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Prize Orations of the Intercollegiate Peace Association
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The day of triumph is not far distant. Already the moving finger of Time paints on the wide horizon, in the roseate tints of the dawn, the picture of Peace—Peace, the victory of victories, beside which Marathon and Gettysburg pale into insignificance; victory without the strains of martial music, unaccompanied by the sob of widowed and orphaned; victory on God's battlefield in humanity's war on war.



THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

By RALPH D. LUCAS, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, representing the Central Group

Third Prize Oration in the National Contest held at Mohonk Lake, May 28, 1914



THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

Nationalism is a precious product of the centuries. The world has paid a tremendous price to widen the political unit until its boundaries include continents. It has been an equally difficult task to weld the spirit of diverse peoples into a homogeneous whole. And the story of this development constitutes a heritage not soon to be given up. The tales of victory and defeat are held even more dear to a united people than life itself. Rightly will any nation jealously defy him who dares advance to plunder its possessions. And it is well that men do not wish to surrender it upon slight provocation. That has been a good diplomacy that sought to protect the nation by war. By the extension of political unity peoples gain moral and physical strength. Thrift becomes more common and moral courage greater when a people strike forward with common aims. And in proportion as the nation as a whole enjoys these advantages and opportunities, the individual widens his horizon in peaceful association with fellow men and receives a benefit beyond computation.

But, good as nationalism has been in the past, a gradual change seems to be overtaking the world's politics. National diplomacy hesitates where a century ago it was firm. Forces which once drove the nations apart seem now to be drawing them together. The discord of disputes seems to be disappearing in the harmony of cooperation. It is no longer possible to determine easily what a nation's interests really are. And it is of the forces that are bringing about this change in the policies of nations, of this new nationalism and its bearing upon the peace movement, that I wish to speak.

Within the last two centuries economic forces have worked a mighty revolution. Continents have been converted into communities. The prosperity of our eastern industries controls the activities of the West, and a disturbance from any section throws a tremor over all. Tribal barter has developed into a world-wide commerce until the most distant nation may easily acquire the products of another. Steel rails weave a web of commercialism among the peoples, and the cable welds them in a mighty network which, responsive to every flash of news, brings all the nations into a mutuality of interests. So interdependent are the nations and so vital are their relations that a single fluctuation in the most distant market finds a response in our own. A slight disorder in Wall Street strains the whole financial world. And thus through intercourse in commerce, industry, the press, Christian missions, and scholastic research a system has been developed that holds no place for the selfish policy of exploiting backward peoples. We no longer consider the advance of alien peoples in wealth and prosperity as a menace to our own. There is being developed a strong international public opinion which realizes that anything that destroys the well-being of one member is the concern of all.

In the light of these facts, future world-politics can have no place for the settlement of disputes by force. A declaration of war by one of the large powers to-day would be more terrible than it has ever been in the past. The man of business, of education, of philanthropy, of civic advancement cannot reasonably advocate a policy that would ruin business, stagnate education, increase poverty, and turn progress over to the ravages of manslaughter. Industry cannot continue when the shoulder that should turn the wheels of industry grows weary beneath the weight of the musket. Education cannot proceed when libraries and lecture halls are deserted for the camp and fortress. A Tolstoy with all his power of vivid presentation does not overdraw the picture. The moral fiber and physical strength of a people must forever afterward bear their scars. A struggling people can never rid themselves of the evil effects of the conflict, although they may rejoice in the valor of their heroes. Nations cannot afford to become the theaters of carnage and bloodshed and the rendezvous of commercial and moral pirates and civic grafters.

Why, then, do nations throw away their strength in the building and equipping of armies and navies? The advocates of militarism tell us that we need a navy to protect our commerce. Possibly it is true that under the present system of international law this is somewhat excusable; for although private property on land is exempt from confiscation and the old forms of privateering have long ago been abolished by an agreement of the powers, yet the policy does not apply to maritime warfare. Enemy's goods in enemy's ships are still subject to seizure. But while this argument does hold for the present, the condition could easily be remedied. Because a man with foreign capital operates ships instead of factories, why is there any special reason for exposing his property to depredation? In the light of common sense such a policy seems absurd. And it should be one of the first aims of our diplomats to eliminate all possibility of this licensed robbery, for as long as it exists there will always be the cry for extravagant expenditure in order to preserve international peace.

But even if we should not need a navy to protect our commerce, again the opponents of the policy of settling international disputes by arbitration say that we need armies and navies to preserve our honor. They tell us that there are certain questions which cannot be submitted to any tribunal; that a nation must reserve the right to submit only those questions it sees fit. Surrender this right, and prestige and self-respect are gone and we become a nation of "mollycoddles" whose patriotism has no virile qualities. It is true that the independence and security of each nation is essential to international life. It is self-governing nations, not subjugated ones, that make possible a strong international life. But the converse is equally true. An international life made up of independent, cooperating, and mutually helpful nations is the best security by which national life can be guaranteed. Those who say that questions of national honor cannot be submitted to a tribunal have a wrong conception of the essence of national life. Love of country means more than a mere willingness to serve as a target for the enemy's guns. We would not deduct one iota from the respect and honor due those who have served the nation on the field of battle. But what a service they might have rendered if they had been spared that life to live serving their fellow men and contributing to the vigor of the race! None of us will give up his firm resolve to defend his own country with all his strength. But theirs is a cheap patriotism which depends for its expression upon the thrilling note of fife and drum. The great test of patriotism is the everyday purpose to deal justly with one's neighbor. Let him who would be a patriot and serve the nation put his life into the work close at hand, and, with a civic temper and moral courage that can grip the scourge, rid our social life of its damning influences. This is the spirit of true national honor. This it is that makes of a nation a real nation. The call to arms is but another signal of the defeat of the underlying principles of civilization.

