The Admiral told me last night he had written to the Admiralty to say that, looking to the future, he believed there were two distinct operations by which the Pekin Government could be coerced,—either by a military force on a large scale such as this, or by a blockade of the Gulf of Pecheli, undertaken early in the year, &c. I was glad to hear him say this, because I recommended the latter course immediately after we heard of the Peiho disaster, with a view to save all this expenditure; and I still think that if the measures which I advised had been adopted, including the sending up to the north of China two or three regiments (enough, with the assistance of the fleet, to take the Taku Forts), much of this outlay might have been spared.

Sunday, July 15th.—I have been on board the Admiral's ship for church. Afterwards I had some talk with him in regard to future proceedings. ... The problem we have to solve here is a very difficult one; for while we are up here for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the Emperor, as a means of placing our relations with China on a proper footing, we have news from the South which looks as if the Government of the Empire was about to pass out of his feeble hands into those of the Rebels, who have upon us the claim that they profess a kind of Christianity.

[Sidenote: A birthday.]

July 20th.[5]—I know that you will not forget this day, though it can only remind you of the declining years and frequent wanderings of one who ought to be your constant protector, and always at your side. It is very sad that we should pass it apart, but I can say something comforting upon it. The Admiral and General came here yesterday, and agreed with the French authorities that the two fleets are to start for the rendezvous on the 26th. Ignatieff, the Russian, who made his appearance here to-day, said, 'After your force lands, I give you six days to finish everything.' If he says what he thinks, it is a promising view of things. Six days before we start, six days to land the troops, and six days to finish the war! Eighteen days from this, and we may be talking of peace. Alas! what resemblance will the facts bear to these anticipations?

[Sidenote: Chefoo.] [Sidenote: Plans for landing.]

Talien-Whan.—July 21st.—Now for a word about Chefoo. I had agreed to dine with the General, Montauban, on the night of my arrival, so, after visiting Gros, I went to his headquarters. I found him in a very well-built, commodious Chinese house. I must tell you that, as we were entering the bay, we descried a steamer a-head of us, and it turned out to be a vessel sent by the French to examine the spot (south of the Peiho Forts), which had been selected for the place of their debarkation when the attack comes off. On the evening of our dinner, the General did not enter into particulars, but gave me to understand that the result of the exploration had been very unsatisfactory, and that his scheme for landing was altogether upset. I heard this with considerable dismay, as I feared that it might be employed as a reason for delay. Before we parted that night, I agreed to land next morning, to see his artillery, &c. He read me the unfavourable report of his exploring party, which was headed by Colonel Schmid, a great friend of the Emperor's, and the best man (so they say) they have got here. He contends that all along the line of coast there is a band of hard sand, at a considerable distance from low-water mark; that the water upon it is very shallow; and that, beyond, there is an interval of soft mud, over which cannon, &c., could not be carried. The French are no doubt very much behind us in their preparations, but then it is fair to say that they have not spent a tenth part of the money, and with their small resources they have done a good deal. It was wonderful how their little wild Japanese ponies had been trained in a few days to draw their guns. After the review we took a ride to the top of a hill, from whence we had a very fine prospect. It is a much more fertile district than this, beautifully cultivated, and the houses better than I have seen anywhere else in China. The people seemed very comfortable, and their relations with the French are satisfactory, as we may infer from the abundant supplies brought to market. On the following morning the English Admiral and General arrived. They had their interview with the French authorities, and settled that on the 26th the fleets should sail from Talien-Whan and Chefoo respectively to the rendezvous, somewhere opposite Taku. From that point the Admirals and Generals are to proceed on a further exploration, and to effect a disembarkation on the earliest possible day. So the matter stands for the present. The state of Europe is very awkward, and an additional reason for finishing this affair.[6] For if Russia and France unite against us, not only will they have a pretty large force here, but they will get news via Russia sooner than we do, which may be inconvenient.

July 22nd, Sunday.—The thirteenth since we parted. It seems like as many months or years. Some one said to-day at breakfast that it is the last quiet one we are likely to have for a while. In one sense I hope this may turn out to be true.... To-morrow our cavalry and artillery are to be embarked. This takes place on the other side of this bay, and I intend to go over to see the operation.

July 26th.—Noon.—I am now starting (having witnessed the departure of the fleet) for the scene of action in the Gulf of Pecheli. The sight of this forenoon has been a very striking one, just enough breeze to enable the vessels to spread their sails. We have about 180 miles to go to the point of rendezvous.... Meanwhile, one has as usual one's crop of small troubles. The servants threatened to strike yesterday, but they were soon brought to reason.

[Sidenote: The rendezvous.] [Sidenote: Jesuit letters.]

July 27th.—Ten A.M.—We have reached our destination after a most smooth passage, during which we have followed close in the wake of the Admiral.... I am reading the 'Lettres edifiantes et curieuses,' which are the reports of the Jesuit missionaries who were established in China at the commencement of the last century. They are very interesting, and the writers seem to have been good and zealous people. At the same time one cannot help being struck by their puerility on many points. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration pushed to its extreme logical conclusions, as it is by them, leads to rather strange practical consequences. Starting from the principle that all unbaptized children are certainly eternally lost, and all baptized (if they die immediately) as certainly saved, they naturally infer that they do more for the kingdom of heaven by baptizing dying children than by any other work of conversion in which they can be engaged. The sums which they expend in sending people about the streets, to administer this sacrament to all the moribund children they can find; the arts which they employ to perform this office secretly on children in this state whom they are asked to treat medically; and the glee with which they record the success of their tricks, are certainly remarkable. From some passages I infer that, in the Roman Catholic view of the case, the rite of baptism may be administered even by an unbeliever.

[Sidenote: The Pey-tang.]

Two P.M.—Hope Grant has teen on board. He tells me that the mouth of the Pey-tang is not staked, and that the 'Actaeon's' boat went three miles up the river. This river is seven or eight miles from the Peiho, and the Chinese have had a year to prepare to resist us. It appears that there is nothing to prevent the gunboats from going up that river.

July 28th—Eleven A.M.—The earlier part of last night was very hot, ... and I got feverish and could not sleep. Towards morning the good luck of the leaders in this expedition came again into play; a breeze sprang up from the right quarter, so that the whole of the sailing ships have been helped marvellously on their way. When I went on deck the whole line of the French fleet—it consists almost exclusively of steamers—was coming gallantly on, Gros at the head. He is quite cutting me out this time. The farther distance was filled by our sailing transports scudding before the wind. They have been filing past us ever since, dropping into their places, which are rather difficult to find, as the Admiral has changed all his dispositions since his arrival here. The captain of the 'Actaeon' dined here yesterday. He told me he had gone a mile or two up the Pey-tang river, been allowed to land, seen the fort, which is quite open behind, and contains about a hundred men. Thirty thousand English (fleet and army) and ten thousand French ought to be a match for so far-sighted an enemy. However, I suppose we must not crow till we see what the Tartar warriors are. Three P.M.—The French Admiral has just been here. He tells me that we are to move from the anchorage to a place nearer Pey- tang on Monday, and that on Tuesday a reconnaissance in force is to be made on that place, with the intention, I presume, of taking it.

[1] Vide supra, p. 226.

[2] Colonel Crealock, military secretary to the Embassy.

[3] 'The absence of any panic was very creditable to the passengers. It, however, was mainly due to the conduct of the two Ambassadors, who, during the whole time, remained quietly seated on the poop conversing together, as if no danger 'impended.'—Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China, by H.B. Loch Private Secretary.

[4] The Honourable T.J. Hovell Thurlow, attache to the Embassy.

[5] His birthday.

[6] The reference apparently is to the uneasiness produced in Europe by the annexation of Savoy to France.



CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND MISSION TO CHINA. PEKIN.

