and alarming shape, he seems suddenly to have awakened from his dream of security, and to have bestirred himself to avert the impending evils; but while the magnitude of the peril pressed him on one side, on the other he was hampered by the consciousness of his own inconsistency, and that he could not do anything without giving Palmerston a good case against him. And when at last he did resolve to take a decisive step, he never calculated upon the means at his disposal to bring about the change of policy which he advocated. He moved, accordingly, like a man in chains. He distrusted Palmerston, and did not dare tell him so; Melbourne would not help him; he dreaded a breach partly official, partly domestic, with Palmerston, and only thought of keeping the rickety machine of Government together as long as possible, by any means he could, and was content to leave the issues of peace or war to the chapter of accidents. The rest of the Cabinet seem to have been pretty evenly balanced, feeling (as was very natural) that they had no good case for opposing Palmerston, conscious that Lord John's alarms were not without foundation, and that his position gave him a right to take a decisive lead in the Cabinet; still they were not inclined to act cordially and decisively with him, and hence vacillation and uncertainty in their councils. Palmerston alone was resolute; entrenched in a strong position, with unity and determination of purpose, quite unscrupulous, very artful, and in possession of the Foreign Office, and therefore able to communicate in whatever manner and with whomsoever he pleased, and to give exactly the turn he chose to any negotiation or communication, without the possibility of being controlled by any of his colleagues. From the beginning, Lord John seems never to have seen his way clearly, or to have been able to make up his mind how to act. My own opinion is, that if there had been a will, there might have been found a way, to do something; but Palmerston had no such will. On the contrary, he was resolved to defeat the intentions of his colleagues, and he has effectually done so.

October 8th, 1840 {p.332}

[Page Head: LORD JOHN'S LAST EFFORT.]

Lord John Russell called on me yesterday morning, more to talk the matter over than for any particular purpose. He was, as usual, very calm about it all. I told him all I thought, and asked him why Guizot's offer had not been made use of; when he said that it had been considered, but for three reasons, which he gave me, it had been judged impossible to make it the foundation of a communication, and that Metternich's paper had been taken instead. Two of the reasons were, 1st. That the Viceroy's offers would probably have been already rejected at Constantinople; 2ndly. That the insurrection in Syria would have been organised, and it might entail consequences on the Syrians that it would be unjust to expose them to; 3rdly. The necessity of the previous concurrence of the Allies. They all seemed to me very bad reasons.

I told him that Palmerston had gained his point, and that the whole thing turned upon the success of the insurrection. He admitted that it did, and stated the grounds there were for hoping that it would succeed. He owned to me that his reason for consenting to the Treaty was the refusal of France to join in coercive measures; which I told him was in my opinion the strong point of Palmerston's case. The fact is, the offer of France is come too late; the machine has been set in motion, and now there is no stopping it. But I shall ever think that if the advances of France had been met in another way, much might have been done. Lord John said the Queen had talked to him, and had expressed her anxiety for some settlement, but at the same time was quite determined to make no unworthy concession.

My brother writes me word that Lord Granville is so disgusted at his position, and at being kept entirely in the dark as to the real position of affairs, that he is seriously thinking of resigning. Bulwer[6] has, however, done his utmost to prevent him, and advised him to write instead and earnestly recommend that, if they meditate any change, whatever they mean to do should be done immediately.

[6] [Mr. Henry Bulwer (afterwards Lord Dalling) was at that time First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, and an ardent supporter of Lord Palmerston's policy—much more so than the Ambassador, Lord Granville.]

I went to Lord John this morning, and read to him my brother Henry's letter. He is alarmed, and says that no doubt much might have been done in the way of conciliation that has not been done; admits that Palmerston (through whom everything must necessarily pass) will do nothing; and that the fact is he does not believe in war, and does not care if it happens. He showed me a paper he wrote with the project of making certain tranquillising communications to the French Government; one of which was, that if the Allies resolved to attack Egypt, they would first give notice to France and try and arrange matters with her. The Emperor of Russia, it appears, is all for attacking Egypt; but no intention exists of taking Egypt from the Pasha in any case. I told him again that I thought an opportunity had been lost of responding to the last offer of France in a conciliatory way, and Lord John said he thought so too; he had written a paper on the subject, showed it to Melbourne—who highly approved of it, left it with him, never heard more about it, and nothing was done. Palmerston's extinguisher was, of course, put upon it. Lord John said he was tired of attempting to do anything; and he now appears to have resolved to wait patiently, and meet his destiny with the stoical resignation of a Turk.

October 9th, 1840 {p.332}

Everything looking black these last two days, funds falling, and general alarm. Lord Granville has written to Palmerston both publicly and privately; in the former enforcing the necessity of some speedy arrangement, if any there is to be; in the latter remonstrating upon his own situation vis-a-vis of the Government. Lord John has again screwed his courage up to summon the Cabinet, with the determination of making another attempt at accommodation with France. He proposed this to Melbourne, who said 'it was too late.' This is what he always does: entreats people to wait when they first want to move, and then when they have waited, and will wait no longer, he says, 'it is too late.' Lord John's design is to have a despatch written to Granville, with which he is to go to Thiers, inviting a frank explanation de part et d'autre, asking what France desires and expects, saying what England intends and does not intend, entering into the position in which all parties are placed, and expressing a readiness to conciliate France in any way that we honourably and consistently can, communicating to our Allies exactly what we say.

[Page Head: NOTE FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.]

But what he would principally desire, and I perceive will not be able to effect, is the supersession in some shape of Lord Ponsonby, against whom grave charges do certainly lie. The other day (the day before the Council at Claremont), Palmerston produced at the Cabinet Ponsonby's despatch announcing the deposition of Mehemet Ali, which he read aloud. Melbourne asked if there was not something said indicative of some differences of opinion among the Ambassadors (probably something grave struck him), to which Palmerston responded that there was nothing. The next day Beauvale's despatch arrived with the report of the Austrian Internuncio to Metternich, who said that Ponsonby had assembled the Ministers at his house on Rifat Bey's arrival, and proposed the immediate decheance of the Pasha, to which he had made no objection, but that his Russian colleague had objected. His objections were, however, overruled by Ponsonby, who had taken upon himself to say that he would make England responsible for the whole and sole execution of the sentence of deposition. Nothing of this was hinted in Ponsonby's own despatch, and the false account therefore which it conveyed of what had passed raised a general and strong feeling of indignation.