Only slowly will any large number of the people accept these new conceptions. But there are already hopeful signs. The growing sentiment is rapidly crystallizing. The developing code of international equity as expressed by the establishment of such an institution as the Hague Court is a step in the right direction. The peaceful settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dispute was an honor to the nations involved. And the work of the International Commission of Inquiry in the Dogger Bank episode between Russia and England is significant of the trend. Again, a modern innovation was wrought when the International Conference in 1906 settled the conflicting interests of Germany, France, and Spain in Morocco. Within the last century the powers ratified over two hundred treaties, each providing for the peaceful settlement by tribunals of specified international disputes. It is true that most peace treaties have dealt almost exclusively with legal questions. The nations have hesitated to submit all international differences to a court of arbitration. But the spirit for arbitral settlement is widening. And this spirit is not for a mere avoidance of war, but seeks the substitution of a better method than war for determining justice between nations. Each nation has its own individual problems to deal with, and in this respect all cannot proceed according to set rules. The movement does not mean the extinction and obliteration of nationality and national rights. The individual has not been minimized because he consents to submit his differences with his fellow men to a court for settlement. And this must be the ultimate attitude of nations whose honor we have a right to guard jealously.

What, then, shall be our program? Whatever attitude is to be adopted, most people agree that the day of universal peace is far in the future. The Balkans and Mexico remind us of the difficulty lying before the coming generations. But the numerous peace societies whose purpose it is to circulate authentic documents, that the great mass of citizens may be brought into sympathetic touch through accurate information, are doing much for the cause. The erection of the Hague Court gives something lasting and tangible to work from. And, above all, the nations will rise to higher standards principally by adopting the ideals of the individual. As man has risen above his barbaric ideals, so will the nations throw their military expenditures into the coffers of public welfare as they come more and more to judge their successes, not by victories in war but by achievements in education, commerce, industry, and artizanship. And, proceeding with such aims, the established international court must be the medium through which all differences will be settled. We shall discover that our internal policy of dealing with the individual can be more easily applied to international relations than was at first supposed. And having reached this point in the evolution of international peace, there must be added to the international court a world-wide police force. As the system develops and our prejudices are abandoned, a method of policing must stand as an enforcer of international law. Until then there is little hope that military expenditures will radically diminish, for we cannot reasonably abolish our present methods unless we have something secure to substitute.

Perhaps such a system will not abolish the utter possibility of war. Only the future can tell us what heights of success the policy will reach. There are those of us who have high hopes because we believe in the good sense of the American people and of our great contemporaries. By the past we are made confident of the future. But if the goal is to be reached, it is for us as individual citizens to contribute our influence toward developing the attitude of peace among our fellow men. For our international welfare and for the honor of the newest of great nations, may we in this issue throw our influence, as a united people, on the side of a higher international morality! May the united peoples of the world abolish the prejudices of misconceptions and, drawn together by common interests, resolve that the priceless heritage of centuries shall not be imperiled by war! And thus over a warring humanity the breaking day of peace shall be hastened, at whose high noon there shall be heard not the clashing of arms but the increasing hum of prosperity under the sway of the new and better national life.



MAN'S MORAL NATURE THE HOPE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE

By VICTOR MORRIS, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon representing the Pacific Coast Group

Fourth Prize Oration in the National Contest held at Mohonk Lake, May 28, 1914



MAN'S MORAL NATURE THE HOPE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE

Two thousand years ago the coming of a Prince of Peace, the Prince of Peace, inaugurated the fulfillment of the prophetic promise that "peace shall cover the earth," and that "man shall learn war no more forever." From the time of Jesus until now men have passively accepted the idea, but have failed to do their part in its fulfillment. To-day there are few indeed but believe that it would be desirable to abolish war. Many also feel in a way that war is brutal. But here our feelings on this great question largely end. We are not aroused to talk, and work, and fight against war as inhuman, as economic folly, as unreason, and especially as an immorality and a sin. Now we are not here to harangue about the physical sufferings wrought through war, but we are here to inquire and find out what we can do about it. How are we going to attack the war problem in order to bring about action, instead of simply talk and discussion? In considering this war problem it is well to bear in mind the fact that war is a resultant of a deeper cause, the war spirit. The war spirit is the spirit of him who first made war in heaven; the war spirit—ambitious, aggressive, covetous and revengeful, rampant through the centuries, never conquered by force, in war subdued only by exhaustion. This war spirit still exists to scourge the nations with war, to stagger with its problem of war the brains of statesmen believing in peace. How are we to attack this stupendous problem? What appeal can we make to the nations that will be strong enough to do away with the war spirit?

In order to overthrow this mighty evil, certainly every possible force must be enlisted. The thought which I wish to bring to you is this: While such appeals as those to economy and to reason are of value, they are not in themselves strong enough to cause the nations to abolish war; and hence, in view of the real inner nature of the war spirit, man's moral nature, working through a developed conscience upon war, is the only force strong enough to effect universal peace.

Against war peace-advocates appeal with force from a business standpoint, on grounds of economy and financial expediency. The vast system of international trade and commerce calls for world peace. The prosperity of world-industries and business requires good will and brotherhood between the nations. So heavy, also, have the burdens of war and militarism become that three fourths of our own expenditures go for war purposes, past and present, and in Great Britain two thirds are so spent.[1] Every German citizen, it is said, carries a soldier on his back. By the testimony of financiers and ministers of state themselves, nothing but financial ruin and bankruptcy await the nations if the present military tragedy continues. But has this obvious condition of affairs affected the race for armaments? Not unless it has accelerated it. To every appeal to economy the reply is that the outlay is necessary if we are to exist at all. But even suppose that for a season the economic motive should lead us to abolish war, as soon as financial advantage was apparent to a nation through war it is evident that all restraints would be removed and war ensue again. The same motive used to abolish war would bring war once more. Again, when we remember that it is the deeper cause, the war spirit, that we must quench, we can understand why this appeal is often made to those who bear not. So far as the great mass of men is concerned, purely economic considerations cannot change the spirit and impulses of the soul. History reveals no great uplifting of humanity or change in ideals as having arisen through purely economic or financial considerations.

[1] The percentages as a matter of fact are not so large, but the argument is not impaired by the fact.—Editor.