THE LANDING—CHINESE OVERTURES—TAKING OF THE FORTS—THE PEN TIENTSIN— NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF—NEW PLENIPOTENTIARIES—AGREEMENT MADE—AGREEMENT BROKEN—TREACHEROUS SEIZURE OF MR. PARKES AND OTHERS—ADVANCE ON PEKIN- -RETURN OF SOME OF THE CAPTIVES—FATE OF THE REST—BURNING OF THE SUMMER PALACE—CONVENTION SIGNED—FUNERAL OF THE MURDERED CAPTIVES—IMPERIAL PALACE—PRINCE KUNG—ARRIVAL OF MR. BRUCE—RESULTS OF THE MISSION.

[Sidenote: The landing.]

On the 1st of August the landing of the allied troops was effected in perfect order, without the slightest opposition on the part of the inhabitants, at the point already mentioned, viz. near the little town of Pey-tang which is situated at the mouth of a river of the same name, about eight miles north of the mouth of the Peiho. What Lord Elgin saw of the operations is described in the following letter:—

August 2nd.—There have been a few days' interval since I wrote, and I now date from Pey-tang, and from the General's ship the 'Granada,' a Peninsular and Oriental steamer; for I owe it to him that I am here. I need hardly tell you the events that have occurred—public events I mean—since the 28th, as they will all be recorded by 'Our Own.' We moved on the 29th to a different anchorage, some five miles nearer Pey-tang. ... All the evidence was to the effect that the Pey-tang Forts were undefended, at least that there were no barricades in the river, and therefore that the best way of taking them would be to pass them in the gunboats as we did the Peiho Forts in 1858, and as we also passed Nankin that year ... but it was resolved that we should land a quantity of men in the mud about a mile and a half below them. This was to have taken place on the 30th, and those of my gentlemen who intended to leave me, as better fun was to be found elsewhere, kept up a tremendous bustle and noise from about 4 A.M. However, at about 6, they were informed that the orders for landing were countermanded, on the plea that there was too much sea to admit of the horses being transferred from the vessels to the gunboats. Next day, the 31st, it was raining, and the sea seemed rougher in the morning. However, at about 9, the gunboats began to move. The General had agreed that I should have his ship, and that I should move either over the bar or as near to it as I could manage. ... I anchored the 'Granada' outside the bar, and as I did not choose to lose the sight of the landing, I got into my row-boat ... going at last on board the 'Coromandel,' the Admiral's ship. The landing went on merrily enough. It was a lovely, rather calm evening. We were within a long-range shot of the Forts; and if shot or shell had dropped among the boats and men who were huddled up on the edge of the mud-bank, it would have been inconvenient. Our enemy, however, had no notion of doing anything so ungenerous; so the landing went on uninterruptedly, the French carrying almost all they wanted on their backs, our men employing coolies, &c., for that purpose. We saw nothing of the enemy except the movements of a few Tartar horsemen out of and into the town, galloping along the narrow causeway on which our troops were to march. At midnight eight gunboats—six English and two French—steamed past the Forts. It was a moment of some excitement, because we did not know whether or not they would be fired at. However, nothing of the kind took place; and, about an hour after they had started, three rockets that soared and burst over the village intimated that they had reached the place appointed to them. Having witnessed this part of the proceedings I lay down on the deck with my great-coat over me; but not for long, for at half-past two, Captain Dew (my old friend)[1] arrived with the announcement that, having been on an errand to the lines of the troops, he had met a party of French soldiers who were obliging some Chinese to carry a wooden gun which they had captured in the fort, declaring that they had entered it, found it deserted, and possessed of no defences but two wooden guns. It turned out that they had not entered first, but that an English party, headed by Mr. Parkes, had preceded them. This rather promised to diminish the interest of the attack on the forts which had been fixed for half-past four in the morning. But there was another fort on the opposite side of the river, perhaps there might be some resistance there. Alas! vain hope. Three shots were fired at it from the gunboats which had passed through during the night, and some twenty labourers walked out of it to seek a more secure field for their industry in some neighbouring village. Afterwards our troops went in and found it empty as the other; so ended the capture of Pey-tang.

We came over the bar in the evening, and I went to see Hope Grant at the captured fort, where he has fixed his abode. While there we discovered a strongish body of Tartar cavalry, at a distance of about four miles along the causeway which leads from this to Tientsin and Taku. I urged the General to send out a party to see what these gentry were doing, lest they should be breaking up the causeway, or doing any other mischief; and I heard from him this morning that he had arranged with General Montauban to do so, and that a party of 2,000 men started on that errand early. The Tartars seem to be in greater force than was supposed. The officer in command (rightly or wrongly, I know not which) resolved to consider the expedition merely a reconnaissance, and to retire after staying on the ground a short time. Of course the Tartars will consider this a victory, and will he elated by it; but perhaps this is a good thing, as it may induce them to face us on the open. The ground on which they were found is firm and fit for cavalry, and is about four miles from the Peiho Forts. This is a very nasty place. The country around is all under water, and it is impossible to get through it except by moving along the one or two causeways that intersect it. The military are, therefore, glad to find sound footing at no great distance.

[Sidenote: Chinese overtures.]

Up to this time no communication of any kind had passed between the Special Ambassadors and any Chinese officials. An ultimatum had been presented by Mr. Bruce in March, demanding an apology for the attack on our ships of war, the immediate ratification of the Treaty, and prompt payment of the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as therein stipulated. As these demands had been formally refused by the Chinese Government, there was no room for diplomacy. Even the bare announcement of his arrival Lord Elgin feared they might interpret as an invitation to treat, and use as an excuse for dilatory and evasive negotiations. The justice of this view was proved by what took place on the 5th of August. Having occasion to station one of his ships near the shore for the purpose of getting water, the Admiral sent a flag of truce to warn some Tartar troops posted near the spot, that 'his ship had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it would fire on the Tartars if they approached too near it.' The Governor- General at once took advantage of the opening this gave him. Affecting to believe that the flag of truce came from Lord Elgin, he addressed to him a despatch full of professions of amity, and saying that he 'had received instructions to discuss and dispose of all questions with the British Minister,' but containing no mention of the ultimatum. To this and numerous similar missives, which came for a time in rapid succession, Lord Elgin had but one reply—that he could discuss nothing until the demands already made had been satisfied.

August 9th.—My diplomacy began yesterday, for I received in the morning a communication from the Governor-General of the province, not frankly conceding our demands, but making tolerably plausible proposals for the sake of occasioning delay. I have refused to stay the march of the military on such overtures; but the great slowness of our operations is likely to lead me into diplomatic difficulties. The Chinese authorities, if they become frightened, are clever enough to advance propositions which it may be impossible to accede to without compromising the main objects of this costly expedition, and by refusing which I shall, nevertheless, expose myself to great animadversion. There was a reconnaissance again this morning, and I hope from the report of Crealock (who accompanied it, and who is doing very well) that the enemy will prove quite as little formidable as I have always expected. The serious advance was positively to have taken place to-morrow, but I almost fear there will be another delay. I am anxious to conclude peace as soon as possible after the capture of the Peiho Forts, because, from what I have seen of the conduct of the French here, I am sure that they will commit all manner of atrocities, and make foreigners detested in every town and village they enter. Of course their presence makes it very difficult to maintain discipline among our own people.

[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]

The 'serious advance' took place on the 12th, and was completely successful. On that day the Allies took possession of the little town of Sinho: two days later they occupied Tangkow. The forts, however, which guarded the entrance of the Peiho—the Taku Forts, from which the British forces had been so disastrously repulsed the year before—remained untaken. Opinions were divided as to the plan of operations. The French were for attacking first the great fortifications on the right or southern bank of the river; but Sir Robert Napier urged that the real key to the enemy's position was the most northerly of the forts, on the left or northern bank. Happily his counsels prevailed. On the 21st this fort was taken by assault, with but little loss of life; and the soundness of the judgment which selected the point of attack was proved by the immediate surrender of all the remaining defensible positions on both sides of the river.

