[Footnote 177: "Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place, nor should I have yet, if the men would do their duty, but this I despair of. It is painful, and extremely grating to me, to give such unfavorable accounts; but it would be criminal to conceal the truth at so critical a juncture."—Washington to Congress, September 2d, 1776.]

[Footnote 178: Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, wrote to his wife, September 14th, from New York: "My baggage is all at King's bridge. We expect to remove thither this evening. I mean our headquarters."—Reed's Reed. Washington, writing of the events of the 15th, says: "I had gone the night before to the main body of the army which was posted on the plains and heights of Harlem." These references fail to confirm the common statement that Washington made the Murray House on Thirty-sixth Street his quarters for a short time after leaving the city.]

* * * * *

The enemy made no advance from Long Island until more than two weeks after the battle. Howe's preparations were delayed because dependent upon the co-operation of the fleet. On the night of the 3d of September, the frigate Rose, of thirty-two guns, sailed up the East River convoying thirty boats, and running through the fire of our guns at the Grand Battery, the ship-yards, and Corlears Hook, anchored close into Wallabout Bay, where on the 5th our artillerists "briskly cannonaded" her. After dark on the 12th, thirty-six additional boats passed our batteries to Bushwick Creek, and the night after forty more followed. Then towards sunset on the 14th, the frigates Roebuck, Phoenix, Orpheus, and Carysfort, with six transports, joined the Rose without receiving material injury from the heavy fire poured upon them by our gunners.

On the following morning, the 15th, the British moved against Manhattan Island, and in the afternoon New York City fell into their possession. What occurred beforehand during the day is known as the "Kip's Bay affair."[179]

[Footnote 179: According to the Hessian major, Baurmeister, the 13th had been first named as the date for the attack. "On this day," he writes, "General Howe wished to land upon the island of New York, because 18 years ago on this day General Wulff [Wolfe] had conquered at Quebec, but also lost his life. The watchword for this end was 'Quebec' and the countersign 'Wulff,' but the frigates were too late for this attack as they only sailed out of the fleet at five o'clock on the evening of the 14th."

The sailing up of these ships is described as follows by the Hon. Joshua Babcock, one of the Rhode Island Committee who had come down to consult with Washington in regard to military matters: "Just after Dinner 3 Frigates and a 40 Gun Ship (as if they meant to attack the city) sail'd up the East River under a gentle Breeze towards Hell-Gate, & kept up an incessant Fire assisted with the Cannon at Governrs Island: The Batteries from the City return'd the Ships the like Salutation: 3 Men agape, idle Spectators had the misfortune of being killed by one Cannon-Ball, the other mischief suffered on our Side was inconsiderable Saving the making a few Holes in some of the Buildings; one shot struck within 6 Foot of Genl Washington, as He was on Horseback riding into the Fort."—MS. Letter in R.I. Public Archives. Also in Force.

Baurmeister preserves the incident that Washington was often to be seen at the East River batteries in New York, and on one occasion "provoked the Hessian artillery Captain Krug [on the Long Island side] to fire off 2 Cannon at him and his suite." "A third shot too would not have been wanting, if the horses of the enemy had been pleased to stay," adds the major.]

Kip's Bay was the large cove which then set in from the East River at about the foot of Thirty-fourth Street. It took its name from the old Kip family, who owned the adjacent estate. From this point breastworks had been thrown up along the river's bank, wherever a landing could be made, down as far as Corlears Hook or Grand Street. Five brigades had been distributed at this front to watch the enemy. Silliman's was in the city; at Corlears Hook was Parsons' brigade, to which Prescott's Massachusetts men had now been added; beyond, in the vicinity of Fifteenth Street, on the Stuyvesant estate, Scott's New York brigade took post; above him, at about Twenty-third Street, was Wadsworth's command, consisting of Sage's, Selden's, and Gay's Connecticut levies; and further along near Kip's Bay was Colonel Douglas, with his brigade of three Connecticut militia regiments under Cooke, Pettibone, and Talcott, and his own battalion of levies.[180] Up the river a chain of sentinels communicated with the troops at Horn's Hook, and every half hour they passed the watchword to each other, "All is well."

[Footnote 180: We know the position of the troops from the statements of their officers. Douglas says: "I lay with my brigade a little below Turtle [Kips] Bay where we hove up lines for more than one mile in length. Gen'l Wadsworth managed the lines on the right and I on the left." Brigade-Major Fish says of Scott's brigade that they were "marched to the lines back of Stuyvesant's," about the foot of Fifteenth Street. Parsons was below at Corlears Hook as appears from Document 32. Silliman himself says that he was in the city. Consult map of New York, Part II., where the position at the time of the British attack is given.]

Very early on the morning of the 15th, which was Sunday, the five British frigates which had anchored under the Long Island shore sailed up and took position close within musket-shot of our lines at Kip's Bay, somewhat to the left of Douglas. This officer immediately moved his brigade abreast of them. The ships were so near, says Martin, one of Douglas' soldiers, that he could distinctly read the name of the Phoenix, which was lying "a little quartering." Meanwhile, on the opposite shore, in Newtown Creek, the British embarked their light infantry and reserves, and Donop's grenadiers and yagers, all under Clinton and Cornwallis, in eighty-four boats, and drew up in regular order on the water ready to cross to the New York side.[181] The soldier just quoted remembered that they looked like "a large clover field in full bloom." All along the line our soldiers were watching these movements with anxious curiosity—that night they would have been withdrawn from the position—when suddenly between ten and eleven o'clock the five frigates opened a sweeping fire from their seventy or eighty guns upon the breastworks where Douglas and his brigade were drawn up. It came like "a peal of thunder," and the militiamen could do nothing but keep well under cover. The enemy fired at them at their pleasure, from "their tops and everywhere," until our men soon found it impossible to stay in that position. "We kept the lines," says Martin, "till they were almost levelled upon us, when our officers, seeing we could make no resistance, and no orders coming from any superior officer, and that we must soon be entirely exposed to the rake of the guns, gave the order to leave." At the same time the flotilla crossed the river, and getting under cover of the smoke of the ships' guns, struck off to the left of Douglas, where the troops effected a landing without difficulty. Howe says: "The fire of the shipping being so well directed and so incessant, the enemy could not remain in their works, and the descent was made without the least opposition." The ordeal the militia were subjected to was something which in similar circumstances veteran troops have been unable to withstand.[182] Retreating from the lines, Douglas's men scattered to the rear towards the Post Road, and the enemy who landed and formed rapidly were soon after them. Douglas himself, who was an excellent officer, was the last to leave, and all but escaped capture.[183] There was no collecting the brigade, however, in any new position in the field, for the thought of being intercepted had created a panic among the militia, and they fled in confusion.

[Footnote 181: "The first landing was of 84 boats with English infantry and Hessian grenadiers under command of Lieut-General Clinton. Commodore Hotham conducted this landing, under cover of 5 frigates anchored close before Kaaps [Kip's] Bay above Cron Point, and maintained a 3 hours cannonade on the enemy's advanced posts in the great wood. The signal of the red flag denoted the departure of the boats, the blue on the contrary the stoppage of the passage, and if a retreat should become necessary, a yellow flag would be shown."—Baurmeister. "Sunday morning at break of day, five ships weighed anchor and fell in close within a musket shot of our lines quite to the left of me. I then moved my brigade abreast of them. They lay very quiet until 10 o'clock and by that time they had about 80 of their boats from under Long Island shore full with men which contained about five or six thousand and four transports full ready to come in the second boats."—Col. Douglas.

Major Fish wrote September 19th that the enemy's ships of war were drawn up "in line of Battle parallel to the shore, the Troops to the amount of about 4000 being embarked in flat bottom Boats, and the Boats paraded."—Hist. Mag.]

[Footnote 182: All accounts agree that it was next to impossible to remain under the fire of the men-of-war. Major Fish says that "a Cannonade from the ships began, which far exceeded my Ideas, and which seemed to infuse a Panic thro' the whole of our Troops, &c." Silliman speaks of the "incessant fire on our lines" with grapeshot as being "so hot" that the militia were compelled to retreat. Douglas's description is as quaint as it is expressive: "They very suddenly began as heavy a cannonade perhaps as ever was from no more ships, as they had nothing to molest them." Martin thought his head would "go with the sound." Lieutenant John Heinrichs, of the Hessian yagers, writes: "Last Sunday we landed under the thundering rattle of 5 men-of-war."]

[Footnote 183: The enemy's boats, says Douglas, "got under cover of the smoke of the shipping and then struck to the left of my lines in order to cut me off from a retreat. My left wing gave way which was formed of the militia. I lay myself on the right wing waiting for the boats until Capt. Prentice came to me and told me, if I meant to save myself to leave the lines, for that was the orders on the left and that they had left the lines. I then told my men to make the best of their way as I found I had but about ten left with me. They soon moved out and I then made the best of my way out."—See further in Documents, Part II., p. 71.]

When the cannonade at Kip's Bay began, Washington was four miles distant, at Harlem. At the first sound of the guns he mounted his horse and rode with all possible despatch to the scene. At about the same time, General Parsons, probably by Putnam's order, directed Prescott's, Tyler's, and the remnant of Huntington's regiment, not over eighty strong, to march immediately to the assistance of the troops where the enemy were landing.[184] Fellows' brigade was also ordered along for the same purpose.

[Footnote 184: Document 32.]