In the afternoon I saw Guizot, whom I found very reasonable, full of regret for the violence at Paris, and admitting that it was not only mad but ridiculous; said he had urged as forcibly as he could that they should do nothing for several days, and pay no attention to any events that might occur on the Syrian coast; that he had written to the Duc de Broglie and entreated him to exert all his influence to keep matters quiet; and then he said that he still did not despair of peace if we would only do something to pacify and conciliate France; that some concession in return for hers she must have, and without which her Government had not the power to maintain peace; that his conviction was, that if we would give Mehemet Ali Candia, or a little more of Syria—two out of the four Pashaliks—that this would be accepted, and that surely the alliance and concurrence of France were worth as much as this. I went from him to John Russell, and told him what he had said.

October 10th, 1840 {p.335}

[Page Head: RECEPTION OF THE FRENCH NOTE.]

The Cabinet met this afternoon. Lord John Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in Palmerston's hands just before the Cabinet, which he only received from Paris this morning.[7] He called on Palmerston and gave it him; but without any observations. Palmerston brought it to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of everybody, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition to be very easily satisfied. This note is ill written, ill put together, and very tame. What a difficult task a French Minister must have, to defend at once such a note and such an expense as had been incurred! Probably Guizot did not much admire the production. The consequence was that the discussion turned on this document, and Palmerston immediately showed a disposition to haggle and bargain, and make it a pretext for extorting from France the best terms she could be got to yield, and all this in the spirit of a pedlar rather than of a statesman. This was, however, overruled. A better and more liberal disposition pervaded the majority, and it was settled that Palmerston should see Guizot and speak to him in a conciliatory tone, and that a note, in a corresponding spirit, should be drawn up and sent to the French Government. This note is, however, to be first submitted for the approbation, and, if necessary, alteration of the Cabinet, so that care will be taken to make it what it ought to be. It would now appear that the French Government would be well enough satisfied if the original terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, and if it is made clear that he will in no case be molested in the hereditary possession of Egypt; but Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt for his life, which was, however, instantly put down by the majority. A more decided disposition appeared in the majority of the Cabinet to adopt the conciliatory policy; whereas they exhibited at the previous meetings rather a doubtful manner, without, however, on any occasion saying much either way. Palmerston displayed the same overweening confidence, and the same desire to conceal whatever militated against his opinion. Besides talking of the success they had already obtained (which after all amounts to very little), he said he had seen somebody, who had seen somebody else, who knew that Louis Philippe was absolutely determined against war under any circumstances. It turned out that there was a despatch from Sir Charles Smith (between whom and Napier there is some jealousy or misunderstanding), in which he says that the position they occupy is of no use whatever, but is purely defensive, and if Ibrahim does not attack the Turks, and expose himself to a defeat, they can do nothing against him. This, however, Palmerston held cheap, because it did not square with his wishes. On the whole the result was satisfactory; and if anybody but Palmerston was at the Foreign Office, everything must be settled at once; but he is so little to be trusted that there is always danger while he is there.

[7] [This was the celebrated Note of which Thiers gave me a printed copy when I dined with him on the 8th October at Auteuil. I came back to Paris, sat up all night with a friend to translate it, and despatched it to England next morning. My translation appeared in the 'Times' on the same day the Note was given to Lord Palmerston— which was another grievance. It was a very lengthy document, recapitulating the whole conduct of France in this affair, but ending in a very tame conclusion. Unfortunately Lord Palmerston did not display the same moderation, and his Notes continued to be as acrimonious as ever.—H.R.]

I went almost immediately to Guizot, and told him that the reception of his note had given a new turn to the discussion, but that it had given the greatest satisfaction, and they were certainly not prepared for such a moderate communication. He laughed, shrugged his shoulders, and said, 'He should think they were not,' any more than he was, that nothing could equal his surprise at receiving it, that it was very ill written, ill arranged, and he owned to me, in confidence, that he thought it went even farther than it ought; farther than he (much as he desired peace) could ever have consented to go. He did not disguise from me, and almost said in terms, that he thought it very discreditable, and strikingly inconsistent with their previous language and ostentatious preparations. I said that I could not comprehend how such a note could emanate from the same quarter as all the denunciations and threats we had lately heard, and that though Thiers had, as everybody knew, a great deal of savoir faire, he would have some difficulty in defending both the note and the preparations. He seemed by no means sorry at the idea of Thiers having got into a scrape and dilemma, but not at all satisfied at the figure which France is made to act in the affair, and not much liking to play any part in the transaction. It is for this reason that he gave Palmerston the note without any remarks on its contents. When I asked him how it was all to be accounted for, he told me that the truth was, it was owing to the dissensions in the French Cabinet, and the determination of the King; and that it was the only mode by which an entire rupture in the Cabinet could be avoided. He said, however, that he would have preferred the rupture rather than a violent difference of opinion ending in such a measure. (At least as I understood him, but I am not quite clear as to his meaning on this point.) I told him that Palmerston would see him, and would (or ought at least to) speak to him in a very conciliatory tone; but that if he did not do so, if he was wanting in any proper expression of the sense of our Government of the conduct of that of France, and if he evinced any disposition to haggle and drive a bargain, he was not to believe that he expressed the sentiments of the Cabinet, but merely gave utterance to his own. We agreed that at all events the road to peace was still open, and could hardly be missed. He said, it depended on us, and only entreated that the communication we made to the French Government might be full, cordial, and satisfactory, giving them all the assurances they could require, setting their minds at rest as to Egypt, and generally in a tone as conciliatory and moderate as theirs to us. He earnestly deprecated the idea of any bargaining, and said that if Palmerston hinted at such a thing with him he must make his proposals directly to Paris, for he would listen to none such here. On the whole, he is well satisfied at the prospect of the preservation of peace, but very much dissatisfied, and even disgusted, at the manner in which this consummation is likely to be brought about; conscious and ashamed of the false position in which the Government of France is placed, probably by their own conduct from the beginning, but certainly by their violent and declamatory language, so full of invective and menace, their expensive and ostentatious preparations, and now their tame (and if it were possible they could be afraid), pusillanimous conclusion. He did not say a great deal, but what he did say was with energy and strong feeling, and these I am certain are his sentiments.

[Page Head: POLICY OF LOUIS PHILIPPE.]

The real truth I take to be that the King is the cause of the whole thing. With that wonderful sagacity which renders him the ablest man in France, and enables him sooner or later to carry all his points, and that tact and discernment with which he knows when to yield and when to stand, he allowed Thiers to have his fall swing; and to commit himself with the nation, the King himself all the time consenting to put the country in a formidable attitude, but making no secret of his desire for peace; and then at the decisive moment, when he found there was a division in the Cabinet, throwing all his influence into the pacific scale, and eventually reducing Thiers to the alternative of making a very moderate overture or breaking up the Government. The King in all probability knew that in the latter event Thiers would no longer be so formidable, and that there would be the same division in the party as in the Cabinet, and that he should be able to turn the scale in the Chamber in favour of peace. It is probable that His Majesty looks beyond the present crisis, and sees in the transaction the means of emancipating himself from the domination of Thiers, and either getting rid of him, or, what would probably be more convenient and safe, reducing him to a dependence on himself.