During the greater part of this time Lord Elgin was on board the 'Granada,' moored off Pey-tang, suffering all the anxieties of an active spirit condemned to inactivity in the midst of action: responsible generally for the fate of the expedition, yet without power to control any detail of its operations; fretting especially at the delays which are, perhaps, necessarily incident to a divided and subdivided command. Writing after the surrender of the Taku Forts he said:—

I have torn up the earlier part of this letter, because it is needless to place on record the anxieties I felt at that time. To revert to the portion of my history which was included in the part of my letter that I have destroyed, I must tell you that it was on the 12th that the troops first moved out of Pey-tang. I saw them defile past, and in the afternoon rode out to the camp, but was turned back by a large body of Tartar cavalry, who menaced my flank, and as some of my people had just discovered, in the apartment of the Tartar General at Sinho, a letter stating that they were determined to capture the 'big barbarian himself' this time, I thought it better to retrace my steps. The second action took place on the 14th, and on the 15th I rode out to see the General, and had a conference with him. On the 17th I went to the gulf to see Gros. I have had dozens of letters from the Chinese authorities, and I have answered some of them, not in a way to give them much pleasure. All these details were given at full length in my annihilated letter, but already they seem out of date.

Tangkow.—August 23rd.—Grant has been marvellously favoured by the weather, for the rain, which arrests all movements here, stopped the day before he moved out of Pey-tang, and began again about an hour after he had taken the Taku Fort, which led to the surrender of the whole. I must also say that the result entirely justified the selection which he made of his point of attack, and, as this was against the written opinion of the French General, it is a feather in Grant's cap. The Chinese are just the same as they were when I knew them formerly. They fired the cannons with quite as little accuracy, but there was one point of difference in their proceedings. On previous occasions we have always found their forts open on one side; so that, when they were turned, the troops left them and escaped. In this instance they were enclosed with ditches, palisades, stakes, &c., so that the poor fellows had nothing for it but to remain in them till they were pushed out by bayonets. Almost all our casualties occurred during the escalade. I went through the hospitals yesterday, and found very few who had been struck by round shot. A very small portion of the force was engaged, so that my opinion of its unnecessary magnitude is not shaken. I need not describe the action for you, as you will no doubt see elsewhere a detailed account of it. My own personal history will not be indifferent to you. I left the 'Granada' at about 5.30 P.M. on the 20th (Monday). Found some dinner and a tent at the camp at Sinho. Started next morning at about 5.30 A.M.; rode into Tangkow, where I now am, and mounted to the top of the Head-quarters' House, whence I had a very good view of the operations. I was dislodged after a while, because a battery opened fire at about fifteen hundred yards from us, and some of the balls fell so near, that we began to think they were perhaps firing at me. On being dislodged from my Belvidere, I took some breakfast to console myself; and soon after, seeing the British flag on the fort which we had been attacking, I rode over to it. We met a good many of our own wounded, and all round the fort were numbers of the poor Chinamen, staked and massacred in all sorts of ways. I found the two Generals there, and soon after the Admiral came up from his ship under a flag of truce. Two letters came to me from the Chinese; but, true to my policy of letting the fighting men have all the prestige of taking the Forts, I would not have anything to say to them. The messengers were told that they must give up the forts to the Commanders-in-Chief before I would listen to them; and that, in the meantime, the army would proceed with its operations. They moved on accordingly, and I returned to my post of observation at Tangkow. I had hardly reached it when the rain began, and in about an hour the roads had become absolutely impassable for artillery, and nearly so for everything else. The troops met with no resistance at the second fort, and the indefatigable Parkes having gone over to the unfortunate Governor-General, extorted from him a surrender of the whole, which he brought to the Commanders-in-Chief on the morning of the 22nd, having, I believe, dictated its terms. Of course, Grant's triumph is complete, and deservedly so. ... The system of our army involves such an enormous transportation of provisions, &c., that we make, however, but slow progress. I have, therefore, urged the Admiral, who has got through the barriers at the mouth of the Peiho (and who is not unwilling to go ahead), to proceed up the river with his gunboats: if he meets with any obstructions which are serious, he can stop his progress, and await the arrival of troops. If he meets none, he will soon reach Tientsin.

August 24th.—This morning, at about four, Grant awoke me with a letter from the Admiral, saying that he had experienced in going up the river exactly what we did in 1858—the poor people coming down in crowds to offer submission and provisions, and no opposition of any kind. He wrote from ten miles below Tientsin, which place he was going to occupy with his small gunboat force. The General has agreed to despatch a body of infantry in gunboats, and to make his cavalry march by land; and I am only awaiting the return of the Admiral to move on. So all is going on well. Grant has also agreed to send a regiment to Shanghae in case there should be trouble there. ... It really looks now as if my absence would not be protracted much beyond the time we used to speak of before I started. ... At the same time, I do not like to be too confident.

[Sidenote: The Peiho.]

August 25th.—Noon.—High and dry at about fifteen miles below Tientsin. This must remind you of some of my letters from the Yangtze, two years ago. We started this morning at 6.30 in the 'Granada:' the General and I, with both our staffs. We had gone on famously to this point, scraping through the mud occasionally with success. In rounding a corner, however, at which a French gunboat had already stuck before us, we have run upon a bank. It is very strange to me to be going up the Peiho river again. The fertility of the plain through which it runs strikes me more than it did formerly. The harvest is at hand, and the crops clothe it luxuriantly. The poor people in the villages do not appear to fear us much. We treated them well before, and they expect similar treatment again. The Admiral did his work of occupying Tientsin well.... He has great qualities.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

Tientsin.—Sunday, August 26th.—We reached this place about midnight. It was about the most nervous operation at which I ever assisted, going round the sharp turns with this long ship by moonlight. I had a moment of painful saisissement when I felt almost certain that we should run into my dear colleague Gros, who had grounded in a little gunboat at one of the worst bends of the river. We only saved him by dropping an anchor from the stern, and going backwards full speed. The Yangtze was bad enough, but we never used to go on at night, and there was no danger of collisions. This ship looks also as if she would go head over heels much more easily than the 'Furious.' I am waiting for Parkes and the General before I decide as to landing, &c. Is it not strange to be here? Immediately ahead of us is the yamun where Gros and I spent the eventful weeks in 1858, which preceded the signature of the treaties of Tientsin! Two P.M.—We are to have the yamun in which Reed and Putiatine were lodged in 1858; a much better quarter than our old one; and the General, Gros, and I are all to lodge in it together.

[Sidenote: Chinese yamun.]

Tientsin.—August 27th.—I had a very bad headache after I had sent off the mail yesterday. ... Our ship had, moreover, got aground, and was lying over so much on one side that it seemed possible that she might topple over altogether. Under these circumstances, and having the prospect of a very noisy night on board, I determined to land and sleep in my yamun. The portion of it dedicated to me consists of a regular Chinese garden, with rockwork and bridges, and ponds full of lotus leaves, and flowerpots of all dimensions with shrubs and flowers in them, surrounded on two sides by wooden buildings, containing rooms with carved woodwork and other Chinese neatnesses. It is the only house of a Chinese gentleman I have ever inhabited, for when I was here before I dwelt in a temple. The mosquitoes were a little troublesome at first, but I got my net up, and slept tolerably, better than I should have done here; for the iron ships get so heated by the sun during the day that they are never cool, however fresh the night air may be.

[Sidenote: Negotiations.]