At about the corner of the present Thirty-sixth Street and Fourth Avenue stood at that time the residence of Robert Murray, the Quaker merchant, on what was known as "Inclenberg" heights, now Murray Hill. His grounds extended to the Post Road, which there ran along the line of Lexington Avenue. Just above him a cross-road connected the Post and Bloomingdale roads, which is represented to-day by the line of Forty-second and Forty-third streets. On the south side of the cross-road where it intersected the Post Road was a large corn-field adjoining or belonging to Murray's estate. When Washington reached this vicinity he found the militia retreating in disorder along both the cross and the Post roads, and Fellows' brigade just coming on to the field. The general, with Putnam and others, was then on the rising ground in the vicinity of the present Forty-second Street reservoir. In a very short time Parsons and his regiments arrived by the Bloomingdale Road, and Washington in person directed them to form along the line of the Post Road in front of the enemy, who were rapidly advancing from Kip's Bay. "Take the walls!" "Take the corn-field!" he shouted; and Parsons' men quickly ran to the walls and the field, but in a confused and disordered manner. Their general did his best to get them into line on the ground, but found it impossible, they were so dispersed, and, moreover, they were now beginning to retreat. The panic which had seized the Connecticut militia was communicated to Fellows' Massachusetts men, who were also militia; and now it was to sweep up Parsons' Continentals, including Prescott's men of Bunker Hill. The latter brigade had been brought on to the ground in bad shape through the fugitive militiamen, and when the British light infantry appeared they broke and retreated with the rest.

To Washington all this confusion and rout seemed wholly unnecessary and unreasonable, and dashing in among the flying crowds he endeavored to convince them that there was no danger, and used his utmost exertions to bring them into some order. He was roused to more than indignation at the sight, and in his letter to Congress on the following day denounced the conduct of these troops as "disgraceful and dastardly."[185] Putnam, Parsons, Fellows, and others were equally active in attempting to stop the flight, but it was to no purpose. "The very demons of fear and disorder," says Martin, "seemed to take full possession of all and everything on that day." Nothing remained but to continue the retreat by the Bloomingdale Road to Harlem Heights.

[Footnote 185: Washington's account of the panic is as follows:

"As soon as I heard the firing, I rode with all possible despatch towards the place of landing, where to my great surprise and mortification I found the troops that had been posted in the lines retreating with the utmost precipitation and those ordered to support them (Parsons' and Fellows' brigades) flying in every direction, and in the greatest confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of their generals to form them. I used every means in my power to rally and to get them into some order; but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual; and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not more than sixty or seventy, their disorder increased, and they ran away in the greatest confusion, without firing a single shot."

There were several stories current after the affair which cannot be traced to any responsible source. One was that the Commander-in-Chief was so "distressed and enraged" at the conduct of the troops that "he drew his sword and snapped his pistols to check them;" and that one of his suite was obliged to seize his horse's reins and take him out of danger from the enemy. Another account represents that he threw his hat on the ground and exclaimed whether such were the troops with which he was to defend America; another states that he sought "death rather than life." Mr. Bancroft has shown how far these statements are to be accepted.]

During these scenes, Wadsworth's and Scott's brigades, which were below Douglas on the river lines, saw that their only safety lay, also, in immediate retreat, and falling back, they joined the other brigades above, though not without suffering some loss. The parties now in the greatest danger were Silliman's brigade and Knox with detachments of the artillery, who were still in the city three miles below. When Putnam, to whose division they belonged, found that no stand could be made at Kip's Bay or Murray's Hill, he galloped down through Wadsworth's and Scott's retreating troops, to extricate Silliman and the others.[186] Not a moment's time was to be lost, for should the British stretch out their troops west of the Bloomingdale Road to the North River, escape would be impossible. Silliman, meanwhile, had taken post with Knox in and to the right of Bayard's Hill Fort, from the top of which they could see the enemy occupying the island above them. At this juncture, Major Aaron Burr, Putnam's aid, rode up to the fort with orders to retreat. He was told that retreat was out of the question. Knox said that he should defend the fort to the last. But Burr, who knew the ground thoroughly, declared that he could pilot them safely to the upper end of the island, and Silliman's men set out for the attempt.[187] Putnam also had called in other guards, and the entire force then took to the woods above Greenwich, on the west side, and keeping under cover wherever it was possible, made their way along without opposition. But it proved to be a most trying and hazardous march. The day was "insupportably hot;" more than one soldier died at the spring or brook where he drank; any moment the enemy, who at some points were not half a mile away, might be upon them. Officers rode in advance and to the right to reconnoitre and see that the way was clear. Putnam, Silliman, Burr, and others were conspicuous in their exertions. Silliman was "sometimes in the front, sometimes in the centre, and sometimes in the rear." The men extended along in the woods for two miles, and the greatest precautions were necessary to keep them out of sight of the main road.[188] Putnam encouraged them continually by flying on his horse, covered with foam, wherever his presence was most necessary. "Without his extraordinary exertions," says Colonel Humphreys, who frequently saw Putnam that day, "the guards must have been inevitably lost, and it is probable the entire corps would have been cut in pieces." Much, too, of the success of the march was due to Burr's skill and knowledge. Near Bloomingdale, the command fell in with a party of the British, when Silliman formed three hundred of his men and beat them off. After making a winding march of at least "twelve miles," these greatly distressed troops finally reached Harlem Heights after dark, to the surprise and relief of the other brigades, who had given them up for lost.

[Footnote 186: Hezekiah Munsell, a soldier of Gay's regiment in Wadsworth's brigade, says: "We soon reached the main road which our troops were travelling, and the first conspicuous person I met was Gen. Putnam. He was making his way towards New York when all were going from it. Where he was going I could not conjecture, though I afterwards learned he was going after a small garrison of men in a crescent fortification which he brought off safe."—Hist. of Ancient Windsor, p. 715.]

[Footnote 187: Affidavits in Davis' "Life of Burr," vol. i.]

[Footnote 188: The line of Putnam's retreat appears to have been from Bayard's Hill Fort on Grand Street across the country to Monument Lane (now Greenwich Avenue), which led to the obelisk erected in honor of General Wolf and others at a point on Fifteenth Street, a little west of Eighth Avenue. (See Montressor's Map of New York in 1775, "Valentine's Manual.") The lane there joined with an irregular road running on the line of Eighth Avenue, known afterwards as the Abington or Fitz Roy road, as far as Forty-second or Third Street. There Putnam, under Burr's guidance probably, pushed through the woods, keeping west of the Bloomingdale Road, and finally taking the latter at some point above Seventieth Street, and so on to Harlem Heights. (See Map of New York, Part II.)]

Although skilfully conducted, this escape is to be referred, in reality, to Howe's supineness and the hospitality of Mrs. Robert Murray, at whose house the British generals stopped for rest and refreshment after driving back our troops. Instead of continuing a vigorous pursuit or making any effort to intercept other parties, they spent a valuable interval at the board of their entertaining hostess, whose American sympathies added flavor and piquancy to the conversation. "Mrs. Murray," says Dr. Thacher in his military journal, "treated them with cake and wine, and they were induced to tarry two hours or more, Governor Tryon frequently joking her about her American friends. By this happy incident, General Putnam, by continuing his march, escaped a rencounter with a greatly superior force, which must have proved fatal to his whole party. Ten minutes, it is said, would have been sufficient for the enemy to have secured the road at the turn and entirely cut off General Putnam's retreat. It has since become almost a common saying among our officers, that Mrs. Murray saved this part of the American army."

* * * * *

Of the Kip's Bay affair there is but one criticism to be made—it was an ungovernable panic. Beginning with a retreat from the water-line, it grew into a fright and a run for safer ground. Panics are often inexplicable. The best troops as well as the poorest have been known to fly from the merest shadow of danger. In this case, so far as the beginning of the rout is concerned, probably the militiamen did no worse than Washington's best men would have done. A retreat from the ship's fire could not have been avoided, though, with better troops, the subsequent rout could have been checked and the enemy retarded.

The incident was especially unfortunate at that time, as it served to increase existing jealousies between the troops from the different States, and so far impair the morale of the army. It excites a smile to-day to read that men from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland charged New Englanders generally with provincialism and cowardice, and that the charge was resented; but such was the fact. The feeling between them grew to such an extent that Washington was obliged to issue orders condemning its indulgence. The Kip's Bay panic offered a favorable opportunity for emphasizing these charges, and the Connecticut and Massachusetts runaways came in for their full share of uncomplimentary epithets. The Connecticut men were remembered particularly, "dastards" and "cowards" being the terms which greeted their ears. All this of course could not but be ruinous to the discipline of the army, and it was an alarming fact to be dealt with.[189] The men south of New England were not without reason in making their harsh criticisms, for many of the New England regiments, the militia in particular, came upon the ground with an inferior military organization. They were miserably officered in many cases, and the men, never expecting to become soldiers as such, were indifferent to discipline. But in another view the criticisms were unfair, because the Pennsylvanians and others, in making comparisons, compared their best troops with New England's poorest. As two thirds of the army were from New England—more than one third from Connecticut—men from this section were necessarily represented largely in every duty or piece of fighting, and whenever any misconduct of a few occurred, it was made to reflect discredit upon the whole. There was no difference between the better drilled and officered regiments from the several States, just as there was little difference between their hastily gathered militia. Thus it may be mentioned as a notable and somewhat humorous coincidence that at the very moment the Connecticut militia were flying from the bombardment of the ships at Kip's Bay, New Jersey and Pennsylvania militia were flying with equal haste from the bombardment of other ships at Powle's Hook as they sailed up the North River to Bloomingdale on the same morning; and that while Reed, Tilghman, Smallwood, and others, were denouncing the Kip's Bay fugitives in unmeasured terms, the indignant Mercer was likewise denouncing the "scandalous" behavior of the fugitives in his own command.[190]

[Footnote 189: This jealousy disappeared when the army was reorganized and the troops became proficient in discipline. The American soldier was then found to be equal to any that could be brought against him, regardless of the locality from which he hailed. But in the present campaign the sectional feeling referred to came near working mischief, especially as it was kept alive by so prominent an officer as Colonel Reed, the Adjutant-general. New England officers protested against the "rancor" and "malice" of his assertions, and represented their injurious influence to members of Congress. Washington, finding that the matter was becoming serious, took the occasion to send a special invitation to Colonels Silliman and Douglas to dine with him in the latter part of September, when he "disavowed and absolutely disapproved every such piece of conduct" which had been a grievance to these and other Eastern officers.—Silliman's MS. Letter. See also extracts in Gordon's history as to the condition of the army at this time.]