Livermere, October 17th, 1840 {p.339}

All this week at Newmarket, where I received regular information of all that went on. Before I left town I saw Lord Holland and Lord John Russell. The latter expressed himself better satisfied than he had yet been, but was still doubtful how far Palmerston could be trusted. Palmerston made no communication to Guizot, and seemed resolved to interpose every delay, though everybody kept on urging that something should be done without loss of time. But he assured Melbourne that in a few days we should hear of the total evacuation of Syria, and that then we should be in a better condition to treat. His colleagues, however, began to get alarmed at these delays, and none more than Melbourne, who would not say or do anything to accelerate Palmerston's movements, though he acknowledged to others that, so far from partaking of his confidence in the success of the operations in Syria, he expected no good news from that quarter. Palmerston went to Windsor, and there the Queen herself began to urge him more strongly than she had ever done, for she hears constantly from Leopold, who is mad with fright, and who imparts all his fears to her. All this did at last produce something, for there was a Cabinet the day before yesterday, at which a despatch to Ponsonby was read, in which he was desired to move the Sultan to reinstate the Pasha in the hereditary government of Egypt, and this had been shown to Guizot, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. This, it may be hoped, will be sufficient, for the Note requires no more than this, and it may be taken as an earnest of our desire to meet the wishes of France. If it only produces a pacific paragraph in the King's speech the crisis will be over.

I do not quite understand how we can consistently send such an instruction to our Ambassador separately. The Sultan pronounced the deposition of Mehemet Ali by the advice of the Four Powers (that is, by that of the four Ambassadors), and I know not how we are entitled to do this act rather than any other without the concurrence of the rest. It was admitted that we could make no overture to France, no pacific communication even, without the consent of all. The Pasha has been solemnly deposed, all the Powers advised this measure, and now we are alone and separately recommending that he should be again restored to the government of Egypt. Russia may not coincide in this recommendation; his deposition from Egypt is now a part of the Treaty. Whatever was the secret intention of the parties, we are now bound,[8] if the Porte insists on it, to exert all our power to expel the Pasha from Egypt as well as from Syria. Such are the inconsistencies into which the precipitate violence of Ponsonby has plunged us.

[8] It is held (though this seems a nice point) that we are not bound.

Downham, October 23rd, 1840 {p.340}

[Page Head: DEATH OF LORD HOLLAND.]

From Livermere to Riddlesworth last Monday, and home to-day. This morning I learnt (by reading it in the 'Globe') the sudden death of Lord Holland, after a few hours' illness, whom I left not a fortnight ago in his usual health, and likely to live many years.[9] There did not, probably, exist an individual whose loss will be more sincerely lamented and severely felt than his. Never was popularity so great and so general, and his death will produce a social revolution, utterly extinguishing not only the most brilliant, but the only great house of reception and constant society in England. His marvellous social qualities, imperturbable temper, unflagging vivacity and spirit, his inexhaustible fund of anecdote, extensive information, sprightly wit, with universal toleration and urbanity, inspired all who approached him with the keenest taste for his company, and those who lived with him in intimacy with the warmest regard for his person. This event may be said with perfect truth to 'eclipse the gaiety of nations,' for besides being an irreparable loss to the world at large, it turns adrift, as it were, the innumerable habitues who, according to their different degrees of intimacy, or the accidents of their social habits, made Holland House their regular and constant resort. It is impossible to overrate the privation, the blank, which it will make to the old friends and associates, political and personal, to whom Holland House has always been open like a home, and there cannot be a sadder sight than to see the curtain suddenly fall upon a scene so brilliant and apparently prosperous, and the light which for nearly half a century has adorned and cheered the world, thus suddenly and for ever extinguished. Although I did not rank among the old and intimate friends of Holland House, I came among the first of the second class of those who were always welcome, passed much of my time there, and have been continually treated with the greatest cordiality and kindness, and I partake largely and sincerely of the regret that must be so deep and universal.

[9] Lord Holland said, just before he died, to the page, 'Edgar, these Syrian affairs will be too much for me. Mehemet Ali will kill me.'

Downham, October 24th, 1840 {p.341}

I have a letter from Clarendon this morning from Windsor, overwhelmed with the news of Lord Holland's death (which he had just received)

'when his mind was as vigorous and his perceptions as clear as ever, and when his advice, and the weight of his experience, were more necessary to his country than at any period of his life. To myself I feel that the loss is irreparable. He was the only one in the Cabinet with whom I had any real sympathy, and upon the great question now in dispute I feel almost powerless, for, with the anility of Melbourne, the vacillation of John, and the indifference of all the rest, Palmerston is now more completely master of the ground than ever.'

He goes on to say:

'Guizot came down here last night; he goes to Paris on Sunday, to be present at the opening of the Chambers, and to defend himself. More, however, than that is in his mind, I am sure, and his feelings towards Thiers are anything but friendly. Thiers, it seems, means to put up Odillon Barrot (Guizot's favourite aversion) for the presidency of the Chamber, and, it is said, to resign if he is beaten. This, Guizot told me, was an inconceivable faiblesse, or an unpardonable legerete; but that whichever it was, he should oppose it, and had written to tell the Duke de Broglie so, in order that he might not be accused of taking the Government by surprise. He said to me, "Donnez-moi quelque chose a dire, let it be ever so small, provided it is satisfactory. I will impose it on Thiers, or break up his administration; but unless I can have something of the kind, and, above all, something wherewith to resserrer les liens entre les deux pays, which is my great ambition, I shall neither be able to calmer les esprits nor to take on myself the government."'

He then goes on to say that Guizot tells him—and his own letters confirm it—that the late attentat on the King had made a much stronger impression, and excited more alarm, than any former one, and he had proposed to Melbourne to send a special ambassador to congratulate the King on his escape, who should also be instructed to peace-make; and suggested that the Duke of Bedford, Lord Spencer, or himself, should go. Melbourne admitted it would be a very good thing to establish some direct communication with the King and Thiers, as well as the truth of all the reasons by which he supported this proposal; but the following day he came down with a whole host of petty objections, 'which seemed to prevail in his perplexed and unserviceable mind.' The Duke of Bedford writes to me that he expects this state of things will lead to a fresh combination of parties, and the breaking-up of this Government.