The peace plea has also been based on grounds of reason. Clearly has it been pointed out that reason demands that no person shall sit in judgment on his own case, yet this we do in a resort to arms. War is not arbitrament by reason, but arbitrament by the sword. Every plain argument of reason condemns war and militarism. The arguments of reason have, indeed, been strong, and have attracted much attention, resulting in the settlement of many disputes by arbitration. But as concerns the final wiping out of war and the surrendering of heavy armaments, reason alone cannot present a permanent powerful appeal, for it is easy in times of stress to plead that reason and justice demand the war. Never was there a fight but the contending parties claimed they were justified. But the chief fact that seems to put reason in the category of impotent appeals is the fact that it is an appeal to the mind, while the war spirit can only be removed by an appeal to the heart, wherein it resides. We may reason with nations all we please, but when the war fury arises, then all the reasoning proves to have been in vain, the appeal to the mind turns out to be too feeble.

Appeals to economy and reason, then, are appeals we must make, but they are too weak in themselves to make a permanent impression against the war spirit. We must then look for some additional, some more compelling, force.

Let us examine the real inner nature of war, for this ought surely to throw some light upon our problem. War is not economy; it is not reason. Is war, then, morality? Is it virtue? It would hardly seem necessary for us to answer this question, for modern civilized nations long ago recognized blood feuds with their kindred as contrary to real morality, as nothing but murder; but they seem unable to recognize that war is just the same—nothing but legalized, organized murder. From the use of violence in settling our international disputes arise all the deadly passions of the soul, such as treachery, insolence, revenge, and a murderous spirit, with the accompanying fruits of robbery, misery, and blood. Surely, O nations! nothing which bears such fruits can be anything but corrupt, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

Look also at its relationship to civilization and citizenship, and its effects upon theme. "War and civilization," said one of the great English ministers, "are contradictory terms, even as Christ and Mars." Particularly damaging is the effect of war upon citizens. For does it not blunt the sensibilities, harden the heart, inflame the mind with passions, and deaden the consciences of men? Said the same great English preacher, "The sword that smites the enemy abroad, also lays bare the primeval savage within the citizen at home." And again, "War is not so horrible in that it drains the dearest veins of the foe, but in that it drains our own hearts of the yet more precious elements of pity, mercy, generosity, which are the lifeblood of the soul."

What now must be our conclusion about war? Had we ten thousand voices, surely every one would be in honor bound to declare war an immorality. Every incident of war declares it such. Every result of battle hands down the same decree. In the words of a famous Russian battle painter, we too may define war as "the antithesis of all morality."

This clear idea of the real inner nature of war ought surely to enable us to find our ground of attack. Since war is sin and war is crime, the conclusion which we draw is, that if it is possible ever to abolish war, man's conscience, his sense of right and wrong, is the only force powerful enough to accomplish the result.

The great searchlight of morality must be turned on war—a searchlight which is always bright and strong and which never has failed to reveal the truth. To turn this on full and strong means to awaken the consciences of men. It must be an individual proposition—not simply the developed consciences of a few leaders who may be submerged by the war spirit of the masses, but there must be developed consciences of all the people individually. All our arbitration treaties and the actual settlement of disputes by arbitration are of great value and should be pressed as far as possible; but are these sufficient forces to develop the consciences of men against war as an immorality and a sin? What are the forces that have always come to our support against an immorality and a sin?

How about our churches? Have they been doing their duty? Have they made it clear that war is sin and war is crime? Has not the Church been too easy? Has its voice sounded clear and strong on this world-evil? Surely a duty rests upon the ministry to be insistent in its characterization of war. What peace-advocates must do is to urge this upon the Church and bring it to a realization of its duty. Church members know the character of war and simply need to have the matter brought home to their hearts.

What about our schools,—not simply the colleges and universities, but all the schools,—which offer fertile ground to sow the seeds of peace? Thus far in the history of our schools too much emphasis has been laid upon military history, etc. Dates and events of national wars have been thoroughly drilled into students, and the glory and blaze of war brought out. We have actually made it a glory and a virtue. One of the most encouraging signs of the times, however, is the fact that many of our text-books are dropping out the prolonged study of wars and centering more on the peaceful pursuits of the nation and the commercial relations with foreign powers. How about direct peace teaching in the lower schools? How much of it do we include in the work? None at all. Many are the speakers who address the schools on war reminiscences, but few indeed are the appeals made for peace. Not until this movement is strongly emphasized in our schools from the very beginning can we hope completely to drive out the war spirit; for time is required to develop in the individual conscience a full realization of the real nature of war, and such development should begin with the plastic period of youth.

With Church and school lined up on the side of peace, the home teaching will soon fall in line; and Church, school, and home combined can develop so strong a conviction concerning war, can make so forceful an appeal to man's moral nature, that the war spirit will take its leave and be gone forever.

We always look to history for a confirmation of our beliefs, and let us glance now to the records of the past and learn her teachings.

First of all, look at the duel as the mode of settling a personal difficulty if peaceful settlement appeared impossible. First, it was heartily accepted as a gentlemanly, honorable, and brave mode of settlement. Then, tolerated and simply suffered to exist. Finally, condemned by conscience as an immorality and a sin, it was banished from civilized nations.

Look also at slavery. At first heartily accepted as a divine arrangement. Then tolerated by the world as undesirable, yet not necessarily wrong. Next its overthrowal attempted on grounds of pity and of reason; until finally, recognized as an immorality and a sin, it too was blotted from the pages of civilization.

No great uplift of humanity, no great movement in civilization, but has found its path to success in the developed moral sense of man. No great change in civilized institutions but has found itself produced by the dynamic, moving forces of morality.

War must be abolished. Only the great powers of morality are vital enough, are dynamic and powerful enough, to carry out our peace program. These forces lie dormant, and simply need stimulation and development. Recognizing the impotency of appeals to economy and to reason, what are we going to do?

In the name of humanity let us impeach war and the war spirit. It is a traitor to every ideal of civilization and of justice. It is the instrument of hatred and of pride, the agent of jealousy and of avarice. In the name of the dead and dying, in the name of justice, which it dethrones, in the name of those whose loved ones it demands, we impeach war as a traitor, guilty of all high crimes and misdemeanors. What else shall we do? Stir up from its greatest depths the heart of man. Educate his conscience till he is unwilling to suffer war to exist. Begin early in Church, school, and home to instil in the minds of young and old continually the true conception of war, that it is an immorality, contrary to every principle of Christianity and to every teaching of our Christ.