[Footnote 190: "The militia of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, stationed on Bergen and at Paulus-Hook, have behaved in a scandalous manner, running off from their posts on the first cannonade from the ships of the enemy. At all the posts we find it difficult to keep the militia to their duty." (Mercer to Washington, Sept. 17th, 1776.) "I don't know whether the New Engd troops will stand there [at Harlem Heights], but I am sure they will not upon open ground," etc.—Tilghman. Document 29.]

The events of the 15th naturally and justly roused the wrath of both Washington and Mercer, and their denunciations become a part of the record of the time. But in recording them it belongs to those who write a century later to explain and qualify. Justice to the men who figured in these scenes requires that the terms of reproach should not be perpetuated as a final stigma upon their character as soldiers of the Revolution. All military experience proves that troops who have once given way in a panic are not therefore or necessarily poor troops; and the experience at Kip's Bay and Powle's Hook was only an illustration in the proof. These men had their revenge. If the records of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were to be thoroughly examined, they would doubtless show that large numbers of Mercer's militia re-entered the service and acquitted themselves well. This is certainly true of many of the routed crowd whom Washington found it impossible to rally on Murray's Hill and in Murray's corn-field. Some of those who ran from the Light Infantry on the 15th assisted in driving the same Light Infantry on the 16th. Prescott's men a few weeks later successfully defended a crossing in Westchester County and thwarted the enemy's designs. Not a few of the militia in Douglas's brigade were the identical men with whom Oliver Wolcott marched up to meet Burgoyne a year later, and who, under Colonels Cook and Latimer, "threw away their lives" in the decisive action of that campaign, suffering a greater loss than any other two regiments on the field. Fellows, also, was there to co-operate in forcing the British surrender. In Parsons' brigade were young officers and soldiers who formed part of the select corps that stormed Stony Point, and among Wadsworth's troops were others who, five years later, charged upon the Yorktown redoubt with the leading American Light Infantry battalion.[191]

[Footnote 191: The Major of this battalion (Gimat's) was John Palsgrave Wyllys, of Hartford, who, as Wadsworth's Brigade-Major, was taken prisoner at Kip's Bay. Alexander Hamilton and Brigade-Major Fish, of New York, who were swept along in this retreat, also figured prominently at Yorktown. Two young ensigns in the Connecticut "levies," Stephen Betts and James Morris, were captains of Light Infantry in that affair. Lieutenant Stephen Olney, of Rhode Island, who barely escaped capture on Long Island by Cornwallis's grenadiers, led Gimat's battalion as captain, and was severely wounded while clambering into the redoubt; and there were probably a considerable number of others, officers and men, who were chased by this British general in the present campaign, who finally had the satisfaction of cornering him in Virginia in 1781. Scammell, Huntington, Tilghman, Humphreys, and others, could be named.]

* * * * *

When Washington found that the enemy had made their principal landing at Thirty-fourth Street, and that a retreat was necessary, he sent back word to have Harlem Heights well secured by the troops there, while at the same time a considerable force under Mifflin marched down to the strong ground near McGowan's to cover the escape of troops that might take the King's Bridge road. Chester and Sargent evacuated Horn's Hook and came in with Mifflin. Upon the landing of more troops at Kip's Bay, Howe sent a column towards McGowan's, and in the evening the Light Infantry reached Apthorpe's just after Silliman's retreat. Washington had waited on the Bloomingdale Road until the last, and retired from the Apthorpe Mansion but a short time before the British occupied it. Here at Bloomingdale the enemy encamped their left wing for the night, while their right occupied Horn's Hook, their outposts not being advanced on the left beyond One Hundredth Street. The Americans slept on Harlem Heights, not quite a mile and a half above them.

"That night," says Humphreys, "our soldiers, excessively fatigued by the sultry march of the day, their clothes wet by a severe shower of rain that succeeded towards the evening, their blood chilled by the cold wind that produced a sudden change in the temperature of the air, and their hearts sunk within them by the loss of baggage, artillery, and works, in which they had been taught to put great confidence, lay upon their arms, covered only by the clouds of an uncomfortable sky."[192]

[Footnote 192: The American loss in prisoners in the Kip's Bay affair was seventeen officers and about three hundred and fifty men, nearly all from Connecticut and New York. A very few were killed and wounded, Major Chapman, of Tyler's regiment, being among the former.

The officer of highest rank among the prisoners was Colonel Samuel Selden, of Hadlyme, Conn., mentioned on page 121. (See biographical sketches, Part II.) One of his officers was Captain Eliphalet Holmes, afterwards of the Continental line, a neighbor of the Colonel's. Being a man of great strength he knocked down two Hessians, who attempted to capture him, and escaped.]

During the day, meantime, the British occupied the city. After the departure of the last troops under Silliman (Knox with others escaping to Powle's Hook by boats) a white flag was displayed on Bayard's Hill Redoubt by citizens, and in the afternoon a detachment from the fleet first took possession.[193] In the evening a brigade from Howe's force encamped along the outer line of works. The next forenoon, the 16th, "the first of the English troops came to town," under General Robertson, and were drawn up in two lines on Broadway. Governor Tryon was present with officers of rank and a great concourse of people. "Joy and gladness seemed to appear in all countenances;" while the first act of the victors was to identify and confiscate every house owned and deserted by the rebels. "And thus," says the now happy loyalist pastor Shewkirk, "the city was delivered from those Usurpers who had oppressed it so long."

[Footnote 193: Baurmeister's Narrative. Shewkirk's Diary.]

* * * * *

Fortunately, the demoralizing effect of the panic of the 15th was to be merely temporary. Indeed, before the details of the affair had time to circulate through the camps and work further discouragement or depression, there occurred another encounter with the enemy on the following morning, which neutralized the disgrace of the previous day and revived the spirits of our army to an astonishing degree. So much importance was attached to it at the time as being a greatly needed stimulant for the American soldier that it becomes of interest to follow its particulars. It has passed into our history as the affair or

BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS.[194]

Never for a moment relaxing his watch over the enemy's movements, Washington, before daylight on the morning of the 16th, ordered a reconnoitring party out to ascertain the exact position of the British. The party consisted of the detachment of "Rangers,"[195] or volunteers from the New England regiments, which had been organized for scouting service since the battle of Long Island, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton, of Connecticut. No better man could have been found in the army to head such a corps, for he had proved his courage at Bunker Hill, and on more than one occasion since had shown his capacity for leadership. The detachment started out, not more than one hundred and twenty strong, and passing over to the Bloomingdale heights, marched for the Bloomingdale Road, where the enemy were last seen the night before.

[Footnote 194: The centennial anniversary of this battle was celebrated in 1876, under the auspices of the New York Historical Society. The oration delivered on the occasion by the Hon. John Jay has been published by the Society, with an appendix containing a large number of documents bearing upon the affair, the whole making a valuable contribution to our Revolutionary history.]

[Footnote 195: THE RANGERS.—The small corps known by this name consisted, first, as already stated, of about one hundred men of Durkee's Connecticut Regiment (Twentieth Continentals), who appear to have accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton, of that regiment, when he went on any special service. These he took with him to Long Island. After the battle there the Rangers were formally organized as a separate body, composed of volunteer officers and men from several of the New England regiments. These were borne on their respective regimental rolls as detached "on command." For captains, Knowlton had at least three excellent officers, men from his own region, whom he knew and could trust—Nathan Hale, of Charles Webb's regiment, and Stephen Brown and Thomas Grosvenor, of his own. The rolls in Force show that there were officers and men in the Rangers from Durkee's, Webb's, Chester's, Wyllys', and Tyler's Connecticut; Ward's and Sargent's Massachusetts; and Varnum's Rhode Island. For a time they received orders directly from Washington and then from Putnam, and were of great service to the army in watching the enemy along the Harlem front. They distinguished themselves on the 16th, and later in the season, when Colonel Magaw was in command of Fort Washington, he begged to have the Rangers remain with him, as he declared that they were the only safe protection to the lines. (Greene to Washington.) They remained and were taken prisoners at the surrender of the fort, November 16th. Though probably not over one hundred and fifty strong, their losses seem to have been heavy. Knowlton fell at Harlem Heights; Major Coburn, who succeeded him, was severely wounded a few weeks later; Captain Nathan Hale was executed as a spy; and Captain Brown, a man as cool as Knowlton, was killed at the defence of Fort Mifflin near Philadelphia, in 1777, a cannon-ball severing his head from his body. Grosvenor served through the war, retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Fifth of the Connecticut line. These facts are gathered from MS. Order Books, documents in Force and Hist. Mag., and from MS. letter of the late Judge Oliver Burnham, of Cornwall, Conn., a soldier in Wyllys' regiment and one of the Rangers, in which he says: "Soon after the retreat from Long Island, Colonel Knowlton was ordered to raise a battalion of troops from the different regiments called the Rangers, to reconnoitre along our shores and between the armies. Being invited by a favorite officer, I volunteered, and on the day the enemy took New York we were at Harlem and had no share in the events of that day."]