August 29th.—I intended to have told you that I was sending a stiff letter to my old friend Kweiliang; but, in fact, it has taken some time and consultation with Gros to settle its terms, and it is only now being translated. Yesterday afternoon the long-expected mail arrived. ... Shall I really eat my Christmas dinner with you? Really many things are more improbable than that. I hoped at one time that this letter might be despatched from Pekin; but as we have to meet Commissioners here, and to make a kind of supplementary treaty before proceeding thither, it is doubtful whether we shall accomplish this. I am not sure that I like my present domicile as well as I did my domicile here in 1858, because, although it is a great deal more orne, it is proportionably hotter, being surrounded by walls which we cannot see over. It is a great place, with an infinite number of courts and rooms of all sizes. I should think several families must live in it, unless the establishment of a Chinese gentleman is very large indeed. If Kweiliang and Co. come into our terms, my present intention is to send at once to Frederick officially, and request him to come on to Pekin. ... He has been having some very troublesome work at Shanghae with the Rebels; indeed, there is at present work enough for both of us in China.

September 1st.—Kweiliang arrived last night, and sent me a hint that he intended to call on me to-day. I sent one in return, to say that I would not see him until he had answered my letter. I fear a little more bullying will be necessary before we bring this stupid Government up to the mark. Both yesterday and to-day I took a ride in the morning with Grant. I rode a horse of his, a very nice one. The sun becomes powerful very early, but it is a charming climate now. The abundance of all things wonderful: beef and mutton at about threepence a pound; peaches, grapes, and all sorts of vegetables in plenty; ice in profusion. I daresay, however, that in six weeks' time it may be very cold.

At one moment, on the 2nd of September, it really seemed as if the object of the mission was achieved; for the Imperial Commissioners—one of whom was the same Kweiliang who had conducted the negotiations in 1858—in a formal despatch gave a positive assurance that the Treaty of Tientsin should be faithfully observed, and that all the demands hitherto made should be conceded in full. A draft of convention was accordingly prepared on this basis; but, when it came to the point, Kweiliang and his colleagues declared that they had no authority to sign it without referring to Pekin; and it became obvious that he either did not possess, or did not at that moment wish it to be supposed that he possessed, powers equal to those which he held in 1858, although his previous language had been calculated to convey the opposite impression.

[Sidenote: Broken off.]

Here was clearly a deliberate design to create delay, with the view of dragging on negotiations into the winter. It was indispensable, Lord Elgin thought, to check this policy by an act of vigour; and accordingly, with the concurrence of Baron Gros, he intimated to the Imperial Commissioners that, in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in assuming the title of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity of constant reference to Pekin would occasion, he had determined to proceed at once to Tung-chow, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and to enter into no further negotiations with them until he should have reached that place.

September 8th.—I am at war again! My idiotical Chinamen have taken to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the army on to Pekin. It would be a long affair to tell you all the ins and outs, but I am sure from what has come to pass during the last few days, that we must get nearer Pekin before the Government there comes to its senses. The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point. Here we are, then, with our base established in the heart of the country, in a capital climate, with abundance around us, our army in excellent health, and these stupid people give me a snub, which obliges me to break with them. No one knows whether our progress is to be a fight or an ovation, for in this country nothing can be foreseen. I think it better that the olive-branch should advance with the sword. I am afraid that this change in the programme—a hostile instead of a peaceful march on Pekin—will keep me longer here, because I cannot send for Frederick till peace is made; and I cannot, I suppose, leave Pekin till he arrives there.

Sunday, September 9th.—Kweiliang and Co. wanted very much to call on me yesterday, but I would not receive them. The junior Commissioner, who was at Canton with Parkes, and knows him well, told him that, in fact, the people here had been urging them to make an effort to prevent war, saying: 'If we were sure that the foreigners would have the best of it, we should not care; but if they are worsted they will fall back on us, and wreak their vengeance upon us.' This does not seem a very formidable state of mind as far as we are concerned. We have behaved well to the people, except at Peytang and Sinho, and the consequence is that we can move through the country with comparative ease. If the people tried to cut off our baggage, and refused us supplies, we should find it very difficult to get on. ... Noon.—I have just returned from a service on board the 'Granada,' where the clergyman administered the sacrament to a small congregation. At four we march to the wars; but as I go to bear the olive, it is not so bad a Sunday's work. You may very likely hear through Siberia of the result of our march before you receive this letter announcing that it is to take place. I shall not, therefore, speculate upon it.

Yang-tsun, about twenty miles above Tientsin.—September 10th.—Two P.M.—This morning we started at about five, and reached this encampment soon after seven. A very nice ride, cool, and through a succession of crops of millet; a stiff, reedy stem, some twelve or fourteen feet high, with a tuft on the top, is the physiognomy of the millet stalk. It would puzzle the Tartar cavalry to charge us through this crop. As it is, we have seen no enemy; and Mr. Parkes has induced the inhabitants to sell us a good many sheep and oxen. Our tents were not pitched till near noon; so I sat during most of the forenoon under the shade of a hedge. There has been thunder since, and a considerable fall of rain. I hope it will not make the roads impassable; but if it fills the river a little it will do us good, for we may then use it for the transport of our supplies, and it is now too low. We do not know much what is ahead of us, but we hear of Tartar troops farther on; and at Tung-chow it is said that a large army is collected under Sang-ko-lin-sin himself (their great general). I am now enjoying the life of a camp; writing to you seated on my portmanteau, with my desk on my only chair. It is perhaps better than my hothouse at Tientsin.

[Sidenote: New Plenipotentiaries.]

September 11th.-Six A.M.—Parkes and Wade have just been in my tent with a letter from two new Plenipotentiaries—really some of the highest personages in the empire—stating that they are under orders to come to Tientsin to settle everything, and deprecating a forward movement.[2] I shall of course stick by my programme, and decline to have anything to say to them till I reach Tung-chow. Of course this proceeding on their part augurs well for peace. It poured all last evening, and the General determined not to march this morning; but as it is fine now, I think we may start at noon, and make out our allotted march. It is cooler this morning, and I think it not improbable that the thunder of yesterday may close the hot season. However, the sun is coming out in his strength, so one cannot say what the day may bring forth. Ten A.M.—All our cart-drivers, with their animals, disappeared during last night, leaving the carts behind them. Probably they got a hint from the Chinese authorities. I am sorry for it, for if we begin to resort to measures of violence to supply ourselves, we may entirely alter the footing on which we have hitherto stood with the people. We are putting all our surplus goods into junks, in order to reduce our baggage.

[Sidenote: Chinese gentleman-farmer.]

Nan-tsai-tsun.—September 12th.—Where will this letter be sent from? It is begun at a small town on the close of our march of to-day, which ought to have been our march of yesterday. It was a very mild one—about eight miles—through a nice country, more wooded than former marches, and with bright sunshine, and a fresh, almost frosty air. The sunshine we had not at first, for we started before the sun had appeared on the horizon. Instead of trusting to our tents, we have this day taken up our abode in the house of a Chinese gentleman- farmer, the owner of about 1,000 acres. It is nearly as large as the house I occupied at Tientsin; at least it has nearly as many courts. The gentleman has a good library, in which I have established myself; and he seems, poor man, very anxious to accommodate us, though his appearance is not that of a man entirely at his ease. As I was starting this morning I got a second letter from the new Plenipotentiaries, rather more defiant in its tone, and saying that there are troops at our next station, with whom we shall come into collision, if we advance with an army. Parkes is gone on with an escort, and we shall soon know from him what the state of the case really is.

[Sidenote: Ho-see-woo.] [Sidenote: Monastery.]