This is what, in my opinion, it ought to lead to; for, having now been behind the scenes for some time, I have satisfied myself of the danger of the interests of such a country as this being committed to such men as our Ministers. How astonished the world would be!—even the bitterest and most contemptuous of their political opponents—if they could be apprised of all that has passed under my observation during the last two months.

Newmarket, October 27th, 1840 {p.343}

At Downham laid up with the gout, and now here. Heard of Thiers' resignation on Sunday, and nothing since; but Lady Palmerston writes me word Guizot went to take leave of them in high spirits, and that there was no doubt he would accept the Foreign Office. Thiers had promised not to oppose the new Government.[10]

[10] [I breakfasted with M. Guizot at Hertford House on the 24th October, having arrived in London on the 21st from Paris, where I had spent the preceding fortnight, and had learned from Thiers, and other friends there, the French side of these curious transactions. A courier arrived in London on the morning of the 24th, bringing a letter from the King to M. Guizot, which he showed me. It was written in his own bold hand, and contained the words, 'Je compte sur vous, mon cher Ministre, pour m'aider dans ma lutte tenace contre l'anarchie!' Whilst I was in Paris, where the greatest irritation and alarm prevailed, my old friend and master, Count Rossi, retained his composure, and said to me, tapping a sheet of paper as he spoke, 'When it comes to the Draft of the Speech from the Throne to be delivered to the Chambers, this will break up. The King will not consent to adopt Thiers' warlike language.' This is exactly what occurred some ten days later. Rossi had a deeper insight into political causes and events than any other man whom I have known.—H.R.]

[Page Head: M. GUIZOT SUCCEEDS M. THIERS.]

Guizot left London pretty well determined to take the Government; and after some little discussion everything was settled, and the new Cabinet proclaimed. The Press instantly fell upon him with the greatest bitterness, and the first impression was that he had no chance of standing, but the last accounts held out a better prospect. I have had no communication with him but a short note he wrote me on his departure, expressing his regret not to have seen me, and begging I would communicate with Bourqueney, and let him call upon and converse with me. I wrote to him yesterday a long letter, in which I told him how matters stood here, and expressed my desire to know what we could do that would be of use to him. In the meantime there has been a fresh course of wrangling, and a fresh set of remonstrances on the part of the peace advocates here, and lively altercations, both by letter and viva voce, between Lord John and Melbourne, and Lord John and Palmerston. Clarendon, in a visit of six days at Windsor, worked away at the impenetrable Viscount, and Lord Lansdowne battered him with a stringent letter, pressing for the adoption of some immediate measure of a pacific tendency; and in a conversation which Clarendon had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he found him well inclined to the same policy, so that there is an important section of the Cabinet disposed to take an active part in this direction. But Palmerston at the same time wrote to Melbourne in a tone of the greatest contempt for all that was saying and doing in France, and, of course, elated by the recent successes in Syria, which, with his usual luck, have happened at this critical moment, and certainly do appear to be decisive.[11]

[11] [Lord Palmerston's object in all these critical discussions with his colleagues had simply been to gain time for the operations in Syria against the Pasha to take effect, for he had never ceased to maintain that they would be completely successful, and in this, whether by superior information, by clearer judgment, or by extreme good fortune, he proved to be in the right, which ensured his ultimate triumph. But if there had been the slightest failure, or check, or delay in any part of the operations, it must have proved fatal to the Government.]

[Page Head: LORD JOHN THREATENS TO RESIGN.]

But just before the news came of the surrender of the Emir Beschir, Lord John had taken up the question in a much more serious and decisive tone than he ever did before; and in correspondence with Melbourne, and viva voce with Palmerston, had announced his determination to quit the Government altogether. The occasion for this vigorous outbreak was the arrival of a box of Foreign Office papers, in which, besides some long rigmaroles of Metternich's, there was a proposal (transmitted by Beauvale) for a congress for the settlement of all disputes, together with the draft of a short answer which Palmerston had written and sent, declining the offer. This Lord John considered to pass all endurance, no matter whether the congress was advisable or not; but that such an important suggestion should be received and rejected without any communication of it to the other members of the Government, especially to him who was their leader in the House of Commons, was so outrageous that he was resolved not to pass it over, and he accordingly wrote his opinion upon it to Melbourne in the strongest terms, recommending him to transfer the lead of the House of Commons to Palmerston, and to dispose of his office as he pleased, as he would no longer go on; and he said that though there must be a Cabinet in a few days to settle about Parliament, he should not attend any more of them. To this Melbourne wrote a curious answer, because it was indicative of no approbation of, or confidence in, his brother-in-law and colleague. He said he thought Lord John had taken this up too strongly (he thinks everything is too strong), but that he had sent his letter to Palmerston, who would, no doubt, see him or write to him on the subject. He then went on to say that he presumed Lord John had well considered his determination, which would be, ipso facto, the dissolution of the Government, as he would not consent to carry it on with Palmerston as leader of the House of Commons; that the retirement of Lord John, and the substitution of Palmerston in such a post, would be such an announcement to all Europe of the intentions of the British Government to persevere in the extreme line of his policy, that he could not for a moment contemplate such a thing. Therefore, if Lord John persisted, the Government was at an end. Shortly after, Palmerston called on Lord John. He admitted that he had done wrong—that he ought to have consulted him, and have made him privy to his answer, but that he had attached so little importance to the proposal, and had considered it so totally out of the question, that he had replied offhand.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON DEFENDS LORD PONSONBY.]

They then went into the question itself, when Palmerston took that advantageous ground which he has always held and asked him how he reconciled his present opinions with his strenuous support of the Treaty itself, and complained again of his acting as he had done, while success was attending the coalition. They seem to have parted much as they met, with mutual dissatisfaction, but without any quarrel. Lord John, however, resolved upon action, and ultimately determined to propose the recall of Ponsonby as the sine qua non of his continuance in office. The violence of these disputes, and the peril in which the existence of the Government seemed to be placed, brought Melbourne up to town, and Lord John came to meet him, and imparted to him his intentions. Just in the nick of time, however, arrived the news of the Emir's flight, which seemed to be almost conclusive of the Syrian question. On this, Palmerston took courage, and, no longer insisting upon supporting Ponsonby a tort et a travers, entreated that a damp might not be cast upon the enterprise just as the final success was at hand; and employed the argument ad misericordiam with regard to Ponsonby by saying, that he would be entitled to a pension if he was left there till December, and it would be hard to recall him before that term was accomplished. Lord John (never sufficiently firm of purpose) at last agreed to wait for the receipt of the official accounts of recent events in Syria which was expected in a few days, and to defer his demand for Ponsonby's recall till then, and Palmerston seems to have satisfied him that he is not at all desirous of quarrelling with France. Indeed, Palmerston himself threw out, that it might be expedient to find a provision for the family of the Pasha, and render the grant of some appointments to his sons instrumental to the settlement of the question. There was a strange article, too, in the 'Morning Chronicle' the other day, which talked of the probability of Ibrahim's being driven out of Northern Syria, and his entrenching himself within the Pashalik of Acre, which would then prevent the accomplishment of the Treaty of July. All this looks as if Palmerston was beginning to think he was driving matters too far, and that it was necessary to lower his tone and modify his policy, unless he was prepared to retire from office. At all events, Lord John was pacified for the moment by this indication of more moderate intentions, and began to hope better things for the future. To-morrow the Cabinet is to meet again.