Let us bring into the conflict against war the great, dynamic, motive force—the Moral Nature of Man. And when we shall have thus developed the consciences of men, there will henceforth be laid up for us a crown of victory, as there will then be a fuller realization that in man's moral nature is the Hope of Universal Peace.



THE TASK OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By HAROLD HUSTED, Ottawa University, Ottawa, Kansas, representing the Western Group

Fifth Prize Oration in the National Contest held at Mohonk Lake, May 28, 1914



THE TASK OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Age by age, civilization advances. Each successive era has contributed that invention or accomplished that achievement which has placed another round in the great ladder of civilization. The development of many small states into powerful nations, and many wonderful improvements in other fields, such as steam navigation, the railroad, the telegraph, and wireless communication, crown the last as the greatest of centuries in the history of the human family. It is difficult to understand why the human mind, whence these mighty inspirations originated, has been incapable of realizing that there still remains the most degrading, the most deteriorating, the foulest blot that ever disgraced this world—the killing of civilized men, by men, as a permissible mode of settling international disputes. This world can never attain its highest standard of civilization until this one disgraceful blemish, called war, is obliterated. It is the collective task of the people living in this twentieth century to bring into reality the millennium of Tennyson,

Till the war drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furl'd In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.

The beginning of this social task, then, is the enlightenment of the peoples as to the immorality, waste, and ineffectiveness of war. God commanded, "Thou shalt not kill." Who shall presume to declare that this precept was directed not to nations but to individuals only? that one man shall not kill, but nations may? We are horrified at the report of a single murder, yet, if viewed from the light of truth, what is war but wholesale murder? What tongue, what pen, can describe the bloody havoc of the battle of Gettysburg, where, between the rise and set of a single sun, fifty thousand of our fellow men sank to earth, dead or wounded?

What sentiment in human hearts which needs to be perpetuated sent rank after rank, column after column, of blue soldiers against the impregnable stone wall of Fredericksburg? And who will place the blame for the carnage of Cold Harbor elsewhere than upon the folly of misguided patriotism and cruel, selfish interests that made the bloody battle possible?

Every soldier is connected, as all of us, by dear ties of kindred, love, and friendship. Perhaps there is an aged mother, who fondly hoped to lean her bending form on his more youthful arm; perhaps a young wife, whose life is entwined inseparably with his; perchance a sister, a brother. But as he falls on the field of battle, must not all these suffer? His aged mother surely falls with him. His young wife is suddenly widowed, his children orphaned. That husband's helping hand is forever stayed. A parent's voice is stilled, and the children's plaintive cries for their loving father fall on unheeding ears. Tell me, friends, you who know the bitterness of parting with dear ones whom you watched tenderly through the last hopeful moments, can you measure your anguish? Yet, what a contrast! Your dear ones departed soothed by kindness and love, while the dying soldier gasped out his life on the battlefield alone.

And what a waste is war! We are just beginning to realize the tremendous cost, the incalculable wastefulness, not only of actual war but of the preparation for future possible wars. For the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, the United States has appropriated in round numbers $535,000,000, in preparation for future wars and because of wars fought in the past. Sixty-seven cents out of every dollar expended by our national government goes to feed the present-day mania for war, present and past, leaving only thirty-three cents out of each dollar for the combined expense of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of our national government. When we realize that the cost of a single battleship exceeds the total value of all the grounds and buildings of all the colleges and universities in the state of Kansas, the figures indicating this expense have more meaning to us. And when we reflect that the cost of a single shot from one of the great guns of that battleship is $1700, enough to send a young man through college, the common man realizes that the United States cannot afford to go to war or even prepare for war.

And all this suffering and cost are to no purpose. War is utterly ineffectual to secure or advance its professed object. The wretchedness it involves contributes to no beneficial result, helps to establish no right, and, therefore, in no respect promotes harmony between the contending nations.

When the Saviour was born, angels from heaven sang to the children of the human family this benediction:

Glory to God in the highest, Peace on earth, good will toward men.

And at last, in the beginning of this twentieth century, nations seem to be visibly approaching that unity so long hoped and prayed for; and that nation which shall precede all others in the abolition of war will be crowned by history with everlasting honor. The risk will be very little, the gain incalculable.

We are coming to believe that the most significant fact about man and his civilization is their improvability. Individual inventive genius has added improvement after improvement until it would seem that man's mastery over nature is to be well-nigh complete as these ideas and inventions are socialized and extended to benefit all. We are now entering the era of social achievement when mankind unitedly undertakes by organization and cooperation mightier tasks than ever accomplished before. Many dreadful diseases are disappearing before preventive medicine, and sanitary science is eliminating many plagues; pestilence is coming to be a thing of the past. Human welfare is now the concern of cooperative mankind, and social science will condemn and banish war or fail to establish itself as an applied science. It can be done! It ought to be done! It will be done!

And although this consummation seems to many far away, it may be accomplished by very simple methods. It only waits the time of concerted action on the part of the leading nations when the principles of arbitration can be invoked more fully, and a world-court established with plenary powers for settling all disputes between the nations.

International legislation has occurred repeatedly, though no world-court has as yet been established. In the case of the Universal Postal Union we have what is tantamount to world-legislation, in that all civilized nations have entered into a formal agreement regarding the delivery of mail. Another instance of practical world-legislation is that of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. Many other examples might be given in which several nations are parties to an agreement regarding some important measure, such as the respect paid to the flag of truce, the regulations concerning commerce on the high seas, and the etiquette of diplomacy. Paramount in world-importance has been the agreement of the leading nations of the world in the establishment of the Hague conferences for the amelioration of war.

Since a conference of nations can meet and decide on the mitigation of the horrors of war, it is certainly conceivable that a tribunal of nations can prevent war. Such a tribunal would in no respect differ from the Supreme Court of the United States in its fundamental foundations. As our Supreme Court is final in settling all disputes in this country, so the international court would be final in adjusting all controversies between the nations. And such a court is clearly the next decisive step in the promotion of this great task of securing world-peace.