The ground which Knowlton reconnoitred and which became the scene of the action remains to-day unchanged in its principal features. What was then known as Harlem Heights is that section of the island which rises prominently from the plain west of Eighth Avenue and north of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street. Its southern face extended from an abrupt point, called "Point of Rocks," at One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Street, east of Ninth Avenue, northwesterly to the Hudson, a distance of three quarters of a mile. At the foot of these heights lay a vale or "hollow way," through the centre of which now runs Manhattan Street, and opposite, at distances varying from a quarter to a third of a mile, rose another line of bluffs and slopes parallel to Harlem Heights. This lower elevation stood mainly in the Bloomingdale division of the city's out-ward, and is generally known to-day as Bloomingdale Heights. In 1776 there were two farms on these heights, owned and occupied by Adrian Hogeland and Benjamin Vandewater, which were partly cultivated, but mainly covered with woods. The Bloomingdale Road, as stated in a previous chapter, terminated at Hogeland's lands about One Hundred and Eighth or Tenth streets, and from there a lane or road ran easterly by Vandewater's and joined the King's Bridge road near One Hundred and Twentieth Street. East of the Bloomingdale and south of Harlem Heights stretched the tract of level land called Harlem Plains.

After the retreat of the 15th, Washington's army encamped on Harlem Heights, with their pickets lining the southern slope from Point of Rocks to the Hudson. The British, as we have seen, lay at Bloomingdale and across the upper part of Central Park to Horn's Hook. An enemy, posted at the lower boundary of Harlem Plains, around McGowan's Pass, where the ground again rises at the northern end of the Park, might be easily observed from the Point of Rocks, and any advance from that quarter could be reported at once. Nothing, however, could be seen of movements made on the Bloomingdale Road or Heights, and it was in that direction that the "Rangers" now proceeded to reconnoitre at dawn on the 16th.

Knowlton, marching under cover of the woods, soon came upon the enemy's pickets, somewhere, it would appear, between Hogeland's and Apthorpe's houses on the Bloomingdale Road, more than a mile below the American lines. This was the encampment of the Light Infantry, and their Second and Third Battalions, supported by the Forty-second Highlanders, were immediately pushed forward to drive back this party of rebels who had dared to attack them on their own ground. Anticipating some such move, Knowlton had already posted his men behind a stone wall, and when the British advanced he met them with a vigorous fire. His men fired eight or nine rounds a piece with good effect, when the enemy threatened to turn his flanks, and he ordered a retreat, which was well conducted. In this brief encounter the Rangers lost about ten of their number, and believed that they inflicted much more than this loss upon the Infantry.[196]

[Footnote 196: The Rangers were thus engaged in a distinct skirmish before the main action of the day. Washington wrote to Congress early on the 16th: "I have sent some reconnoitring parties to gain intelligence, if possible, of the disposition of the enemy." A letter in the Connecticut Gazette, reprinted in Mr. Jay's documents, and which was probably written by Captain Brown, says: "On Monday morning the General ordered us to go and take the enemy's advanced guard; accordingly we set out just before day and found where they were; at day-brake we were discovered by the enemy, who were 400 strong, and we were 120. They marched up within six rods of us and there formed to give us Battle, which we were ready for; and Colonel Knowlton gave orders to fire, which we did, and stood theirs till we perceived they were getting their flank-guards round us. After giving them eight rounds apiece the Colonel gave orders for retreating, which we performed very well, without the loss of a man while retreating, though we lost about 10 while in action." Judge Burnham says substantially the same: "Colonel Knowlton marched close to the enemy as they lay on one of the Harlem Heights, and discharged a few rounds, and then retreated over the hill out of sight of the enemy and concealed us behind a low stone wall. The Colonel marked a place about eight or ten rods from the wall, and charged us not to rise or fire a gun until the enemy reached that place. The British followed in solid column, and soon were on the ground designated when we gave them nine rounds and retreated.... Our number engaged was only about 120."]

At his headquarters in the Morris Mansion, Washington, meantime, was writing his despatches to Congress. The unwelcome duty fell to him to report the scenes of the previous day which had so deeply stirred his indignation. He made a plain statement of the facts, described the retreat from New York, acknowledged the loss of baggage and cannon, and despondently expressed his misgivings as to the soldierly qualities of a majority of his troops. "We are now," he wrote, "encamped with the main body of the army on the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet with a defeat in case of an attack, if the generality of our troops would behave with tolerable bravery. But experience, to my extreme affliction, has convinced me that this is rather to be wished for than expected. However, I trust that there are many who will act like men, and show themselves worthy of the blessings of freedom." Not unfounded was this trust, for at the very time the commander-in-chief was writing the words, the Rangers were bravely fighting in the Bloomingdale Woods, and many others soon after, including one of the very regiments which fled from Kip's Bay twenty-four hours before, were likewise to act "like men" and prove their real worth in the open field. Just as the letters were sent off word came in to headquarters that the enemy had appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, and Washington rode down to the picket-posts to make the necessary dispositions in case of an attack. Adjutant-General Reed and Lieutenant Tilghman, who had also been writing private letters describing Sunday's panic, and other members of the staff, went to the front about the same time. Knowlton's men had not yet come in, and their fire was distinctly heard from the Point of Rocks, where the commander-in-chief was now surveying the situation. Anxious to learn whether the British were approaching in force on the Bloomingdale Heights, no attack being threatened from the plains, Colonel Reed received permission to go "down to our most advanced guard," namely, to the Rangers, whom he found making a momentary halt on their retreat. The enemy soon came up again in large numbers, and the Rangers continued to retire. Colonel Reed, describing his experience at this point, states that the British advanced so rapidly that he had not quitted a house (which may have been Vandewater's) five minutes before they were in possession of it. "Finding how things were going," to use Reed's words, he returned to Washington "to get some support for the brave fellows who had behaved so well." Knowlton, however, fell back to our lines, and the enemy halted in their pursuit on the north-east edge of Bloomingdale Heights, opposite the Point of Rocks, where a part of them appeared in open sight, and "in the most insulting manner" sounded their bugle-horns as if on a fox chase. "I never felt such a sensation before," says Reed; "it seemed to crown our disgrace." But the chase was not yet over.

Learning from Knowlton that the British Infantry who had followed him in were about three hundred strong, and knowing that they were some distance from their main army, Washington determined, if possible, to effect their capture. Knowlton's men, who had done nobly, were ready for another brush, and there were troops at hand who could be depended upon to behave well under any circumstances. The opportunity for a brisk and successful skirmish presented itself, and the general proposed to improve it. Accordingly he formed the plan of engaging the enemy's attention in their front, while a flanking party should attempt to get into their rear and cut off their escape. The troops that were stationed nearest to the Point of Rocks at this time appear to have been Nixon's brigade, of Greene's division, Weedon's newly arrived regiment of Virginians, General Beall's Marylanders, Colonel Sargent's eastern brigade, Clinton's and Scott's brigades, and other regiments belonging to Putnam's and Spencer's divisions. For the flanking detachment, the general selected Knowlton's Rangers, to whom he added a reinforcement of three of the Virginia companies, about one hundred and twenty men, under Major Andrew Leitch. These were directed to make their way or "steal around" to the rear of the enemy by their right flank. To make a demonstration against the enemy in their front, while the flanking party effected its object, a detachment of volunteers was organized from Nixon's brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Crary, of Varnum's Rhode Islanders,[197] who marched down into the "hollow way" directly towards the British on the opposite ridge. As Washington hoped, this move had the desired effect. The British, seeing so small a party coming out against them, immediately ran down the rocky hill into an open field, where they took post behind some bushes and a rail fence that extended from the hill to the post road about four hundred yards in front of the Point of Rocks.[198] This field was part of the old Kortwright farm, lying just west of the present Harlem Lane, above One Hundred and Eighteenth Street, in which the line of that fence had been established for more than half a century before this engagement, and where it remained the same for more than half a century after. It is possible to-day to fix its exact position, for the march of modern improvements has not yet disturbed the site.

[Footnote 197: Captain John Gooch, of Varnum's regiment, wrote September 23d: "On the 16th the enemy advanced and took possession of a hight on our right flank about half a mile Distance with about 3000 [300?] men; a party from our brigade of 150 men, who turned out as volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Crary, of the regmt I belong to, were ordered out if possible to dispossess them."—Document 30.]