While all these wranglings are going on here, and nothing is done, but a great deal contemplated, Bourqueney presses for something on our part and keeps repeating that every minute is precious. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia is highly satisfied with the state of things as it is, and he intimated to Bloomfield that he should be extremely indisposed to consent to any scheme for a fresh arrangement in which France should participate, while our vague notion is, that the coalition should fall to the ground as soon as its object is attained, and that we should bring in France as a party to some final settlement of the East, and dotation of the sons of Mehemet Ali. In the meantime the Chambers met yesterday, and all depends upon their proceedings.

November 7th, 1840 {p.347}

Lord Palmerston has written a long and able letter, setting forth all the reasons why no special mission should be sent to Constantinople, and why Ponsonby should not be recalled; a skilful defence of Ponsonby showing how right he had been about Syria; what unprecedented influence he had obtained, having got both the Turkish fleet and army placed under the command of Englishmen, and how he had infused such spirit into the Turkish councils that they had made exertions of which nobody thought they were capable, and manifested a vigour it was not imagined they possessed. This letter must have been a very good one, for it entirely brought over Lord John to his opinion, and even convinced Clarendon himself; and the former had already written to Palmerston to say that he gave up his demand for Ponsonby's recall. There is, however, still too much reason to believe, that Palmerston is bent upon quarrelling with France,[12] and that he is now fighting to gain time in hopes of some commotion in Egypt itself, which might lead to the complete ruin of the Pasha.

[12] [This was the real charge against Lord Palmerston and his policy, and it is impossible to doubt that he was actuated in the whole of this affair, not so much by a desire to support the Sultan and to ruin the Pasha of Egypt, as by the passionate wish to humble France, and to revenge himself on King Louis Philippe and his Ministers for their previous conduct in the affairs of Spain. At this very moment, far from wishing to strengthen M. Guizot in his efforts to maintain peace, Lord Palmerston addressed to him a most offensive despatch, and published it, with a view to weaken and injure the French Ministry.—H.R.]

[Page Head: M. GUIZOT'S LETTER.]

This evening Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter which he had received the day before from Guizot, which I shall copy here.

M. Guizot's Letter to Baron Bourqueney.

Mon Cher Baron,—Le discours de la Couronne est definitivement arrete. Je crois que vous le trouverez conforme a la verite des choses et aux convenances de la situation. Vous recevrez une circulaire que j'adresse a tous mes agents. J'y ai essaye de marquer avec precision l'attitude que le Cabinet veut prendre et qu'il gardera. Mais ce ne sont la que des paroles: il faut des resultats. On les attend du Cabinet. Il s'est forme pour maintenir la paix, et pour trouver aux embarras de la question d'Orient quelque issue; pour vivre il faut qu'il satisfasse aux causes qui l'ont fait naitre. La difficulte est extreme. L'exaltation du pays n'a pas diminue, la formation du Cabinet donne aux amis de la paix plus de confiance, mais elle redouble l'ardeur des hommes qui poussent, ou qui se laissent pousser, a la guerre; les malveillants et les rivaux exploiteront, fomenteront les prejuges nationaux, les passions nationales. La lutte sera tres-vive et le peril toujours imminent. Je dirai la verite. Je m'applique a eclaircir les esprits et a contenir les passions: je ne puis que cela. Ce n'est pas assez; pour que le succes vienne a la raison, il faut qu'on m'aide. Deux sentiments sont ici en presence, le desir de la paix et l'honneur national. Je l'ai souvent dit a Londres, je le repete de Paris. Le sentiment de la France—je dis de la France, et non pas des brouillons et des factions—est qu'elle a ete traitee legerement, qu'on a sacrifie legerement, sans motif suffisant, pour un interet secondaire son alliance, son amitie, son concours. La est le grand mal qu'a fait la Convention du 15 Juillet, la est le grand obstacle a la politique et a la paix. Pour guerir ce mal, pour lever cet obstacle, il faut prouver a la France qu'elle se trompe, il faut lui prouver qu'on attache a son alliance, a son amitie, a son concours, beaucoup de prix, assez de prix pour lui faire quelque sacrifice. Ce n'est pas l'etendue, c'est le fait meme du sacrifice qui importe, qu'independamment de la Convention du 15 Juillet quelque chose soit donne, evidemment donne, au desir de rentrer en bonne intelligence avec la France, et de la voir rentier dans l'affaire, la paix pourra etre maintenue et l'harmonie generale retablie en Europe. Si on vous dit cela se peut, je suis pret a faire les demarches necessaires pour atteindre a ce but, et a en accepter la responsabilite, mais je ne veux pas me mettre en mouvement sans savoir si le but est possible a atteindre. Si on vous dit que cela ne se peut pas, qu'on entend s'en tenir rigoureusement aux premieres stipulations du traite, et ne rien accorder, ne rien faire qui soit pour la France une preuve qu'on desire se rapprocher d'elle, pour le Cabinet une force dans la lutte qu'il a a soutenir, la situation restera violente et precaire, le Cabinet se tiendra immobile, dans l'isolement et l'attente. Je ne reponds pas de l'avenir. Dites cela a Lord Palmerston, c'est de lui que l'issue depend. Il vous parlera de l'etat de la Syrie, de l'insurrection du Liban, des progres que font les Allies. Repondez simplement que c'est la pour la France une raison de se montrer plus facile a satisfaire, mais que ce n'est pas pour l'Angleterre une raison de ne rien faire en consideration de la France. Je n'ai encore rien dit, rien ecrit nulle part. J'attends ce qu'on vous dira a Londres....