If nations can agree to establish war as their arbiter of peace, why can they not establish a more peaceful substitute? It is possible, for there is nothing in the nature of strife that cannot be settled, no quarrel that cannot be judged, no difficulty that cannot be satisfactorily adjusted.

With the establishment of a true world-court, there would rise on the vision of the nations for the first time the prospect of justice for the united whole of mankind. Justice to the smaller countries would be secured; encroachments by the strong upon the weak would be prevented; the moral standard of politics would be uplifted; and though every step would be exposed to the selfishness, corruption, and love of despotism that are prevalent in all men, yet is it not reasonable to suppose that, as progress is now being made in the various nations for overcoming these evils, so it would be made in this united whole, to the unspeakable benefit of mankind?

This country has been foremost in the promotion of this great movement to organize the world. It is especially fitting that the United States should take the lead. The greatest nation having a government of the people and by the people, with the longest experience and the greatest success, is best fitted to lead others. We have the form of national government which foreshadows the form of world-government. Theoretically, our states are sovereign; all rights which are not formally surrendered by accepting the Constitution of the United States are reserved to them. In a like manner, referring to the establishment of a world-court, the nations individually will be expected to surrender to the nations collectively only such jurisdiction as pertains to the settling of their controversies.

A world-court would appeal to the strongest, the purest, and the deepest thinkers of every race. It would cover a new field, appealing to reason and altruism and justice. It would by its very effect upon individuals tend to develop the qualities it demands, and would prove a mighty influence for uplifting the intellectual and moral standards not only of men but nations. It would by its very international nature annihilate all national antipathies and promote an era of universal good will and genuine understanding.

To send a husband or father, glorious in the perfection of physical manhood, out on the field of carnage to be slain in an effort to settle international difficulty or to uphold fancied national honor, is unquestionable barbarism. It is far more humane to terminate disputed questions by arbitration than by the keen-edged sword. International peace compacts can hold mankind together by unbreakable yet unburdensome bonds and greatly promote prosperity and social progress. The wanton woe and waste that inevitably follow in the train of war will soon be things of the past. The twentieth century, already so full of radiant promise, so enlivened by a new social conscience, will devote its collective energies to the abolition of war and the substitution of its successor—a world-court, based on the facts of humane solidarity and the principles of international peace.



THE PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

By BRYANT SMITH, Guilford College, North Carolina, a Senior in Guilford College

Prize-Winning Essay in the Pugsley Contest, 1912-1913

THE PUGSLEY PRIZE-ESSAY CONTESTS

In 1908 Mr. Chester DeWitt Pugsley, then an undergraduate student in Harvard University, gave $50 as a prize to be offered by the Lake Mohonk Conference for the best essay on "International Arbitration" by an undergraduate student of an American college. The prize was won by L. B. Bobbitt of Baltimore, a sophomore in Johns Hopkins University. The following year (1909-1910) a similar prize, of $100, was won by George Knowles Gardner of Worcester, Massachusetts, a Harvard sophomore. A like prize of $100 in 1910-1911 was won by Harry Posner of West Point, Mississippi, a senior in the Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College.

The prize of 1911-1912, of which John K. Starkweather of Denver, Colorado, a junior in Brown University, was the winner, was the first offered to men students only (other similar prizes having been offered to women students) in the United States and Canada.

In the fifth Pugsley contest (1912-1913) the prize was awarded to Bryant Smith of Guilford College, North Carolina, a senior in Guilford College at the same place, whose essay follows. The judges were Chancellor Elmer Ellsworth Brown of New York University, Rollo Ogden, editor of the New York Evening Post, and Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, U.S.A., retired.

Each winner is invited to the Lake Mohonk Conference next following, where he publicly receives the prize from its donor, Mr. Pugsley.



THE PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

The first concerted effort looking toward an eventual world-wide peace was the Hague Conference of 1899, where representatives of twenty-six nations assembled in response to a rescript from the Czar of Russia, whose avowed purpose, as set forth in the rescript, was to discuss ways and, if possible, devise means, to arrest the alarming increase in expenditures for armaments which threatened to bankrupt the national governments.

Unable to accomplish anything definite in this respect because of the vigorous opposition headed by Germany, the delegates turned their attention toward giving official recognition and concrete form to ideas which had already obtained in the settlement of international disputes, and toward the formation of a court before which the nations might have their differences adjudicated. The principles embodied in good offices and mediation and commissions of inquiry have given gratifying evidence of their efficiency, each in its respective capacity. The original achievement of the conference, however, was the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The composition of this court was to include not more than four persons from each of the signatory powers; from which panel, in case of an appeal to arbitration, each party was to select two judges, who, in turn, should elect their own umpire unless otherwise provided by the disputants. That it would be subject to criticism might have been expected. That twenty-six nations could unanimously agree upon any court whatever was the real occasion for surprise. The four cases arbitrated during the eight years intervening between this and the Second Hague Conference served to bring out its defects, chief of which were its decentralized and intangible nature. Nominally a court, in reality it was but a panel scattered all over the world from which a court could, with great difficulty and expense, be selected. Nominally permanent, in reality it had to be re-created for each case to be judged.

The Second Hague Conference, working on a basis of this short experience, undertook to remedy these inherent defects in the arbitral machinery by leaving the Permanent Court just as it was, and by creating besides an International Court of Prize to serve a special function indicated by its name, and a court of Judicial Arbitration to supplement the work of, if not eventually to supplant, the former court. To insure greater impartiality and also to encourage the weaker powers the expenses of the new court, instead of falling upon the litigants in each case, were to be prorated among the ratifying powers. To insure greater tangibility and permanency the new court was to be composed of only seventeen members, each to serve a term of twelve years at a salary of $2400 per annum, with an additional $40 for each day of actual service. Furthermore, the court was to meet once a year and to elect each year a delegation of three of its members to sit at The Hague for settling minor cases arising in the interval between regular sessions, having the power also to call extra sessions of the entire court whenever occasion should demand. To insure a more judicial personnel the convention specifies that members shall be qualified to hold high legal posts in their respective countries. The method by which members of the court were to be appointed—the one point upon which the delegates were unable to agree—was deferred for subsequent determination.