[Footnote 198: Tilghman's reference to these movements is as follows: "The General rode down to our farthest lines, and when he came near them heard a firing, which he was informed was between our scouts and the outguards of the enemy. When our men [Knowlton's] came in they informed the General that there was a party of about 300 behind a woody hill, tho' they only showed a very small party to us. Upon this the General laid a plan for attacking them in the rear and cutting off their retreat, which was to be effected in the following manner: Major Leitch, with three companies of Colo Weedon's Virginia regiment, and Colo Knowlton with his Rangers, were to steal round while a party [Crary's] were to march towards them and seem as if they intended to attack in front, but not to make any real attack till they saw our men fairly in their rear. The bait took as to one part; as soon as they saw our party in front the enemy ran down the hill and took possession of some fences and bushes and began to fire at them, but at too great distance to do much execution," etc.—Document 29. See also Washington's letter to Congress, Sept. 18th, 1776.]

In order to keep the enemy engaged at that point, Crary's party opened fire at long range, to which the British replied, but not much execution was done on either side. Meanwhile Knowlton and Leitch moved out to get in the rear. Colonel Reed accompanied the party, and as he had been over the ground he undertook the lead, with the Virginians in advance. It was probably his intention to march down under cover of the bushes, cross the Kortwright farm unobserved some little distance below the enemy, and reach the top of the Bloomingdale ridge before they were discovered. Once there, the British would be effectually hemmed in. Unfortunately, however, some "inferior officers," as it would appear, gave unauthorized directions to the flanking party; or the party forming the "feint" in front pushed on too soon, in consequence of which Leitch and Knowlton made their attack rather on the British flank than in their rear.[199] The latter now finding a retreat necessary, left the fence and started back up the hill which they had descended. Our men quickly followed, Crary in front, Knowlton and Leitch on the left, and with the Virginians leading, joined in the pursuit with splendid spirit and animation. They rushed up the slope, on about the line of One Hundred and Twentieth Street, and, climbing over the rocks, poured in their volleys upon the running Light Infantry.

[Footnote 199: It is quite clear that Knowlton and Leitch did not form two parties, as some accounts state, one moving against the right flank of the enemy and the other against the left. They acted as one body, the Virginians marching in front, having been ordered on to "reinforce" Knowlton. Thus Captain Brown writes that after retreating they "sent off for a reinforcement," which they soon received; and Colonel Reed confirms this in his testimony at the court-martial of a soldier who acted a cowardly part in the fight. "On Monday forenoon," he says, "I left Colonel Knowlton with a design to send him a reinforcement. I had accordingly ordered up Major Leitch, and was going up to where the firing was," etc. (Force, 5th Series, vol. ii. p. 500.) Reed's letters to his wife show that Leitch and Knowlton fell near him, within a few minutes of each other, which could not have been the case had they been on opposite flanks. The accounts of Tilghman, Marshall, the soldier Martin, and others, leave no doubt as to this point that there was but one flanking party, and that Knowlton commanded it.]

It was right here, now, just on the crest of the ridge, and when our gallant advance was turning the tide against the enemy, that we suffered the loss of those two noble leaders whose memory is linked with this day's action. In a very short time after the first rush, Leitch was severely wounded not far from Reed, having received three balls in his side in as many minutes; and in less than ten minutes after a bullet pierced Knowlton's body, and he too fell mortally wounded. We can identify the spot where the fall of these brave officers occurred as on the summit of the Bloomingdale Heights below One Hundred and Nineteenth Street, and about half way between the line of Ninth and Tenth Avenues. The site is included within the limits of the proposed "Morningside Park," which will thus have added to its natural attractiveness a never-fading historical association.[200]

[Footnote 200: Judge Burnham refers to the flank attack briefly as follows: "Passing over we met the enemy's right flank which had been posted out of our sight on lower ground. They fired and killed Colonel Knowlton and nearly all that had reached the top of the height." This reference to the top of the height, taken in connection with Reed's statement that "our brave fellows mounted up the rocks and attacked them as they ran in turn," goes to confirm the selection of the spot where Leitch and Knowlton fell. Burnham states that he was within a few feet of the latter when he was shot.]

Leitch was borne to the rear to be tenderly cared for until his death at a later day. In after years the Government remembered his services by granting his widow a generous pension. Knowlton met his fate with a soldier's fortitude and a patriot's devotion. "My poor Colonel," writes an officer of the Rangers, who without doubt was Captain Stephen Brown, next in rank to Knowlton, "my poor Colonel, in the second attack, was shot just by my side. The ball entered the small of his back. I took hold of him, asked him if he was badly wounded? He told me he was; but says he, 'I do not value my life if we do but get the day.' I then ordered two men to carry him off. He desired me by all means to keep up this flank. He seemed as unconcerned and calm as tho' nothing had happened to him." Reed, on whose horse the colonel was carried to the lines, wrote to his wife on the following day: "Our loss is also considerable. The Virginia Major (Leitch) who went up first with me was wounded with three shot in less than three minutes; but our greatest loss was a brave officer from Connecticut, whose name and spirit ought to be immortalized—one Colonel Knowlton. I assisted him off, and when gasping in the agonies of death, all his inquiry was if we had drove the enemy." Washington spoke of him in his letters and orders as "a valuable and gallant officer," who would have been "an honor to any country."

Meanwhile the Rangers and Virginians kept up their attack under their captains, and Washington, finding that the entire party needed support, sent forward three of the Maryland Independent companies, under Major Price, and parts of Griffith's and Richardson's Maryland Flying Camp.[201] At the same time, as Washington reports, some detachments from the Eastern regiments who were nearest the place of action, which included most of Nixon's and Sargent's brigades, Colonel Douglas's Connecticut levies, and a few others, were ordered into the field. Our total force engaged at this time, now about noon, was not far from eighteen hundred strong, and very soon a considerable battle was in progress. Besides Reed and other members of Washington's staff, Generals Putnam, Greene, and George Clinton accompanied the detachments, and encouraged the men by individual examples of bravery.[202] The troops now "charged the enemy with great intrepidity," and drove them from the crest of the heights back in a south-westerly direction through a piece of woods to a buckwheat field, about four hundred paces, as General Clinton describes it, from the ridge, or just east of the present Bloomingdale Asylum, where the Light Infantry, now reinforced by the Forty-second Highlanders, finally made a stand. The distance the latter troops had advanced and the sound of the firing had evidently warned Howe, at his headquarters at Apthorpe's, that they needed immediate assistance, and he promptly ordered forward the reserve with two field-pieces, together with the Yagers and Linsingen's grenadiers of Donop's corps. The field-pieces and Yagers came into action at the buckwheat field, and here a stubborn contest ensued for about an hour and a half.[203] But our troops pressed the enemy so hard at this point, and the Highlanders and Yagers having fired away their ammunition, the latter all again fell back, and the Americans pursued them vigorously to an orchard a short distance below, in the direction of the Bloomingdale Road. Here had been hard fighting in the open field, and the best British troops were beaten! At the orchard the result was the same, the enemy making little resistance, their fire "being silenced in a great measure," and the chase continued down one of the slight hills on Hogeland's lands and up another, near or quite to the terminus of the Bloomingdale Road. Beyond this third position our troops were not allowed to follow the enemy, whose main encampment was not far distant. The Fifth Regiment of Foot had been trotted up "about three miles without a halt to draw breath," reaching the ground at the close of the action. Linsingen's grenadiers appeared about the same time, while Block's and Minegerode's men were sent to McGowan's Pass, which had not yet been occupied. A large body of the enemy were put under arms, and within their camp every preparation was made for a general engagement; but this, above all things, Washington wished to avoid, and, quite content with the brilliant success of his troops thus far, he despatched Lieutenant Tilghman to the front to bring them off. Before turning from the field they had won so gloriously, they answered the bugle blast of the morning with a cheer of victory, and marched back in good order.[204]

[Footnote 201: There appear to have been nine companies of Maryland troops engaged, three under Major Price, three under Major Mantz, and three others of Richardson's regiment. Among these were one or more companies of Colonel Ewing's as yet incomplete battalion. One of his officers, Captain Lowe, was wounded.—Force, 5th Series, vol. ii. p. 1024. Also Capt. Beatty's letter in Mr. Jay's Documents.]

[Footnote 202: Greene wrote at a latter date: "Gen. Putnam and the Adj. Gen. were in the action and behaved nobly." "I was in the latter part, indeed almost the whole of the action."—Gen. Geo. Clinton. (See his two letters in Jay's documents.) "Gen. Putnam and Gen. Greene commanded in the Action with about 15 to eighteen hundred men."—Stiles's MS. Diary.]

[Footnote 203: "A very smart action ensued in the true Bush-fighting way in which our Troops behaved in a manner that does them the highest honor."—Letter from Col. Griffith, of Maryland. Lossing's Historical Record, vol. ii., p. 260.]

[Footnote 204: "The General fearing (as we afterwards found) that a large body was coming up to support them, sent me over to bring our men off. They gave a Hurra and left the field in good order."—Tilghman's Letters, Doc. 29.