Nothing can be better, more serious, or better calculated to produce an effect, if anything can, upon our impenetrable Cabinet. Bourqueney showed it in the first instance to Melbourne, who told him to show it to Palmerston; but he said he had scruples in doing that lest Palmerston should make him an answer calculated to exclude all hope of accommodation; but Melbourne hinted that he would take care of this, and accordingly he took it to Palmerston this morning. He read it, said it was very moderate, and praised the tone and language. But when Bourqueney began to ask what he had to say to the fond, he only talked of the practical difficulties, and ended without saying anything the least promising or satisfactory, though nothing decidedly the reverse. Bourqueney had previously been with Billow, who is just come back, and who desires no better on the part of his Government than to join in any conciliatory measure we may adopt; and Esterhazy, who is expected every hour, will, he doubts not, be equally well disposed. But although such is the disposition both of Austria and Prussia, though the Queen is earnestly desirous of seeing tranquillity and security restored, and almost all, if not quite all, the Cabinet, are in favour of an accommodation with France, and France herself is prepared to accept the slightest advance offered in a conciliatory spirit, the personal determination of Palmerston will probably predominate over all these opinions and inclinations. He will put down or adjourn every proposal that is made, and if any should be adopted in spite of him, he will take care to mar it in the execution, to remove no difficulties, and create them where they don't already exist. The most extraordinary part of the whole affair is, that a set of men should consent to go on with another in whom they have not only no confidence, but whom they believe to be politically dishonest and treacherous, and that they should keep gravely discussing the adoption of measures with a full conviction that he will not fairly carry them out. It is like Jonathan Wild and his companions playing together in Newgate. I understand the last decision of the Cabinet is that Guizot is to be invited to say what would suit his case. There would be a difficulty in specifying what concessions we should make, either for Mehemet Ali or his sons, because events are proceeding rapidly in Syria, and we might be offering what we have already restored to the Sultan, and what the Porte has assisted to recover for itself. It is settled that all this shall be fairly stated to Guizot, with an assurance that we are desirous of assisting him, together with our willingness to concert with him the means. This may do, if honestly and truly carried out.

Friday, November 13th, 1840 {p.349}

[Page Head: TERMS OF CONCILIATION.]

The day before yesterday Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter from Guizot in reply to the one I had written him. He then proceeded to tell me all that had occurred since I had before seen him, and to this effect: On Saturday the Cabinet had resolved upon an invitation to Guizot to announce his wishes and ideas, and proposed a frank explanation de part et d'autre on the whole question. On Sunday, Palmerston communicated this to Bourqueney, and very faithfully. On Sunday or Monday arrived a despatch from Metternich, first of all confirming Neumann as sole Minister to the Conference, and secondly announcing that any concession in Syria was now quite out of the question. This he told Bourqueney, and conveyed to Palmerston, to whom it was a great accession of force, and by this the disposition of Austria, and with it that of Buelow, became entirely changed, and very unfavourable to any transaction. On Monday morning Bourqueney received a letter from Guizot saying that he had had a conference with Lord Granville, to whom he had suggested various alternatives for a settlement on the basis of a concession, which Granville was by the same post to transmit to Palmerston, and he at the same time told Bourqueney what they were: Egypt hereditary, St. Jean d'Acre for life, and either Tripoli or Candia for one of his sons; or the hereditary Pashalik of Acre instead. On Monday night Bourqueney met Palmerston at dinner at the Mansion House, when he said to him, 'You have heard from Lord Granville, and he has transmitted to you M. Guizot's proposals (or suggestions).' 'No,' said Palmerston, 'I have heard from Lord Granville, but he sent me nothing specific on the part of Guizot. But come to Lady Palmerston's to-night from hence, and we will talk it over.' He went there, and Palmerston read to him a long despatch from Granville, but which, to his surprise, did not contain any of the specific propositions which Guizot had notified to him, and, conceiving that Granville must have certain good reasons for this reticence, he resolved to say nothing of them either, and confined himself to mere general inquiries as to what could be done, to which he obtained no satisfactory reply, not a hope being held out of any concession. In this condition of affairs he came to me to tell me what passed and consult me as to the future. I told him that though there was the same desire for a reconciliation with France, and the same anxiety to assist M. Guizot on the part of my friends, when they came to consider what was possible and would be safe and justifiable, they were unable to find any expedient to meet the immense practical difficulties of the case; that events had proceeded with such celerity, and placed the question in so different a position, that concessions formerly contemplated as reasonable and possible were now out of the question. They all felt that they could offer nothing in Syria; that it was possible the Sultan might be actually in possession of any town or territory at the moment they were offering it, and that now justice to the people, honour and fidelity to our allies, especially to the Sultan himself, forbade us to make any concession whatever in that quarter. Bourqueney did not deny the force of this, but he said Guizot was sanguine as to the acceptance of some such terms as he had suggested, and it was of the last importance he should be undeceived, and made acquainted with the real truth, and know what he had to rely on. He said he would write, but he entreated me to write to him too, and to tell him the substance of what I had imparted to him. Accordingly I did write to Guizot at great length, setting forth in terms as strong as I could, and without any disguise, the difficulties of the case, and the utter unreasonableness of the French public in requiring, as a salve to their vanity, terms which we could neither in good policy or good faith concede. We both agreed that under existing circumstances it was not desirable that Guizot should make any proposal to our Government, and so we both of us told him. Such was the result of a conversation which when reported to Guizot will be a bitter disappointment to him; but I concur with the rest, that we could not now make any of the concessions he was disposed to ask. Bourqueney suggested that if the chances of war should be hereafter favourable to the Pasha, if the Allies should make no impression upon Acre or the south-west part of Syria, then possibly some transaction on such a basis might be possible. This, however, it was useless to discuss. Yesterday I saw Dedel, who has lately been at Walmer, and he told me the Duke of Wellington's opinion exactly coincided with ours, coincided both as to the impossibility of our making any concession in Syria, and to its perfect inutility if we did. We might degrade ourselves, weaken our own cause, but we should neither strengthen Guizot nor satisfy the cravings of French vanity and insolence, still less silence that revolutionary spirit which, not strong enough in itself, seeks to become formidable by stimulating the passions and allying itself with all the vanity, pride, and restlessness, besides desire for plunder, which are largely scattered throughout the country.

It is curious that Austria, hitherto so timid, should all of a sudden become so bold, for besides this notification to Neumann, Metternich has said that, though we have instructed Ponsonby to move the Sultan to restore Mehemet Ali to Egypt, he has not given the same instructions to Stuermer, and that he wants to see the progress of events and the conduct of the Pasha before he does so.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON'S IRRITATING LANGUAGE.]