Ho-see-woo.—September 14th.—We had a charming march to this place yesterday morning. The country much more beautiful than before, and hills in the distance. All around us the most luxuriant crops, and hamlets embosomed in clumps of willows. The temperature was delicious; almost too cold at starting, but, later, a fresh breeze in our faces gave the requisite coolness and no more. Our march was about twelve miles, and on reaching its close I was conducted to a temple where I now am. It is a monastery, with very nice apartments, and quantities of stabling, grain, agricultural implements, &c., all indicative of a very prosperous community. I have seen no bonzerie on anything like so comfortable a scale. I had a second letter from my Commissioners in the evening of the last day on which I wrote a page of this journal, more humble in its tone then the preceding one, and as my General was getting uneasy about his supplies, &c., I thought it necessary to make a kind of proposition for an arrangement. ... Our soldiers do so little for themselves, and their necessities are so great, that we move but slowly. Our present party consists of about 1,500 fighting men; but we count about 4,000 mouths, and all must have abundantly of the best. The French (I admit that they take more out of the country, and sometimes perhaps by rougher methods) carry on their backs several days' provisions. They work in all sorts of ways for the army. The contrast is, I must say, very striking. ... I therefore thought it better to send Wade and Parkes to the new Imperial Commissioners, to see whether they intended to resist or not, and to make a proposal to test this. They set out last night, and I have just heard from them, that, as they did not find the Commissioners at the place they expected (Matow), they are gone on to Tung-chow, the place where I intend to sign the Convention. Parkes is one of the most remarkable men I ever met; for energy, courage, and ability combined, I do not know where I could find his match; and this, joined to a facility of speaking Chinese, which he shares only with Lay, makes him at present the man of the situation.

[Sidenote: Terms agreed to.]

After eight hours' discussion the Chinese Commissioners conceded every point; agreeing among other things that the army should advance to a place called Five-li Point, within six miles of Tung-chow, and there remain while the Ambassador proceeded with an escort of 1,000 men to Pekin. In the high character and standing of the two Commissioners, one the Minister of War, the other a Prince of the Blood Imperial, and in their repeated assurances that 'what they signed was as though the Emperor signed it,' and that 'no comparison could be drawn between the authority vested in them and that held' by previous Commissioners, there appeared to be everything necessary to justify the belief that their word might be trusted. Unhappily the confidence which the Allies were thus led to repose in them was destined to be deceived; not however, so far as appears, owing to bad faith on their part, but owing to the fact that their pacific influence at court was overborne on this occasion by that of the war party, headed by the Commander-in-Chief, Sang-ko-lin-sin.[3]

On the return of the two secretaries from the conference, Lord Elgin at once acquainted Baron Gros and Sir Hope Grant with its results; and it was agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should move forward on Monday the 17th from Ho-se-woo to the place already mentioned, Five-li Point, which they expected to reach in two days' march; and that, at the same time, or rather before the departure of the army, Mr. Parkes and some members of the Ambassador's suite should proceed to Tung-chow to prepare for his reception, and to procure means of transport, accompanied by an officer of the Quarter-master General's Department, and another of the Commissariat, and escorted by a small body of troops.[4]

Sunday, September 16th.—We have had service in my temple. The General and Staff attended. ... Wade and Parkes did good work at Tung- chow. It is arranged now that the General and bulk of the force proceed to-morrow on their way to the point at which (if the Chinese Plenipotentiaries come in to all our terms) we are to stay the progress of the main body, going on from that point with an escort of 1,000 men. This place is about five miles from Tung-chow, and twenty from Pekin; and so I hope to effect my pacific entry into Pekin. ... This place has been, I am sorry to say, much maltreated, for the people ran away, and when that takes place, it is impossible to prevent plundering. The present plan is, that I remain here till the army has taken up its new position, and all is arranged for my reception at Pekin and Tung-chow, when I shall move on. Gros is here. He has just been with me, and is in a great state because our soldiers, in their zeal to drive away all Chinese robbers, have driven away all his coolies.

September 17th.—I rode out very early this morning to see my General before he started, and to give him a hint about the looting, which has been bad here. He disapproves of it as much as I do. ... Parkes went off again this morning to Tung-chow, with another missive from me to my Prince (the new Plenipotentiary), rather stiff and plain-spoken; and Loch is gone with him to get carts, &c., as I have no means of conveying my goods and chattels. I shall probably hear to- morrow whether there is any hitch; but even if all be right, I hardly expect to get on before Thursday, for want of transport.

[Sidenote: Agreement broken.]

September 18th.—Noon.—There is firing in front of us; and I have a letter from Parkes from Tung-chow, stating that the Prince and his colleagues made great difficulties about an audience with the Emperor. If I was sure that Parkes and Co. were well out of Tung-chow, and that we should push on well, I should not regret the firing. Five P.M.—M. de Bastard, Gros' secretary, has just returned from Tung-chow. He reports that the Tartars this morning were in possession of the ground on which, according to the understanding entered into with the Prince and Co., we were to have encamped. He had to ride through their army, to his no small alarm; but he met Parkes (who knows not what fear is) riding back to Tung-chow to tell the Prince, &c., of the position of the Tartar army, and that they should be held responsible for the consequences. Loch was with the General. I wonder he is not come to inform me of what has happened.

[Sidenote: Treacherous seizure of Mr. Parkes and others.]

At the time when these words were written, nearly the whole of the party which had ridden forth the morning before, 'in high spirits at the prospect of an early and successful termination of the war,' had been treacherously seized by the soldiers of Sang-ko-lin-sin, and Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were being violently hurried off, with their hands tied behind their backs, in a rude springless cart, over a badly-paved road, to the prisons of Pekin. The details of their capture and imprisonment, together with such particulars as could afterwards be ascertained of their companions' fate, may be read in the very interesting narrative of one of the victims.[5] We can here touch only upon those points in which their story is mixed up with public events.

[Sidenote: Cause of the change.]

As to the origin and cause of the renewal of hostilities, it is impossible to speak with certainty; nor is it probable that we shall ever arrive at a better opinion on the subject, than that which was formed by Lord Elgin on the spot. In his report to the Government he wrote:—

To hazard conjectures as to the motives by which Chinese functionaries are actuated is not a very safe undertaking; and it is very possible that further information may modify the views which I now entertain on this point. I am, however, disposed at present to doubt there having been a deliberate intention of treachery on the part of Prince Tsai and his colleague; but I apprehend that the General-in-Chief, Sang-ko- lin-sin, thought that they had compromised his military position by allowing our army to establish itself so near his lines at Chang-kia- wan. He sought to counteract the evil effect of this by making a great swagger of parade and preparation to resist when the Allied armies approached the camping-ground allotted to them. Several of our people, Colonel Walker, with his escort, my private Secretary, Mr. Loch, Baron Gros' Secretary of Embassy, Comte de Bastard, and others, passed through the Tartar army during the course of the morning on their way from Tung-chow without encountering any rudeness or ill-treatment whatsoever. At about a quarter to ten, however, a French Commissariat officer was assaulted by some Tartar soldiers under circumstances which are not very clearly ascertained; and this incident gave rise to an engagement, which soon became general. On the whole, I come to the conclusion that, in the proceedings of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries and Commander-in-Chief in this instance, there was that mixture of stupidity, want of straightforwardness, suspicion, and bluster, which characterises so generally the conduct of affairs in this country; but I cannot believe that, after the experience which Sang-ko-lin-sin had already had of our superiority in the field, either he or his civil colleagues could have intended to bring on a conflict in which, as the event has proved, he was so sure to be worsted.

[Sidenote: Firm measures.]

Late on the night of the 18th, Lord Elgin received at the same time the report of a successful engagement, and the intelligence of the capture of his friends. From this moment he felt that, until the prisoners were given up, there could be no further negotiation. A notification was at once issued, that 'all English and French subjects were required to return to the head-quarters of their respective armies; and that if any impediment was put in the way of their return, the city of Pekin would forthwith be attacked and taken.' Even when offers came that they should be restored on condition of his withdrawing his troops, he refused to listen to such terms; convinced that any sign of yielding on his part would be as dangerous to their safety as it would be fatal to all hope of success in the objects of his mission.[6]

September 23rd.—I have had a very busy time since I last wrote in this journal. I have, moreover, been separated from it, and from all my effects. On the 21st we had another battle with the Tartars. I accompanied the army, and saw it all. Considering that the Tartars are so wretchedly armed and led, they did pretty well. We are now about six miles from Pekin, but I believe the Generals will not move for a week. We learn that Parkes and his companions, viz. Loch, De Norman, Bowlby, Captain Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, nineteen Sikhs, and one of the Dragoon Guards, are in Pekin, but we have had no communication with them yet.