THE BATTLE-FIELD.—Recently gathered material seems to settle all doubts as to the several points occupied by the British and Americans during the action. Where did it begin and where did it end? As to the first skirmish, it began near the British encampment at Bloomingdale. Here was Howe's left, and, as Howe reports, Knowlton approached his advanced posts under cover of the woods "by way of Vandewater's Height." This was what we call Bloomingdale Heights. The original proprietor of the greater part of this site was Thomas De Key. From him all or a large part of it passed to Harman Vandewater and Adrian Hogeland, as the deeds on record show. In 1784 the property was purchased by Nicholas De Peyster. The position of Hogeland's and Vandewater's houses as given on the accompanying map is taken from old surveys which mark the location and give the names. The Bloomingdale Road at that time stopped at these farms. That part of it above One Hundred and Tenth Street, running through Manhattanville and continuing until recently to the King's Bridge Road at One Hundred and Forty-sixth Street, did not exist during the Revolution, but was opened a few years later. (Hoffman's Est. and Rights of the Corporation of New York, vol. ii.) A lane or road running from Hogeland's by Vandewater's connected the Bloomingdale with the King's Bridge road at One Hundred and Nineteenth Street. Washington himself gives us the general line. Before the battle of Long Island he ordered Heath to have troops ready to march to New York as soon as called for, and he describes the proper route thus: "There is a road out of the Haerlem flat lands that leads up to the hills, and continues down the North River by Bloomingdale, Delancy's, &c., which road I would have them march, as they will keep the river in sight, and pass a tolerable landing-place for troops in the neighborhood of Bloomingdale." (Heath Correspondence, Mass. Hist. Coll. for 1878.) From this topography and the records the position becomes clear: Howe camped around Bloomingdale with his advance posts along the Bloomingdale Road, perhaps as far as its terminus near Hogeland's. They were last seen in this vicinity the night before. Knowlton, next morning, marches out from Harlem Heights, reconnoitres "by way of Vandewater's," and comes upon the British posts on and along the line of the Bloomingdale Road. Then he falls back under cover of the woods and over fences towards the Point of Rocks, the enemy following him.

As to succeeding movements, if we can fix Washington's station and the hill which all agree that the British descended, there is no difficulty in following them after. Point of Rocks was the extreme limit of Harlem Heights. There were our advanced posts overlooking the country south. Washington states that he rode down to "our advanced posts" to direct matters. Where better could he do so than at Point of Rocks? And in a sketch of the field preserved in the Stiles Diary, and reproduced among Mr. Jay's documents, Washington is given just that station where an earthwork had been thrown up. To confirm this and also to locate the next point, we have a letter from Major Lewis Morris (Jay documents), in which he says: "Colonel Knowlton's regiment was attacked by the enemy upon a height a little to the south-west of Days's Tavern, and after opposing them bravely and being overpowered by their numbers they were forced to retreat, and the enemy advanced upon the top of the hill opposite to that which lies before Days's door, with a confidence of success, and after rallying their men by a bugle horn and resting themselves a little while, they descended the hill," etc. In one of Christopher Colles's road maps (published in the N.Y. Corporation Manual for 1870, p. 778), Days's tavern is put directly opposite Point of Rocks on the King's Bridge Road, which fixes the hill occupied by the enemy as the north-east bluff of Bloomingdale Heights, or about One Hundred and Twenty-third Street, between Ninth and Tenth avenues. They ran down this bluff to fences and bushes at the edge of "a clear field." This was part of the Kortwright farm, and the farm lines of 1812 show the same northern boundary that surveys show in 1711. This northerly fence line is given in the accompanying map, and it will be noticed that it would be the natural line for the British Infantry to take in opposing Crary's party. The soldier Martin speaks of their taking a post and rail fence with a field in their rear. General George Clinton, who gives a clear description of the fighting from this point, also mentions this field and fence, but appears to have been mistaken in stating that the enemy were driven back to that position. They ran down the hill and took up that position. Then, when driven back, they retreated in the general direction of their first advance—that is, towards their camp, passing through a buckwheat field, and orchard to the Bloomingdale Road, and not, as generally stated, to the high ground in Central Park east of Eighth Avenue. General Clinton says they fell back from the orchard "across a hollow and up another hill not far distant from their own lines," which doubtless refers to undulations on Hogeland's place, and possibly to the then hilly ground about One Hundred and Seventh Street and Eleventh Avenue. One of the Hessian accounts states that the Yagers who were sent to support the Light Infantry came into "a hot contest on Hoyland's Hill"—a reference clearly to Hogeland's lands; and this with the fact that the Yagers and Grenadiers afterwards bivouacked "in the wood not far from Bloomingdale," and that the British "encamped in two lines" at the same place, indicates the point where the action terminated—namely, near Bloomingdale, between Hogeland's and Apthorpe's.

In regard to the beginning of the action, General Clinton, in his account, starts with a locality called "Martje Davits Fly," and estimates distances from it. This name, more properly "Marritje David's Vly," strictly described the round piece of meadow at the western end of the Hollow Way close to the Hudson. It formed part of Harlem Cove. Old deeds, acts, and surveys give the name and site exactly. Clinton speaks of the "Point of Martje David's Fly" as if he had reference to a point of land in its vicinity, possibly the Point of Rocks, and from which he gives his distances.

The name of the battle appears perhaps most frequently in modern accounts as that of Harlem Plains. Greene and others speak of it as the action of Harlem Heights or the heights of Harlem. As the movements were directed by Washington from the Heights, and as the fighting was done practically in defence of the Heights, this seems to be the proper name to adopt. Heath says the fighting took place "on the Heights west of Harlem Plains," and Washington, Clinton, and others make similar references to the high ground, showing that the affair was not associated with the Plains.]



This affair, as Washington wrote to Schuyler, "inspirited our troops prodigiously." The next day the general most heartily thanked the men "commanded by Major Leitch, who first advanced upon the enemy, and the others who so resolutely supported them;" and once more he called upon all to act up to the noble cause in which they were engaged.

The British loss, according to Howe, was fourteen killed and about seventy wounded, but Baurmeister puts it much higher—seventy killed and two hundred wounded. The Americans lost not far from eighty, of whom at least twenty-five were killed or mortally wounded. The loss in officers, besides Knowlton and Leitch, included Captain Gleason, of Nixon's Massachusetts, and Lieutenant Noel Allen, of Varnum's Rhode Island, both of whom were killed. Captain Lowe, of Ewing's Marylanders, was wounded, also Captain Gooch, of Varnum's, slightly. The heaviest loss fell upon Nixon's and Sargent's brigades, namely: Nixon's regiment, four killed; Varnum's, four; Hitchcock's, four; Sargent's, one; Bailey's, five, and two mortally wounded. Colonel Douglas lost three killed. Among the Marylanders there were twelve wounded and three missing. The loss in the Virginia detachment and the Rangers does not appear. General Clinton on the next day buried seventeen of our men on the field, and reported over fifty wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw, of Little's regiment, simply writes to his wife in regard to the action, "I was there," and adds that our loss was one hundred. He puts the casualties in his brigade alone [Nixon's] at seventy-five. All the troops behaved well. Greene speaks with pride of the conduct of his Rhode Islanders, Varnum's and Hitchcock's. Captain Gooch wrote to a friend enthusiastically, "The New England men have gained the first Laurells;" while Tilghman wrote with equal enthusiasm, "The Virginia and Maryland troops bear the Palm." In reality, palm and laurel belonged to both alike.

Knowlton, on the 17th, was buried with the honors of war near the road on the hill slope, not far from the line of One Hundred and Forty-third Street, west of Ninth Avenue. Leitch died on the 1st of October, and is said to have been buried by Knowlton's side, where Major Thomas Henly, a Massachusetts officer, killed on Montressor's Island on September 23d, was also buried.[205] On the 22d, Captain Nathan Hale, "the martyr-spy," was executed in New York. Finding Washington anxious to have information of the enemy's numbers and designs, Hale volunteered to enter their camp in disguise. Captured at the last moment as he was on the point of escape, he frankly avowed his mission, and just before his execution, on the Rutgers farm, he told the spectators around him that he only regretted he had but one life to give for his country. The war saw no more courageous or unselfish sacrifice. Few worthier of a monument than he!

[Footnote 205: Heath states that Henley was buried by Knowlton's side, and the spot is indicated in the orders of September 24th: "Thomas Henley will be buried this P.M. from the quarters of Maj. David Henley below the hill where the redoubt is thrown up on the road." During the action of the 16th, troops were throwing up intrenchments across the island at about One Hundred and Forty-fifth Street. This was the first and most southerly of the three lines constructed on the Heights. Sauthier's map, the authority in the case, shows this line with a battery across the King's Bridge Road, just at the top of what is known as Breakneck Hill. It was on the slope of this hill that Knowlton and Henley were buried. Mr. Lossing puts his grave in one of the redoubts on the second line, afterwards included in Trinity Cemetery; but that line had not been thrown up when Knowlton died. (Silliman's letter of September 17th, P.M. Part II., page 55.) Mr. Jay and others have suggested the erection of a monument to Knowlton and Leitch. No finer site could be found than the spot where they fell in Morningside Park.

Respecting Major Henley, spoken of by Washington as "another of our best officers," see Glover's letter, Document 35.]

The battle of the 16th was followed by inactivity on the part of the British, and Washington securely established himself on Harlem Heights. The chief excitement was the occurrence of the great fire on the night of the 21st of September, which broke out near Whitehall Slip, in New York, and destroyed a fourth of the city. In addition to accounts of the calamity already published and generally familiar, the experiences of Pastor Shewkirk, as given in his diary in the present work, will be read with interest.



CHAPTER VII.

WHITE PLAINS—FORT WASHINGTON.

What now remains to be noticed as coming within the scope of the present narrative are those incidents which led to the evacuation of Harlem Heights by our army, and the subsequent capture of Fort Washington, by which the British finally came into the possession of the whole of New York Island.