Events have so befriended Palmerston that he is now in the right, and has got his colleagues with him; but where he is and always has been wrong is in his neglect of forms; the more fortiter he is in re, the more suaviter he ought to be in modo. But while defending his policy or attacking that of France, he has never said what he might have done to conciliate, to soften, and to destroy those impressions of intended affronts and secret designs which have produced such violent effects on the French public. On the contrary, he has constantly, in his State papers, and still more in his newspapers, said what is calculated to irritate and provoke them to the greatest degree; but Dedel says this has always been his fault, in all times and in all his diplomatic dealings, and this is the reason he is so detested by all the Corps Diplomatique, and has made such enemies all over Europe. Guizot will now be cast on his own resources, and must try whether the language of truth and reason will be listened to in France; whether he can, by plain statements of facts, and reasonable deductions therefrom, dissipate those senseless prejudices and extravagant delusions which have excited such a tempest in the public mind. It is clear enough to me that if he cannot, if vanity and resentment are too strong for sober reason and sound policy, no concessions we could make would save him from downfall, or save Europe from the consequences of this moral deluge.

November 15th, 1840 {p.353}

Two days ago, Lord John Russell called on me. We had some talk, but nothing very conclusive. He said the operations in Syria could not go on much longer, and we are threatened with the greatest of all evils, the hanging over of the question for another year. This he thought the worst thing of all. It is curious that he told me Stopford wrote word he must send his ships into port, and all the authorities, military and naval, say nothing can be done after the 20th. Palmerston keeps telling Bourqueney they can go on all the winter, and that the operations will not be suspended at all. I asked Lord John, if the campaign did close, leaving the Pasha in possession of all the south-west of Syria from Damascus to the Desert, and Acre unattacked, whether on such a status an agreement could not be concluded, terminating the contest by the concession of the original terms of the treaty. He said Melbourne would like that very well, but that there would be difficulties, and France would not come into the treaty on those terms. I told him I was pretty sure France would, though I did not tell him what had passed between Bourqueney and me. However, I sent for Bourqueney, and told him to propose nothing new, but to wait till the campaign was over, and in the meantime to prepare the way for some specific proposition which France might make in a spirit of amicable intervention to put an end to the contest.

December 4th, 1840 {p.354}

[Page Head: DEBATE IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER.]

In the course of the last three weeks, and since I last wrote, a mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of St. Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers.[13] Palmerston is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. He is justified by the success of his operations and by the revelations in the speeches of Thiers and Remusat. So, at least, the world will consider it, which does not examine deeply and compare curiously in order to form its judgements; and it must be acknowledged that he has a fair right to plume himself on his success. His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot makes a sort of common cause with him in the Chamber, and Thiers makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and designs which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the Pasha is now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest is at an end. Guizot continued up to the eve of the discussion to press us to do or say something to assist him; but when he found we could or would do nothing, he took the only line that was left him, and the best after all, and threw himself on the sense and reason of the country. He told the truth, and justified himself by vindicating us. He has done very well, and shown himself a good debater; but the discussion has been disgracefully personal, and with all the talent displayed they have not an idea how a deliberating assembly ought to conduct its debates, and the disclosures and revelations of official secrecy and confidence have been monstrous. Thiers has all along been playing a false, shuffling, tricky part, and at last he got so entangled in the meshes of his own policy, and so confused by the consequences of his double dealing, that he evidently did not know what to do; and the King had no difficulty in getting him out of a Government that he could no longer conduct. He says now that he meant to make war by and by; but though these menaces and the reasons he gives afford Palmerston his best justification, and are appealed to triumphantly by him and his friends, my own conviction is that Thiers would gladly have closed the account by a transaction, and that at last he would have come into the Treaty—if Palmerston would have let him in—upon terms much worse for the Pasha than those to which he would not have consented before July. Nothing that has occurred shakes my conviction that Palmerston was very wrong not to endeavour to bring France into the Treaty and to offer the status quo, though it is very possible France would have refused it. If the French Government were on the one hand resolved to agree to nothing, and under no circumstances to join in coercing the Pasha, Palmerston on the other was as obstinately determined to settle the business his own way, and not to make any proposal to France which she would or could accept. They both stood aloof, and both were immensely to blame. Palmerston has taken his success without any appearance of triumph or a desire to boast over those who doubted or opposed him; whatever may be said or thought of his policy, it is impossible not to do justice to the vigour of his execution. Mr. Pitt (Chatham) could not have manifested more decision and resource. He would not hear of delays and difficulties, sent out peremptory orders to attack Acre, and he provided in his instructions with great care and foresight for every contingency. There can be no doubt that it was the capture of Acre which decided the campaign; and the success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our naval and military commanders, and probably solely to him.

[13] [The bombardment and capture of St. Jean d'Acre by the allied fleet took place on the 3rd November, whilst these diplomatic troubles were going on in London and Paris. The French Chambers opened on the 6th November.]

Yesterday I saw the Baron Mounier, who is come over here, on a sort of mission, to talk about possible arrangements, from Guizot. He still pertinaciously urges our doing or saying something demonstrative of a disposition to be reconciled with France, and that, in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern Question, we wish to show her some deference. He wants (Syria being gone) that we should make out that it is from consideration for France that Egypt is left to the Pasha. I told him the only difficulty appeared to be that, as we had already announced we had no intention to strip him of Egypt, and had signified long ago that we had advised the Sultan to restore him to that Government, I did not see how we could now make any such declaration available, and that it would go for nothing. But he said he thought by a not difficult employment of diplomatic phraseology much might be done; and he suggested that there must be some definite settlement of the whole question, including stipulations and guarantees for the Syrian population (of the mountains, I presume), and to this France might be invited to accede. In short, nothing will satisfy her but having a finger in the pie upon any terms. What Guizot now wants is to renew the English alliance. So he said when he went away; but it may well be doubted whether the French are not too sulky with us and too deeply mortified not to make this an unpopular attempt just now. Mounier is the son of Mounier the Constitutionalist, entirely in Guizot's confidence, a talkative man not seemingly brilliant, but he is well versed in affairs, an active member of the Chamber of Peers, and considered indispensable there as a redacteur and transactor of Parliamentary business.