This, in addition to the one hundred and fifty-odd treaties privately entered into by two or more nations, many of which contain pledges to submit certain classes of disputes to the Permanent Court, is, in brief, what has been accomplished by way of constructive political organization by the modern peace movement.

How much does this signify? In view of the present attitude of the social mind, what are we to infer from this as bearing upon the ultimate outcome of international arbitration? It shall be the purpose of this paper to answer that question.

In an address before the Mohonk Conference of 1911 Dr. Cyrus Northrup, ex-president of the University of Minnesota, said: "What is really wanted is not continued talking in favor of peace with the idea of converting the people; for the people are already converted! They are ready for peace and arbitration!" In the October number of the Review of Reviews for 1909, Privy Councillor Karl von Stengel, one of the German delegation to the First Hague Conference, is quoted as follows: "It must be stated emphatically that in its ultimate aims the peace movement is not only ... Utopian, but ... dangerous...." These quotations are given as typical of the attitude manifested by the two extremes, the injudiciously optimistic and the ultraconservative, toward every social reform. All true progress pursues a course intermediate to these two.

The idea entertained by so many enthusiastic peace advocates, that the world is ready for peace if we but had institutional facilities adequate to carry out the will of the people, is erroneous. In all democratic states political institutions are but a concrete expression of the social mind, the media created by the people, through which society executes its will. "With a given phase of human character ... there must go an adapted class of institutions."[1] Therefore, I submit that if the people were ready for peace they could easily provide the means necessary for its accomplishment.

[1] Herbert Spencer, "The Study of Sociology."

The first gentleman quoted above drew his conclusion from the indications that of the two million inhabitants of his state, one million nine hundred thousand would favor arbitration as shown by the enthusiasm manifested at a meeting of the state peace society a few weeks before. Similar conditions in other parts of the country, he thought, would corroborate the application of his assertion to the entire country. Such a conclusion is fallacious in that it fails to consider three essential facts about the people of the United States which largely determine the attitude of any people toward war. First, they have no grievance. Second, no appeal is being made to their patriotic bias. Third, their emotions and passions are quiescent.

The first of these needs only brief mention. No people in this enlightened age wishes to fight as a matter of course, regardless of any reasonable pretext. If nations never had any personal interests involved, there would, of course, be no more war. In this respect the people of the United States are not ahead of the other parts of the civilized world. Disinterested parties have been in favor of peace for two thousand years.

The other two facts deserve more extended consideration.

The disposition in individuals to pluck motes out of their neighbors' eyes and leave beams in their own, in the nation becomes what Herbert Spencer calls the bias of patriotism. According to him patriotism is but an extended self-interest. We love our country because our own interests and our country's interests are one. Unable to view international affairs apart from national interests, we are handicapped in making those balanced judgments necessary to judicial arbitration. An act reprehensible under the Union Jack becomes patriotic under the Stars and Stripes. At both Hague Conferences all the powers were seemingly in favor of curtailing expenditures for armaments. The unprecedented increase in expenditures which followed bespeaks their sincerity, or, rather, bespeaks each nation's mistrust of the sincerity of others. A number of years ago the Farmers' Alliance, organized in some of the Southern tobacco states, voted to reduce the acreage of tobacco for a given year in order to raise the price. So many members tried to profit by this opportunity to realize a high price for a big crop that there was a greater acreage planted that year than ever before. Can we expect better of groups than of the individuals of which the groups are composed? Most nations question the justice of Russia's policy leading up to the war with Japan, England's course in South Africa, and America's attitude toward the Philippines; yet the body of citizens of each of these three countries, while concurring in the general opinion concerning the other two, justifies its own government's actions with patriotic pride.

The chief respect in which this bias interferes with the progress of international arbitration is in restricting the scope of general arbitration treaties, the average formula of such treaties excluding all questions which involve "national honor and vital interests." A greatly modified survival of the spirit which in primitive peoples regarded the tribe over the mountain or across the stream as a fit object of hatred and fear, the objection to a judicial settlement of such questions assumes that a nation's honor and vital interests are goods peculiar in that they may be inconsistent with justice. The attitude of the United States toward the recently proposed treaty between England and America may be taken as typical of the attitude which prevails on this subject generally. The formulators of the treaty took an advanced step in that, instead of reserving questions of national honor and vital interests, they provided for the arbitration of all differences which are "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of principles of law or equity," thereby recognizing the judicial nature of arbitration. The action of the Senate, however, which sustained the opinion of the majority report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, objecting to the last clause of Article III of the treaty,[2] would indicate that the significance of a general arbitration treaty attaches not so much to the definition of its scope as to who shall determine what cases conform to the definition. It would seem that the nature of the reservation is relatively unimportant so long as its interpretation devolves upon the parties at variance. The majority report, objecting to the delegation to the joint high commission of the power to determine the arbitrability of cases in terms of the treaty, contains this statement[3] in which the minority report likewise concurs: "Every one agrees that there are certain questions which no nation ... will ever submit to the decision of any one else." As cases of this nature it enumerates territorial integrity, admission of immigrants, and our Monroe Doctrine. The significance of this insistence upon a means of evasion is evident. There is not yet enough international confidence. The powers are not yet ready to submit to unlimited arbitration.

[2] The clause, referring to the commission of inquiry, reads:

"It is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the Parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under Article I of this Treaty, that question shall be submitted to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the Commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Article I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty."—Editor.

[3] See Senate Document 98, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10.—Editor.

The other enemy to rational judgment—and rational judgment must be the only basis of arbitration—is the danger of emotionalism. The average man is yet largely irrational. When cool and self-possessed, and when his prejudices and traditions do not interfere, he can pass rational judgment upon questions in which his own interests are not concerned; but when his passions are aroused he dispenses with any effort to reason and acts in obedience to blind impulse. He knows that it is expensive to fight, that it is dangerous, and that it is wrong; but when he is provoked, he fights. The characteristics of the average man are the characteristics of society. We have not yet outgrown the mob.