The American position at the Heights, strong by nature, was made still more so by defensive works. Three lines of intrenchments and redoubts were thrown across the island between One Hundred and Forty-fifth and One Hundred and Sixty-second streets; batteries were built around King's Bridge, and at several points on the heights overlooking the Harlem; and on the commanding site on the line of One Hundred and Eighty-third Street, two hundred and thirty feet above the Hudson, stood the powerful fortress called Fort Washington. Describing these works more in detail, the first of the three lines, that furthest south, was the one already referred to on which troops were digging during the action of Harlem Heights. It extended along the line of One Hundred and Forty-sixth Street. The second line, which was much stronger, was laid out a short distance above at One Hundred and Fifty-third Street. There were four redoubts in the line. Less than half a mile above, between One Hundred and Sixtieth and One Hundred and Sixty-second streets, and not extending east of Tenth Avenue, or the old Post Road, was the third line. It mainly commanded the depression in the heights which is now known as Audubon Park, and included no redoubts. In addition to this triple line, there were single breastworks and batteries at various points from Point of Rocks north, along the ridge. The high and rugged bank of the Harlem overlooking the present High Bridge was known as Laurel Hill, and at the northern extremity, at One Hundred and Ninety-second Street, there was an American battery, which the British afterwards named Fort George. On the west side, at One Hundred and Ninety-sixth Street, there was a small battery which became Fort Tryon. On the further side of Spuyten Duyvil Creek stood Fort Independence, commanding King's Bridge and its approaches.[206]

[Footnote 206: The position of the various works at Harlem Heights appears on Sauthier's plan which seems to have accompanied Howe's report of the capture of Fort Washington. Good copies of it may be found in Stedman's history and in the New York Revolutionary MS., vol. i. In 1812, when Randall surveyed the island, many of these works were still traceable. He gives parts of the second and third lines, Fort Washington and the others above, all of which agree with Sauthier's locations. Some of the works remain well preserved to-day.]

Fort Washington was a large, five-sided work with bastions, strong by virtue of its position, and important as commanding the passage of the Hudson in connection with Fort Lee (first named Constitution), opposite, on the summit of the Palisades on the Jersey side. Much labor had been expended upon it, and it was generally regarded as impregnable. The obstructions in the river consisted mainly of a line of vessels chained together, loaded with stone, and then sunk and anchored just below the surface of the river. It was expected that they would resist the passage of the British ships, which would thus be also brought to a stop under the guns from either shore, and made to suffer heavily. Both the Continental Congress and the Provincial Congress of New York had urged that no means or expense should be spared to make the obstructions effectual, in view of the serious results that would follow the enemy's possession of the river above.

Nearly a month now had elapsed since the retreat of our army to Harlem Heights, and the British had made no further progress. They had in the mean time thrown up a series of works across the island in front of their main camps at Bloomingdale and McGowan's Pass, which could be defended by a comparatively small force. On the 9th, however, they showed indications of taking the field again by sending two frigates up the Hudson. In spite of the sunken obstructions, the ships made their way through without difficulty. Then, on the morning of the 12th, Howe embarked the greater part of his army in boats, and passing through Hell Gate, under cover of a fog, landed on Throg's Neck, an arm of the Westchester coast, about six miles above. Percy was left to protect New York with three brigades. By this move the British general placed himself on Washington's flank in Westchester County, and threatened his communications. But the Neck was a poor selection for a landing-place.[207] It was practically an island, the crossings to the mainland being a causeway and fords, the opposite approaches of which were fortified by the Americans. Colonel Hand's riflemen had pulled up the planks on the bridges, and Prescott's Massachusetts were ready behind breastworks to resist any attempt on the part of the enemy to cross. Here the British wasted five days in collecting their stores, while the Americans kept a sufficient force to meet them at the causeway and vicinity. Among other regiments which relieved each other at this point were Nixon's, Varnum's, Malcom's, Graham's, and Ritzema's.

[Footnote 207: "Frog's Neck and Point is a kind of island; there are two passages to the main which are fordable at low water, at both of which we have thrown up works, which will give some annoyance should they attempt to come off by either of these ways."—Tilghman to William Duer, October 13th, 1776. MS. Letter. On hearing that they had landed on the Neck, Duer replied from the Convention at Peekskill, on the 15th: "There appears to me an actual fatality attending all their measures. One would have naturally imagined from the Traitors they have among them, who are capable of giving them the most minute description of the Grounds in the county of Westchester, that they would have landed much farther to the Eastward. Had they pushed their imaginations to discover the worst place, they could not have succeeded better than they have done."—MS. Letter.]

* * * * *

During and for some time before these movements an interesting correspondence was carried on between Washington's headquarters and a committee of the New York Convention, a portion of which may be introduced in this connection. It gives us a glimpse of the deep interest and anxiety felt in the Convention in matters affecting the protection of the State, and the internal difficulties that had to be encountered. The correspondence was conducted mainly between Lieutenant Tilghman for headquarters and Hon. William Duer for the Convention.[208] Thus, on September 20th, the latter writes to Tilghman as follows:

[Footnote 208: The Convention's Committee on Correspondence consisted of William Duer, R.R. Livingston, Egbert Benson, and two others. Nearly all of Tilghman's letters to the committee have been published either in Force or in the Proceedings of the N.Y. Provincial Congress. Of Duer's replies, however, but few are in print, the originals being in the possession of Oswald Tilghman, Esq., of Easton, Talbot County, Md., to whom the writer is under obligations for the favor of quoting the extracts given in the text. (See biographical sketch of Colonel Tilghman.)]

"I can easily imagine that Genl Howe must be both chagrined and disappointed at the Retreat of our Army from New York. I have no doubt but what he expected fully to have taken them in a net; and he certainly would have succeeded had we pertinaciously persisted in the plan of defending the city. You observe that if the passage of the North River is sufficiently obstructed that our lines will keep the enemy from making any progress in front. This is certainly true; but you must recollect that the Sound is, and must ever be, open; and if they should succeed in landing a Body of Men in Westchester County, they might, by drawing lines to the North River, as effectually hem us in, as if we were in New York. From Sutton's Neck to the North River (if I am not mistaken) is not above twelve miles."

Again on the 2d of October, speaking of the possibility of the enemy's getting on our flank or rear, Duer says:

"I wish they would delay this attempt till Genl. Lee arrives, or till Mifflin comes from Philada. I am sensible that however great General Washington's abilities and vigilance are, he must stand in need of the assistance of such excellent officers. Is Genl Greene with the Army, or is he still in Jersey? If he could be spared from that quarter his presence, I think, would be of great consequence. I am much mistaken, if he is not possest of that Heaven-born Genius which is necessary to constitute a great General.—I can scarcely describe to you my feelings at this interesting Period—what, with the situation of our enemies in your quarter and the cursed machinations of our Internal Foes, the fate of this State hangs on a single battle of importance."

Again on the 8th:

"I am sorry to tell you (for the credit of this State) that the Committee I belong to make daily fresh discoveries of the infernal Practices of our Enemies to excite Insurrections amongst the inhabitants of the State. To-morrow one Company, actually enlisted in the enemy's service, will be marched to Philadelphia, there to be confined in jail, till the establishment of our Courts enables us to hang the Ringleaders."

And on the following day Robert R. Livingston added on this subject:

"Tho' we are constantly employed in the detection of treasons, yet plots multiply upon us daily, and we have reason every moment to dread an open rebellion. We have ordered troops to be raised but fear they will be too slow in coming, and that we shall be under the disagreeable necessity of asking a small and temporary aid from the Genl; but we shall defer this till reduced to the last extremity."

When the ships went up the river on the 9th, it was feared they had troops on board who might make an attempt on the Highlands, whereupon Duer wrote on the 10th:

"In this [attempt] they will undoubtedly be joined by the villains in Westchester and Duchess County; it is therefore of the utmost consequence that a Force should be immediately detached from the main body of our army to occupy these posts.... By the Influence and Artifices of the capital tories of this State the majority of Inhabitants in those counties are ripe for a revolt."

But with a stout heart Duer continues:

"It is our Duty, however, to struggle against the tide of adversity, and to exert ourselves with vigour adequate to our circumstances. This, as an Individual, I am determined to do in the Capacity in which I am at present acting, and I have no doubt those friends I have in the military line will do the same. We are not to expect to purchase our Liberties at a cheaper rate than other nations have done, or that our soldiers should be Heaven born more than those of other nations. Experience will make us both have and win; and in the end teach Great Britain that in attempting to enslave us she is aiming a dagger at her own vitals."

On the 12th, before he heard of the landing at Throg's Neck, he wrote to Tilghman:

"Notwithstanding the enemy had, agreeable to your last advices, sent no vessels up the Sound, depend upon it, they will endeavor to make an attack upon your Flanks by means of Hudson's and the East River.... If General Lee is returned from the Southward and arrived at your camp (which I suppose to be the case) I beg my affectionate compliments to him. I wish to Heaven I could come and see you, but I am so embarrassed with the Committee I am engaged in that I have not hardly an hour, much less a few days to spare. This morning we marched off a Company of men, who had been enlisted to join the Battalion to be raised by Major Rogers, to the City of Philadelphia. We have an admirable clue of their abominable conspiracies, and (however late this undertaking has been) I hope by spirit and perseverance we may baffle their wretched Plots of occasioning a revolt in this State."[209]

[Footnote 209: As evidence of the estimation in which Lee was held at this time, Duer writes on the 15th to Colonel Harrison: "I beg my affectionate compliments to Genl Lee, whom I sincerely congratulate on his arrival in camp—partly on account of himself as he will have it in his [power] to reap a fresh Harvest of Laurels, and more on account of his Country which looks to him as one of the brave asserters of her dearest rights."—MS. Letter.