December 13th, 1840 {p.357}

For the last week at Norman Court, during which little or nothing has happened; but I heard one or two things before I left town. Guizot had made a direct application to Palmerston for his permission to attribute the leaving of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, to the influence of France, and to a desire to gratify her. This Palmerston (through Lord Granville) refused; but Guizot had not waited for the answer, and in his speech he said so, and it was not without its use. But while everything was on the point of being settled, Metternich (who is always in hot or cold fits of courage or cowardice) sends over a proposal that Egypt shall only be granted to Mehemet Ali for his own and his son's lives, and not hereditary. For what possible reason this absurd proposition was made, unless to create embarrassment and rekindle animosities, nobody can conceive; though probably the real solution is that Metternich is in his dotage, has no policy in his brain, and acts from foolish impulses. I have heard no more of it; and though Palmerston would not be at all averse to the proposal as a matter of inclination, I do not suspect him of the folly of listening to it, and, if he did, his colleagues would not.

December 29th, 1840 {p.357}

[Page Head: LORD MELBOURNE IN HIGH SPIRITS.]

Went on Thursday last to the Grange, and returned yesterday. Just before I went, the Duke of Bedford called on me; he was just come from Woburn, where he had had a great party—Melbourne, like a boy escaped from school, in roaring spirits. They anticipate an easy session, and all Melbourne's alarm and despondency are quickly succeeded by joy at having got out of a scrape, and confidence that all difficulties are surmounted and all opposition will be silenced. But it now comes out that of all who were opposed to Palmerston's policy, not one—not even Lord Holland—was in his heart so averse to, and so afraid of it, as Melbourne himself; and, nevertheless, he would say nothing and do nothing to impede or alter it. Palmerston is now doing his best to flatter Lord John out of any remains of sourness or soreness that their recent disputes may have left in his mind; and (passing over all that subsequently occurred) he writes to him to invite him to Broadlands, and says that while their recent successes have far exceeded the most sanguine expectations, he never shall forget how much of them is owing to the powerful support which he (Lord John) gave to him (Palmerston) in the Treaty. There is, it must be owned, astuteness in this; for Lord John's original support of the Treaty, and Palmerston's success in the operations, bind them indissolubly together, and it is very wise to put this prominently forward and cancel the recollection of all the rest.

[Page Head: TORY OPINION OF LORD PALMERSTON'S POLICY.]

But while public opinion appears to be universally pronounced in Palmerston's favour, and the concurrent applause of all the Tory papers indicates the satisfaction of that party, some circumstances lead me to believe that their approbation of the Treaty of July, and of all Palmerston's proceedings under it, is by no means so certain as the Government believe. At the Grange I found Lord Ashburton loud in his condemnation of the whole thing, talking exactly as we have all been talking and writing for many weeks past; and what surprised me much more was, that, in a conversation which I had with Granville Somerset yesterday, he expressed precisely the same opinions; and when I expressed my surprise at his language, and said that I had fancied all the Tories were enraptured with Palmerston, he replied that he had no reason to believe any such thing; that he had not met (among the many with whom he had conversed) with any such general and unqualified approbation; and he believed both the Duke and Peel had carefully abstained from pronouncing any opinion whatever on the subject, leaving themselves entire liberty to deal with the whole question as they might think fit. The notion is, that the Tories are charmed with a transaction which separates us from France, but Lord Ashburton and Granville Somerset—a bigoted Tory, if ever there was one—inveighed against the Treaty precisely because it had produced that consequence. It is the approbation expressed by Aberdeen, both before and since our successes, which has led to the general belief that the Tories are with the Government on this matter, for Aberdeen is regarded as their mouthpiece upon all questions of foreign policy. I had another conversation with Mounier just before he went. He had been to Strathfieldsaye, and was delighted with his reception by the Duke, and with the tone and tenor of his talk, anxious for a reconciliation with France, and entering into the whole history of our mutual relations from the Restoration to the present day, as he said, with the greatest clearness, precision, and solidity. He admitted that Guizot's was a very difficult situation, and the restoration of amicable feelings between the two countries very difficult also, but a thing earnestly to be desired.

December 31st, 1840 {p.359}

The end of the year is a point from which, as from a sort of eminence, one looks back over the past, happy if the prospect is not gloomy, and if the retrospect carries with it no feelings of regret and self-reproach. The past year has been full (as what year is not?) of events, of which that which has made the deepest impression on society is the death of Lord Holland. I doubt, from all I see, whether anybody (except his own family, including Allen) had really a very warm affection for Lord Holland, and the reason probably is that he had none for anybody. He was a man with an inexhaustible good humour, and an ever-flowing nature, but not of strong feelings; and there are men whose society is always enjoyed but who never inspire deep and strong attachment. I remember to have heard good observers say that Lady Holland had more feeling than Lord Holland—would regret with livelier grief the loss of a friend than this equable philosopher was capable of feeling. The truth is social qualities—merely social and intellectual—are not those which inspire affection. A man may be steeped in faults and vices, nay, in odious qualities, and yet be the object of passionate attachment, if he is only what the Italians term 'simpatico.'



CHAPTER X.

Successes in India, China, and Syria—The Hereditary Pashalik of Egypt—Lord Palmerston's Hostility to France—Lord Palmerston and the Tories—His extraordinary Position—A Communication from M. Guizot—Death of the Duchess of Cannizzaro—Her History—Dinner with Lady Holland—Macaulay's Conversation— Opening of the Session—A Sheriffs' Dinner—Hullah's Music Lecture—Tory Successes—Duke of Wellington ill—Irish Registration Bill—Opposed by the Conservatives—Conservative Government of Ireland—Petulance of Lord Palmerston—Double Dealing of Lord Palmerston—Ill Temper of the French—M. Dedel's account of the State of Affairs—M. Dedel's account corrected—Termination of the Disputes with France—Bad News from China—Hostility of the United States—The Sultan's Hatti- sherif—The Hatti-sherif disapproved by some Ministers—Peel's Liberality—The Hatti-sherif disavowed—The Bishop of Exeter left in the lurch—Poor Law Amendment Bill—Lord Granville's Illness—Death of Mrs. Algernon Greville—Loss of 'The President'—Government defeated—China Troubles—Danger of the Government.

January 7th, 1841 {p.360}

Yesterday arrived (through the French telegraph) the news of the death of the King of Lahore, the surrender of Dost Mahomed, and the settlement of the Chinese quarrel, all coming just in time to swell out the catalogue of successes to be announced in the Queen's Speech. In France the aspect of affairs is improving, the King has given answers on New Year's Day which he would not have ventured to make a short time ago, and His Majesty assures Lord Granville that the war fever is rapidly diminishing. The French hardly trouble themselves now (except in an occasional undergrowl in some Liberal paper) about Syria, and the Government considering Mehemet Ali's destiny decided, only desire to be re- admitted into the great European Council, for the purpose of participating in the measures to be adopted for determining the condition of the Christian population of Syria, and for securing Constantinople from any exclusive protection or influence.