[Sidenote: Pali-chiao]

Pali-chiao.—September 27th.—I closed my last letter somewhat in haste, for I had been separated for three days from it and my desk, and when we met again, I was busy with my despatches, &c. The arrest of Parkes and the others is a very disagreeable incident, and we do not yet know what it may lead to. I sent word yesterday to the Emperor's brother, who is now named to treat with me, that unless they are returned to the camp within three days' time, and a pledge is given that the Convention I drew up at Tientsin is signed, Pekin will be assaulted. We are anxious, until we receive an answer to this ultimatum. It was a reply to a letter from the Prince to me, in which he coolly stated that the prisoners should be returned when our army and fleet had retired from the country. ... Meantime we have an army in excellent health, abundantly supplied, and which, in five actions with the enemy, has lost some twenty killed! ... I think I told you at the close of my last letter, that at midnight on the 18th I received a note in pencil from the General, telling me what had led to the conflict of that day. At 3.30 A.M. I sent an answer by Crealock, and at five set off with an escort of thirty Irregulars, to ride about twenty miles to the General's camp.

We then agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should send a notification to the chief mandarin of Tung-chow, to the effect that, unless our countrymen were forthwith restored, Pekin would be assaulted. No notice was taken of this. So on the 21st we advanced, and attacked a large body of Tartars, encamped between Tung-chow and Pekin. I accompanied the infantry and artillery during the day's proceedings. We encamped after the battle, where we now are, among some trees. We sleep in tents, but we have a house where we mess. I am living with the General, as my establishment has not yet been brought up from Ho- see-woo. I rode over yesterday to see the Russian Minister, who, with his sixteen Cossacks, is occupying the village, or rather town, of Chin-kia-wan, which was taken after the affair of the 18th. It is a sad scene of desolation. General Ignatieff was very obliging and friendly, as I have indeed found him to be throughout. He and I entirely agree as to how the Chinese should be fought. ... I may be very near the close of this China business, or I may be at the commencement of a new series of difficulties. All is very uncertain at present. ... The climate is pleasant here, were it not for the quantity of dust, which is overwhelming. We have abundance of grapes, and some other good fruit.

September 29th.—At midnight of the 27th I was roused by Wade, who brought me a letter from Prince Kung (the Emperor's brother), a good deal milder than the last, but still implying that Parkes, &c., were not to be returned until the treaty, &c., was signed. The comparative mildness of the tone of this communication was clearly attributable to the firmness of my last letter, and I therefore induced those with whom I act to agree to nay adhering to it in my reply. I accordingly wrote to say that the army would advance unless the prisoners should return in the course of to-day; but that I do not intend to add to the Convention which I have already furnished to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, and that I will sign that at once, and close the war, if they choose. I hardly expect to see our friends to-day. The Generals will not advance to-morrow, but they say they will on Monday. Meanwhile it is raining; a sort of English rain, not tropical; and if we have not too much of it, it will do good.

October 1st.—Yesterday morning came another letter, proposing that the army should retire to Chin-kia-wan, and that then the treaty should be signed and the prisoners restored. This was clearly inadmissible, as the Chinese would infer from it that whenever they had a difficulty with us they had only to kidnap some of our people to bring us to terms. So we have again handed the matter over to the Generals, from whose hands indeed it would not now have been taken if they had not urged me to make this last overture to Prince Kung. I do not know when they will advance.

October 3rd.—We have moved about two miles, and are now lodged in a mosque—a nice building, a good deal ornamented—which is for the nonce turned to profane uses. The army was to have advanced to attack Sang-ko-lin-sin's force to-morrow, but now I am told the French are not ready. ... These delays give the Chinese fresh heart, and they are beginning to send people to fire on our convoys, &c., coming up from Tientsin. ... There was a letter sent to me yesterday by Prince Kung, signed by Loch and Parkes. Loch managed in his signature to convey to us in Hindostanee that the letter was written under compulsion. As it was in Chinese the information was hardly necessary. It said that they two were well treated, complimented Prince Kung, and asked for some clothes. We have heard nothing about the others who are missing.

[Sidenote: Advance on Pekin.]

October 5th.—We left our mosque this morning at about seven. The whole army was drawn up in contiguous columns of regiments, and had a good appearance. The cavalry on the right, then the artillery, and then the infantry. The French were on our left. In this way we advanced about four miles, when we reached a place from which we saw one of the gates of Pekin at about a mile and a half distance. We met with no enemy, but we heard of him about three miles farther on. However, the French declined to go any farther; so here we remain for the night, and we have got into a joss-house, which is lucky, for we have no tents with us—only a very light kit and three days' provisions for each person. We hear that the Emperor has left for Tartary, which is very probable. We might have stopped him if we had marched on immediately after the 21st ultimo; but that was, in the judgment of the Generals, impossible.

[Sidenote: Suburbs.]

October 6th.—Five P.M.—We are lodged in a Lamaserie in the north-west suburb of Pekin. Our move began at seven. We streamed along narrow roads in a long line. I got a scolding from the General for outflanking the skirmishers, which I did to get out of the dust. At about nine we reached a brick-kiln, from whence we had a view of Pekin, and of a mound, behind which, as we were assured, Sang-ko-lin- sin and his army were encamped. We halted for some time and then advanced; we on the right, the French on the left, towards these supposed camps. The French were to attack in front, we were to take the enemy in flank. I was with the second division of our force. When we arrived abreast of the entrenchment we could see nothing of an enemy. After a while I rode to the top of the mound at the corner of the entrenchment, and found the French General and Staff. The Tartars had all decamped the night before. I then rejoined our army and advanced with it to this point. With the exception of a few shots exchanged with a picket of the enemy, we know of no fighting which has taken place to-day; but, strange to say, our cavalry which went off far to the right in the morning has not been heard of yet, and we cannot discover what has become of the French. It is a nice country, covered with clumps of trees and suburban villas. The temperature of the air is cool, but the sun was very hot all day.

[Sidenote: The Summer Palace.]

Sunday, October 7th.—We hear this morning that the French and our cavalry have captured the Summer Palace of the Emperor. All the big- wigs have fled, nothing remains but a portion of the household. We are told that the prisoners are all in Pekin. ... Five P.M.—I have just returned from the Summer Palace. It is really a fine thing, like an English park—numberless buildings with handsome rooms, and filled with Chinese curios, and handsome clocks, bronzes, &c. But, alas! such a scene of desolation. The French General came up full of protestations. He had prevented looting in order that all the plunder might be divided between the armies, &c. &c. There was not a room that I saw in which half the things had not been taken away or broken to pieces. I tried to get a regiment of ours sent to guard the place, and then sell the things by auction; but it is difficult to get things done by system in such a case, so some officers are left who are to fill two or three carts with treasures which are to be sold.... Plundering and devastating a place like this is bad enough, but what is much worse is the waste and breakage. Out of 1,000,000 l. worth of property, I daresay 50,000 l. will not be realised. French soldiers were destroying in every way the most beautiful silks, breaking the jade ornaments and porcelain, &c. War is a hateful business. The more one sees of it, the more one detests it.

[Sidenote: Return of some of the captives.]