Lee had just returned from South Carolina, and was associated by the army with the brave defence of Charleston harbor. The honor of that affair, however, belonged entirely to Moultrie.]

On the 13th, Tilghman wrote to Duer:

"When your favor of the 10th came to hand, I was attending his Excellency, who was obliged to ride up to West Chester upon the Alarm of the Enemy's Landing at Frog's Point.... From their not moving immediately forward, I imagine they are waiting for their artillery and stores, which must be very considerable if they seriously intend to set down in the country upon our rear. The grounds leading from Frog's Point towards our Post at King's bridge are as defensible as they can be wished. The roads are all lined with stone fences and the adjacent Fields divided off with stone [fences] likewise, which will make it impossible for them to advance their artillery and ammunition waggons by any other Rout than the great roads, and I think if they are well lined with troops, we may make a Considerable Slaughter if not discomfit them totally. Our riflemen have directions to attend particularly to taking down their Horses, which if done, will impede their march effectually. Our troops are in good spirits and seem inclined and determined to dispute every inch of Ground."

On the 15th he wrote to Duer again as follows, after informing him that the enemy had not moved from the Neck:

"From the number of vessels that have been continually passing up the Sound we conclude that they are transporting cannon and stores necessary to enable them to penetrate the country and set down in our rear. To hinder them from effecting this, Genl Lee, who arrived yesterday, has taken the command in that quarter. He will be posted in such a situation with a very considerable number of Light Troops that, let the Enemy advance by what road they will, they cannot elude him; if they march in one great body he can easily draw his Divisions together; if they divide and take different Routs, they will fall in with the different parties. He will have the Flower of the Army with him, as our lines in front are so strong that we can trust them to Troops who would not stand in the field."

Duer, on the 17th, replied:

"I expect daily to hear of some grand attempt made by the Enemy.... If one half of our army think as much of the Importance of the approaching Contest as you do, I shall entertain no Doubt of our success. May Heaven protect you, and all my Friends who are venturing their Lives in so great and good a cause."

On the same date Tilghman wrote:

"I have not time to describe the Disposition of our Army perfectly to you, but you may depend that every step is taken to prevent the enemy from outflanking us and at the same time to secure our Retreat in case of need. The Enemy have made no move from Frog's Point.... I don't know how it is, but I believe their design to circumvent us this time will prove as abortive as the former ones. If we can but foil Genl Howe again, I think we knock him up for the Campaign. You ask if Genl Lee is in Health and our people feel bold? I answer both in the affirmative. His appearance among us has not contributed a little to the latter. We are sinking the ships as fast as possible; 200 men are daily employed, but they take an immense quantity of stone for the purpose."

To meet this move upon their flank and rear, the Americans were obliged to abandon their strong camp at Harlem Heights. On the 16th, while the British were still at Throg's Neck, Washington called a council of war, when it was agreed that they could not keep their communications open with the back country, if they remained where they were and the British advanced. At the same it was voted to hold Fort Washington. To be ready to counteract the next move of the enemy, a part of the army was stationed at advantageous points in Westchester County, the main camps being extended along the hills west of the Bronx River. Both Valentine's Hill and Miles Square were occupied and fortified.

On the 18th, Howe left Throg's Neck and transferred his army further eastward to Pell's Point below New Rochelle. The Light Infantry advanced from the coast, but were faced by Glover's brigade from behind stone walls, and made to suffer some loss.[210] Glover and his men were complimented for their conduct both by Washington and Lee. The enemy again delayed in the vicinity of East Chester and New Rochelle until the 22d.

[Footnote 210: In this skirmish Captain Evelyn, the British officer who captured the patrol of American officers on Long Island, was mortally wounded, and died soon after, much regretted. He is supposed to have been buried in New York.]

Wishing exact information of the position of the enemy and of the topography of the country, the commander-in-chief, on the morning of the 20th, requested Colonel Reed and Colonel Putnam, his engineer, to undertake a reconnoissance in person. Setting out from King's Bridge with a foot-guard of twenty men, these officers proceeded to the heights at East Chester, where they saw some of the enemy near the church, but could obtain no intelligence. The houses in the vicinity were deserted. From this point Reed returned to attend to his office duties, while Putnam, disguising his appearance as an officer by taking out his cockade, loping his hat, and concealing his sword and pistols under his loose coat, continued on alone in the direction of White Plains. Learning from a woman at a house that the British were at New Rochelle, he passed on to within three or four miles of White Plains, where he met some "friends to the cause" and ascertained the general situation. "I found," he writes, "that the main body of the British lay near New Rochelle, from thence to White Plains about nine miles, good roads and in general level open country, that at White Plains was a large quantity of stores, with only about three hundred militia to guard them, that the British had a detachment at Mamaroneck only six miles from White Plains, and from White Plains only five miles to the North River, where lay five or six of the enemies ships and sloops, tenders, etc. Having made these discoveries, I set out on my return." Reporting this information to the commander-in-chief about nine o'clock in the evening, Colonel Putnam retired to "refresh" himself and horse, only to receive orders soon after to proceed immediately to Lord Stirling's brigade,[211] now in Spencer's division, which had already advanced on the road towards White Plains. He reached Stirling at two o'clock that night, and at dawn the general pushed on to White Plains, arriving there about nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st. Washington himself and Heath's division followed during the day, and the troops set to work throwing up lines at that important point. By delaying near New Rochelle, Howe had missed his opportunity. During the night of the 21st, Colonel Haslet, of Stirling's brigade, surprised and captured some thirty men belonging to the partisan Rogers' Scouts, and soon after Colonel Hand with his now veteran riflemen proved himself more than a match for an equal party of yagers encountered near Mamaroneck. In the first of these skirmishes, Major Greene, a fine Virginia officer, was mortally wounded.

[Footnote 211: Stirling, who with Sullivan had recently been exchanged as prisoner, was now in command of Mifflin's brigade, Mifflin being absent in Philadelphia.]

Washington concentrated his army at White Plains, completed two lines of works, with his right on the river Bronx, and awaited the advance of the British. Howe had moved from New Rochelle to Scarsdale, and on the morning of the 28th marched against the Americans. A mile or more from White Plains, on the main road to New York, he fell in with General Spencer's advance parties under Colonels Silliman, Douglas,[212] and Chester, who offered resistance and lost some men, but they were driven back by superior numbers. On the left of the American position, across the Bronx, rose Chatterton's Hill, which offered a good site for the better defence of that flank. Colonel Putnam had just arrived on the hill to throw up works when the enemy made their appearance below.[213] According to Haslet, the Delawares were the first troops to report on this hill, where they took post with one of General Lincoln's Massachusetts militia regiments, under Colonel Brooks, on their right. They were followed immediately by McDougall's brigade, consisting of what was lately his own battalion, which had no field officers, Ritzema's, Smallwood's, and Webb's. The troops formed along the brow of the hill, and stood waiting for the enemy. The two-gun battery brought up at the same time was Captain Alexander Hamilton's.

[Footnote 212: See letters of these officers, Documents 17, 22. Also Tallmadge's account, Document 26.]

[Footnote 213: "October 29th [28th] the British advanced in front of our lines at White Plains about 10 o'clock A.M. I had just arrived on Chatterton Hill in order to throw up some works when they hove in sight; as soon as they discovered us they commenced a severe cannonade but without any effect of consequence. General McDougal about this time arriving with his brigade from Burtis's and observing the British to be crossing the Bronx below in large bodies in order to attack us, our troops were posted to receive them in a very advantageous position. The British in their advance were twice repulsed; at length, however, their numbers were increased so that they were able to turn our right flank. We lost many men, but from information afterwards received there was reason to believe they lost many more than we. The rail and stone fence behind which our troops were posted proved as fatal to the British as the rail fence and grass hung on it did at Charlestown the 17th of June 1775."—Colonel Rufus Putnam, Document 43.]

The British marched up in brilliant array towards Washington's position, but unexpectedly declined to make an attack in front, although the centre was our weakest point. Chatterton's Hill appeared to engage Howe's attention at once, and it became the first object of capture. The troops assigned for this purpose were the Second British brigade and Hessians under Donop, Rall, and Lossberg, in all about four thousand men. They crossed the Bronx, under cover of their artillery, and prepared to ascend the somewhat abrupt face of the hill on the other side. McDougall's men reserved their fire until the enemy were within short range, when they poured a destructive shower of bullets upon them. The British recoiled, but moved up again to the attack, while Rall came around more on the left, and after a brisk fight, in which the militia facing Rall failed to stand their ground, they succeeded in compelling McDougall to retreat. Had the militia held their own, the fight might have been another Bunker Hill for the enemy. As it was, Colonel Putnam compared it to that engagement. In falling back, McDougall suffered some loss, but the whole force escaped to the right of our lines, with fewer casualties than they inflicted on the enemy. The latter lost about two hundred and thirty; the Americans something over one hundred and forty. Colonel Smallwood was wounded, and lost two of his captains, killed. Ritzema's New York Continentals suffered the most, having made a brave fight. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Webb, of Wethersfield, Ct., one of Washington's aids, who had shown his coolness under fire on Bunker Hill, was slightly wounded and had a horse shot under him while carrying orders.[214]