Interwoven with this impulsive temperament and associated with some of the most cherished affections of the human heart is the spirit of war, developed by thousands of generations of ancestral conflict and passed on to us as a heritage to be rooted out of our nature before we shall realize in its fullness the ideal for which we strive. Mortal conflict sanctified by religion, devastation idealized by literature, pillage justified by patriotism, fellow-destruction ennobled by self-sacrifice—these form a complex of contradictory emotions from which men are as yet unable to unravel the one essential characteristic of war; namely, the attempt to dispense justice in a trial by battle, and make it stand out in its revealed inconsistency, dissociated from its traditional concomitants of which it is neither part nor parcel. The romance of knighthood and chivalry still appeals to the human heart, notwithstanding the fact that war, love, and religion, the knight's creed, are an inconsistent combination. Most men can be made to see this in their minds, but cannot be made to feel it in their souls. Many old Civil War veterans, who would not consent for their sons to volunteer in the Spanish-American War, would have gone themselves had they been able. Some did go. To men so disposed it is useless to talk of the horrors of war. Give us a just grievance; let some competent enthusiast inflame this passion with a war cry like "Remember the Maine," "Fifty-four forty or fight," "Liberty or death," and, reenforced by the animal inherent in man, it will arouse popular demonstrations devoid of all reason, creating a force that cannot be controlled by a cold, calculating intellect. Can you listen to a bugle call on a clear, still night without a quickening of the pulse as there flashes through your soul a suggestion of all past history with its marshaling hosts and heroic deeds? Can you see a military parade without a suggestion of "Dixie" and the Star Spangled Banner, or feeling your bosom swell with patriotic pride? This association may be, and doubtless is, a delusion, but it is a delusion developed and fortified by thousands of years of custom and precedent and it would be contrary to the history of human progress if man should become disillusionized in one generation. It may take centuries. If we are to have international arbitration in the near future, we must have it in spite of this spirit of war rather than by destroying the spirit. In fact, the only practical way to destroy it is to let it, like vestigial organs of which biologists tell us, degenerate from disuse. This inherited emotional tendency remains as a threat with which we, as exponents of arbitration, must reckon before we are justified in saying that the world is ready for peace.

Because of these two social characteristics—the patriotic bias which perverts judgment, and uncontrolled passions which submerge reason—the educational propagandists still have a task to perform.

Let us now examine the stand-pat idea that unlimited arbitration is but a dream as expressed in the quotation from Privy Councillor Stengel. This is farther from the truth than the other extreme just discussed. He who will, with an unprejudiced mind, examine cross sections of history at widely separated stages, cannot fail to see that along with the growing tendency of reason to predominate over passion, superstition, and custom there has been a parallel tendency to restrict militarism as a social activity. From a war conceived as religion to war as patriotism, then war as commercialism and the tool of ambition, man is now coming to the more rational conception of war as the despoiler of nations. David speaks of the "season of the year" when nations went forth to battle. Fifteen hundred years later governments pretended at least to justify their military operations on rational grounds. To-day war is the last resort, and even its most ardent defenders do not attempt to justify it except in disputes which involve national honor and vital interests.

In view of the foregoing facts it is evident that the modern peace movement has by no means the whole of the task to perform. Rather, we can almost justify ourselves in the assumption that war is not long to remain one of our social inconsistencies and that it is now making its last, and, therefore, most determined, stand on questions of national honor and vital interests.

Among the numerous forces contributing to this evolution of international peace, the chief agencies have been, and still are, moral and industrial. These same forces are working to-day with cumulative effect.

Warfare is becoming more and more inconsistent with the ethical spirit of the times. Men may talk of the expenses, horrors, and devastations of war as paramount causes for the tendency to substitute arbitration; but antedating all other causes, underlying and strengthening all others, is the slowly changing social conscience which, as each generation passes, appreciates more fully warfare's inconsistency with justice and antagonism to right. This same cause found civilized society taking keen delight in the heathen barbarity of a gladiatorial combat, and has transformed and lifted it up to where it is horrified at a bull-baiting or a prize fight. It found human beings with absolute power of life and death over other human beings and has evolved the view that all men are created free and equal. It found individuals settling questions of honor by a resort to arms, and has substituted therefor a judge, counsel, and a jury. These three institutions—gladiatorial combats, slavery, and dueling—were no more regarded in their day as only temporary phenomena of social evolution than is war so regarded by military sympathizers of to-day; yet these have one by one been eliminated, and war is fast becoming as much out of harmony with the ethical spirit of this age as was each of the above out of harmony with the spirit of the age which dispensed with it, and the effort to demonstrate that war is just as dispensable is meeting with success. The teachings of Christ, who two thousand years ago announced the doctrine of human brotherhood and surrendered his life to make this doctrine effective, have slowly but surely wrought their leavening influence upon the source of all war; namely, the hearts of men. Warfare has for centuries been gradually yielding to this deepening consciousness and that it must eventually, if not soon, take its place beside the long-discarded gladiatorial profession, the outlawed slave trade, and the discountenanced custom of the duelist must be evident to any one who takes more than a superficial view of the great determining forces which shape human progress.

Besides moral forces, industrial forces were mentioned as a factor tending to the adoption of arbitration. During recent times, under the impetus caused by the relatively modern innovations of steam, electricity, and the press, this class of causes has been unusually effective. Industry has overstepped international boundary lines. Through the division of labor we are passing from the independence of nations to the interdependence of nations. International banking, transportation, and commerce, by establishing communities of interest in all parts of the world, are binding the peoples of the earth into one great industrial organization. As striking evidence of this development, more than one hundred and fifty international associations[4] and more than thirty-five international unions of states have been formed. The modern intricate system of communication is a veritable nervous system which, in the event of any local paralysis or upheaval, informs the entire industrial organism. The figure is no longer "the shot heard, round the world," but becomes "the pulse-beat felt, round the world." If Spencer's definition of patriotism—that is, coextensive with personal interests—is correct, the bias of patriotism cannot retard the progress of arbitration much longer, for patriotism will be a world-wide feeling, since personal interests are no longer restricted to nationality.

[4] "Annuaire de la Vie Internationale," 1910-1911, reports on 510.—Editor.

No, Herr Stengel, each passing year finds the causes which make for war weakened and the causes which make for arbitration proportionately reenforced. The skeptics are the dreamers and the peace workers are the practical men of affairs.