Pressed thus closely up to the walls of the capital, the Chinese Regent—for the Emperor had retired to Tartary, 'being obliged by law to hunt in the autumn'—yielded at last to save the storming of the city. In the afternoon of the 8th of October the English and French prisoners detained in Pekin, numbering eight in all, were sent into the camp.[7]

October 9th.—Yesterday at 4 P.M., Parkes, Loch, and one of Fane's Irregulars arrived. With them were four French soldiers and M. d'Escayrac (the head of a scientific commission). The hands and wrists of the latter were in a sad condition, they had been so hurt by the cords tied round them. Bowlby, De Norman, and the rest, do not seem to be in Pekin as we had hoped. Parkes and Loch were very badly treated for the first ten days; since then, conciliation has been the order of the day, and, I have no doubt, because I stood firm. If I had wavered, they would have been lost; because the Chinese, finding they had a lever with which they could move us, would have used their advantage unsparingly. Parkes and Loch have behaved very well under circumstances of great danger. The narrative of their adventures is very interesting, but I cannot attempt to give it in this letter. They seem to be in good health notwithstanding the hardships they have gone through.

In a public despatch of the same date, announcing the restoration of the captives, he wrote:-

To no one of their numerous friends is the return of these gentlemen a matter of more heartfelt gratification than it is to me. Since the period of their arrest, I have been compelled, by a sense of duty, to turn a deaf ear to every overture for their restoration which has involved the slightest retrograde movement of our army, or the abandonment of any demands previously preferred by me against the Chinese Government. I have felt that any such concession on my part would have established a most fatal precedent, because it would have led the Chinese to suppose that by kidnapping Englishmen they might effect objects which they are unable to achieve by fair fighting or diplomacy. I confess that I have been moreover, throughout, of opinion, that in adopting this uncompromising tone, and boldly setting the national above the personal interest, I was in point of fact best consulting the welfare of our friends who were in durance. But it was not to be expected that all persons would view in the same light a question of policy so obscure; and apart from the warm personal interest which I feel in their safety, your Lordship can well understand that it relieves me from a great load of anxiety to learn from the result that the course which I have followed was not ill- calculated to promote it.[8]

Later in the same despatch he expressed himself anxiously yet hopefully about the captives who were still missing:—

It is a matter of great concern to me, that we know as yet nothing certain respecting the fate of Mr. Bruce's Attache, Mr. de Norman, Mr. Bowlby, the special correspondent of the Times, and the nineteen troopers (consisting of eighteen Sikhs and one Dragoon) who formed the escort, and were under the command of Lieutenant Anderson, of Fane's Irregular Horse. This portion of the party became separated from Messrs. Parkes and Loch, when the latter, at the commencement of the conflict of the 18th ultimo, were taken up to Sang-ko-lin-sin, for the ostensible object of obtaining a safe-conduct from him. Since that time we have heard nothing authentic about them, but we are assured that, though they are not now in Pekin, they will soon be restored to us.

[Sidenote: Fate of the rest.]

Unhappily the hopes thus raised were not destined to be realised. On the 12th of October nine more prisoners were returned to the camp—eight troopers of Fane's Irregular Horse and one French soldier; but the evidence given by them left no doubt that two at least of the remainder, Lieutenant Anderson and Mr. De Norman had perished, having sunk under circumstances of much suffering from the consequences of the maltreatment to which they were subjected. 'I was not personally acquainted' wrote Lord Elgin, 'with Lieutenant Anderson, but he is spoken of by all who knew him as an excellent officer. Mr. De Norman was a young man of remarkable promise. With considerable abilities, great assiduity, singular steadiness of character, and courage of no mean order, he had every promise of achieving eminence in his profession. We all mourn most bitterly his untimely end.'[9]

There were others whose fate remained at that time unknown; among them Mr. Bowlby, the correspondent of the Times, whose corpse was afterwards recovered and recognised. The warmth of regard which Lord Elgin had learnt to feel for him, is shown in many passages of his journal. Officially he wrote, 'I deplore his loss, not only because he was a highly-accomplished and well-informed gentleman, but also because, from the conscientious and liberal spirit in which he addressed himself to the investigation of the singularly complicated problems presented by the moral, social, political, and commercial condition of China, I had conceived the hope that he would be the means of diffusing sound information on many points on which it is most important for the national interests that the British public should be correctly informed.'[10]

The journal, during these anxious and troubled days, is naturally imperfect. One brief entry sums up his feeling on the main subject.

Camp near Pekin.—October 14th.—We have dreadful news respecting the fate of some of our captured friends. It is an atrocious crime, and, not for vengeance, but for future security, ought to be severely dealt with.

[Sidenote: Burning of the Summer Palace.]

The form which the retribution took is well known. The Palace of Yuen-ming- yuen, the Summer-palace of the Emperor, the glory and boast of the Chinese Empire, was levelled with the ground.

The reasons which led Lord Elgin to decide upon this act are fully stated in a despatch dated the 25th of October. After dwelling on the necessity of inflicting some punishment at once severe and swift, that should leave Pekin untouched (for he had engaged not to harm the city) and should fall specially on the Emperor, who was personally responsible for the crimes that had been committed, he goes on to discuss the different courses that were open to him. He might inflict a fine; but it could not be exacted except by appropriating a further portion of the Chinese revenue, already seriously trenched upon by our previous demands. Or he might require the surrender of the individuals guilty of violating the flag of truce: but if he named no one, some miserable subordinates would be given up; if he specified the real culprit, Sang-ko-lin-sin, the demand would infallibly be refused and could not be enforced. Dismissing these alternatives he proceeds:—

Having, to the best of my judgment, examined the question in all its bearings, I came to the conclusion that the destruction of Yuen-ming- yuen was the least objectionable of the several courses open to me, unless I could have reconciled it to my sense of duty to suffer the crime which had been committed to pass practically unavenged. I had reason, moreover, to believe that it was an act which was calculated to produce a greater effect in China, and on the Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose.

It was the Emperor's favourite residence, and its destruction could not fail to be a blow to his pride as well as to his feelings. To this place he brought our hapless countrymen, in order that they might undergo their severest tortures within its precincts. Here have been found the horses and accoutrements of the troopers seized, the decorations torn from the breast of a gallant French officer, and other effects belonging to the prisoners. As almost all the valuables had already been taken from the palace, the army would go there, not to pillage, but to mark, by a solemn act of retribution, the horror and indignation with which we were inspired by the perpetration of a great crime. The punishment was one which would fall, not on the people, who may be comparatively innocent, but exclusively on the Emperor, whose direct personal responsibility for the crime committed is established, not only by the treatment of the prisoners at Yuen- ming-yuen, but also by the edict, in which he offered a pecuniary reward for the heads of the foreigners, adding, that he was ready to expend all his treasure in these wages of assassination.

On Thursday, the 18th of October, the extensive buildings of the palace were given to the flames; and during the whole of the 19th they were still burning. 'The clouds of smoke,' says Mr. Loch, 'driven by the wind, hung like a vast black pall over Pekin;' well calculated to enforce with their lurid gloom the lesson conveyed to the citizens in a proclamation which Lord Elgin had caused to be affixed in Chinese to all the buildings and walls in the neighbourhood, to the effect 'that no individual, however exalted, could escape from the responsibility and punishment which must always follow the commission of acts of treachery and deceit; and that Yuen-ming-yuen was burnt as a punishment inflicted on the Emperor for the violation of his word, and the act of treachery to a flag of truce.'

[Sidenote: Convention signed.]

Five days later, on the 24th of October, the Convention, which had been the subject of so much dispute, was finally signed, and Lord Elgin exchanged with the Emperor's brother the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin.