From the foregoing synopsis of the technical accomplishments of the modern peace movement to date, and from the effort to interpret their significance in the light of fundamental social characteristics and the present social attitude, I trust three things have become evident:

First. The movement for international peace through arbitration, far from being a mere bubble on the surface of society to be burst by the first war cloud which appears on the horizon, is a movement, centuries old, coincident with social evolution, deep-rooted in the very nature of a developing world-wide civilization.

Second. International peace through arbitration is not to be a ready-made affair, coming in on the crest of some wave of popular enthusiasm as was expected by many in 1899.

Third. Being an outgrowth of the natural laws of human development, a result so much deeper and more fundamental than political laws can produce, international peace through arbitration may be furthered, but cannot be accomplished, by legislation; may be delayed, but cannot be prevented, by the neglect to legislate. To undertake to hasten arbitration by forcing legislative proceedings beyond what the people will indorse, would be as futile as to turn up the hands of the clock to hasten the passage of time.

To those who can appreciate these facts there is no occasion for discouragement in the suspicious attitude manifested by the powers toward any definite step in the direction of unrestricted arbitration, apparently so inconsistent with their general pacific professions. "Rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing."[5]

[5] F. H. Giddings, "The Elements of Sociology."

With the truth of these deductions granted, it would seem safe to assume that the institutions for the settlement of international difficulties will develop in much the same way as have the institutions for the settlement of difficulties between individuals. It should be profitable, therefore, to compare the present growth of arbitration with the evolution and decay of the various modes of trial as the idea of judicial settlement diffused itself through the mind of the English people causing established forms to give way to something better. Dispensing with the blood feud, which hardly deserves the name of trial, the oldest form of such institution was trial by ordeal which, according to Thayer in his "Evidence at the Common Law," seems to have been "indigenous with the human creature in the earliest stages of his development." This form gradually fell into disuse before the more rational form of compurgation introduced into Teutonic courts in the fifth century. In 1215 it was formally abolished. Compurgation was abolished in 1440 as its inferiority to trial by witnesses became fully recognized. In the latter form, instituted early in the ninth century, when the witnesses disagreed the judicial talent of the day conceived of no other method of decision than to fight it out. Thus we have trial by witnesses and trial by battle developing concurrently, although they were recognized as distinct forms. After two centuries of effort to abolish it, trial by battle was made illegal in 1833, the last case recorded as being so decided occurring in 1835. Out of the trial by witnesses has evolved our modern trial by jury, at first limited to certain unimportant cases, then having its sphere extended as its superiority became more evident, until finally it superseded all other forms and to-day is the accepted mode of settling even questions of honor.

The growth and extension of international arbitration has not been dissimilar to this. Six cases were arbitrated in the eighteenth century, four hundred and seventy-one in the nineteenth, while more than one hundred and fifty cases have been arbitrated during the first thirteen years of the twentieth century. Between the First and Second Hague Conferences only four uses were submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Since the Second Conference, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory disposition of the Venezuelan affair, eight cases have been tried, a ninth is pending, a tenth will soon be docketed if the United States is not to act the hypocrite in her international relations by refusing to submit to England's request to arbitrate the question as to whether or no we exempt our coastwise vessels from toll duty through the Panama Canal. Defects have been detected in the Permanent Court of Arbitration and we are well on the way toward a better court. Representatives of only twenty-six nations took part in the deliberations of the First Hague Conference; representatives of forty-four nations took part in the deliberations of the Second Hague Conference. Wars of aggression and conquest, though not formally outlawed, are effectively so, and arbitration for the recovery of contract debts is now practically obligatory. As time passes and its feasibility gains credence, arbitration, like the jury trial, will extend its sphere of usefulness until it too settles questions of honor. Nor need we imply from this analogy that it will take such an age to accomplish this result. Because of the increased mobility of society, resulting from the greater like-mindedness and consciousness of kind incident to our modern communities of interests and systems of communication, and from our greater susceptibility to rational rather than traditional appeals, a reform can be wrought more easily and the people can adjust themselves to the change far more readily than several centuries ago.

Bearing in mind, then, our attempted analysis of counter social forces at work, our deductions from this analysis and the foregoing analogy the significance of which grows out of the truth of these deductions, let us conclude with a suggestion as to what the next Hague Conference should attempt. It should, of course, like the former Conferences, extract as many teeth as possible from war. As to improving our arbitration facilities, its first task evidently should be to determine some method whereby members of the Judicial Arbitration Court shall be apportioned and selected. If, as has been suggested, it is decided to use the same scheme of apportionment as that for the International Court of Prize, the provision that each party to a case shall have a representative on the bench should be changed so as to provide that neither party shall have a representative on the bench. If this court is not to be a misnomer like the Permanent Court of Arbitration, its rulings must be in accord with the principles of jurisprudence rather than with the spirit of compromise such a provision would tend to produce. With this accomplished and the Judicial Court of Arbitration put in practical working order "of free and easy access" to the powers, it may be doubted whether anything further can be done. If the powers can be made to agree to submit to the court all cases growing out of the disputed interpretation of treaties, a great advance will have been made, but it is doubtful whether the present state of public opinion would indorse such a progressive step. These international legislators can do no more than provide channels through which the spirit of international peace can exercise itself as it expands, and the Judicial Court of Arbitration, at the optional use of the nations, conforms admirably to this requirement. The delegates should, therefore, avoid the universal tendency of such bodies to legislate too much. None of these Hague Conferences can alone accomplish the ultimate purpose of the so-called dreamers, but each Conference may be a landmark on the upward journey toward that consummation, anticipated by Utopians from the earliest times, foretold by prophets from Micah and Isaiah to Robert Burns and Tennyson, labored for by practical statesmen from Hugo Grotius to William H. Taft, when each man shall be a native of his state and a citizen of the world.

AUTHORITIES

For acts and conventions of Hague Conferences: "Texts of the Peace Conferences" by James Brown Scott.

For data concerning proposed treaty with England: Text of treaty and majority and minority reports of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

For statistics of arbitration treaties: "Revised List of Arbitration Treaties," compiled by Denys P. Myers.

For development of trial by jury: "Evidence at the Common Law" by Thayer.

THE END

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