Camp near Pekin.—October 26th.—This will be one of the shortest letters which you have received from me since we parted, and yet perhaps it will not be the one which you will welcome the least, because it will convey to you the news that I have signed my treaty, and that the specific object for which I came out is therefore accomplished. I have not written my daily journal lately, because it would have been filled with my difficulties. ... However, I have succeeded at last in a sort of way. Loch is going home with the treaty, and will make a point of seeing you, and giving you all our news. ... I cannot decide as to my own return until I see Frederick. ... The deaths of poor Bowlby and the others who were with him were very sad! Loch's escape was most providential. With 5,000 men led on without delay, as ought to be done in China, nothing of this kind would have occurred. I told Palmerston so before I started; but the delays incident to conveying so large an army as ours without risking anything, have nearly made the whole thing break down.

October 27th.—Nine A.M.—Loch tells me he must be off, so I must end my brief epistle. I take up my abode in Pekin to-day, in the palace of the Prince of I., who played me false at Tung-chow.

Pekin, Prince of I.'s Palace.—October 30th.—I have been in bed for two days with an attack of influenza, but I am better to-day, though not by way of going out. Here we (the General and I) are occupying a great enclosure containing a series of one-storied wooden buildings with covered passages and verandahs. There is a good deal of aristocratic seclusion about the place, as it is surrounded by walls, and entirely cut off from the world without; but there is little appearance of luxury and comfort about it. It rained yesterday and the day before, and I had considerable difficulty in reading in my bed, as my paper windows, which keep out the cold pretty well, keep out also a good deal of light. They are not transparent, so the view through them is not lively. To-day there is a beautiful sunshine, and I have been walking about a little in the court before my room door. The present arrangement is that we remain here till the 8th. I had some difficulty in obtaining this; but it is of great importance that, before the army goes, I should get a decree from the Emperor sanctioning the publication of the Treaty all over the empire. ... The French General will not, however, consent to remain.

[Sidenote: Funeral of the murdered captives.]

October 31st.—Another fine day, but I have not left the house, partly from consideration for the remains of my cold, and partly because I have had letters to finish. I have had visits from both my colleagues, Gros and Ignatieff. The latter and I are always very good friends. Perhaps he takes advantage of my simplicity; but at any rate we always seem to agree remarkably. He is wide awake to the Jesuit intrigues here. By the way, I should mention that the French had a wonderful funeral on Sunday, in honour of the murdered captives. I could not attend, being in bed at the time. Several speeches in bad taste were delivered, and a remarkable series of performances took place. Among other things, each soldier (this is, I believe, the French practice on such occasions) fired his musket into the grave, so that the coffins were covered with cartridges. The Chinese say that it was because they were not sure whether the occupants were really dead. On the day following, they inaugurated the old Jesuit cathedral, which they have recovered from the Chinese Government; and the bishop who preached, in order to make amends for the omission of all reference to us at the ceremony of the funeral, complimented Queen Victoria and her digne representant for having come to China to set up the Roman Catholic cathedral in Pekin. This reflection will comfort ——[11] when he comes to vote next year the balance of the L10,000,000 spent. I have no news of Frederick yet; so I am no further advanced with my own plans than I was when Loch left me.

[Sidenote: Imperial Palace.] [Sidenote: Visit from Kung.]

Pekin.—November 2nd.—Yesterday, after the mail had left, I mounted on horseback, and with an escort, and Parkes and Crealock, proceeded to the Imperial City, within which is the Imperial Palace. We obtained access to two enclosures, forming part of the Imperial Palace appendages: both elevated places, the one ascended by a pathway in regular Chinese rockwork on a large scale, and really striking in its way; and the other being a well-wooded park-like eminence, crowned by temples with images of Buddha. The view from both was magnificent. Pekin is so full of trees, and the houses are so low, that it hardly had the effect of looking down on a great city. Here and there temples or high gateways rose above the trees, but the general impression was rather that of a rich plain densely peopled. In the distance the view was bounded by a lofty chain of mountains, snow-capped. From the park-like eminence we looked down upon the Imperial Palace—a large enclosure crowded with yellow-roofed buildings, generally low, and a few trees dotted among them. It is difficult to imagine how the unfortunates shut up there can ever have any exercise. I don't wonder that the Emperor preferred Yuen-ming-yuen. The yellow roofs, interspersed here and there with very deep blue ones, had, however, a very brilliant effect in the sunshine. After enjoying these views I went to the Russian Minister's, and found him installed in a house got up a l'Europeenne, and looking very comfortable, with his national stoves. He showed me his chapel also. This morning I got a letter from Gros telling me that, in opposition to my advice, he had been to see Prince Kung. I told him he ought to let the Prince come to him first; but the Jesuits think that they can curry favour with the Chinese by making him condescend. They are quite wrong, as I am sure the result will prove. The Prince came to see me to-day before returning Gros' visit, which goes for something in this land of ceremony. I received the Prince with all honour, and had a good deal of talk with him through the interpreters, in a style which reminded me of the dialogue at the commencement of 'Eothen.' I have, I believe, secured the edict for which we have been waiting; so I have done everything except see the Emperor, which I am not likely to do, as he is at Jehol. We ended by photographing the Prince, a proceeding which I do not think he much liked.

[Sidenote: Return visit.]

November 7th.—There has not been much to report since the 2nd. I returned Kung's visit the next day, and we had a more coulant conversation than I have before had with any Chinese authority. It is something to get at men who are so high placed that they are not afraid—or at any rate are less afraid—of being denounced if they listen to foreigners. I dined the night before with the Russian Minister, who was very hospitable. On Sunday I went to see two temples in the Chinese city, the one being that to which the Emperor goes four times a year to offer sacrifices to Heaven, the other the Temple of Agriculture.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Mr. Bruce.] [Sidenote: Interview with Prince Kung.]

November 10th.—I had got so far when a note from Frederick reached me, saying that he had started at 1 A.M. on the 6th from Tientsin to ride to Pekin, and had been obliged, by fatigue, to rest at Ho-see- woo. We were to have left Pekin on the 8th, so I was obliged to send to beg one day's respite from the General. It was impossible to make Frederick start back to Tientsin on the very day following his arrival. At about noon he reached Pekin. It was a great relief to me, because I had been choosing a house for him, and there were other matters concerning which it was most important that he should be consulted. I found him very well disposed to stay on at Pekin, but on finding that both Gros and Ignatieff were opposed to leaving their legations there for the moment, we both agreed that it would be better to act as they had resolved to do. I therefore wrote to Prince Kung acknowledging the good faith which he had shown about the Emperor's edict and the publication of the treaty (both of which things have been done in the most complete manner), and adding that the English army would, in accordance with the terms of the convention, retire at once from Pekin. I went on to inform him that I proposed to call on him to take leave, and at the same time to introduce to him Mr. Bruce, who had just arrived at Pekin. We proceeded, accordingly, to his palace, at 4 P.M. on the 8th, with an imposing military escort. After we had conversed some time together, I told Parkes to explain to the Prince that in England the individual who represents the sovereign, whatever his personal rank, always takes precedence of all others; that, as my task in China was completed, Mr. Bruce would henceforward occupy that position, and that, therefore, with the Prince's permission, I would give up to him the seat of honour on which I was placed and take his seat instead. I then rose and changed seats with Frederick. This little bit of acting answered very well. It put Frederick into direct relations with the Prince, and did away with the impression (if it existed) of my having superior rank to him. The Prince was civil, and said, rather neatly, that he hoped they would conduct business satisfactorily, not only because he was British Minister, but brother to Lord Elgin, with whom he had had such pleasant relations. On the following day (the 9th), before we started, he came to our abode to return our visit. I made Frederick receive him, telling the interpreters to say that I had no business to speak of, but that I should come into the room before he left the house to take leave of him. The consequence was that Frederick had a long and, to all appearance, satisfactory conversation with him.

[Sidenote: Leaves Pekin.]

After this we set out for Tung-chow. We had to wait there all night, as our boats were not ready, and we are now (10th November, noon) gliding down the river, each in a chop boat (a little boat with a very convenient cabin, in which one can sleep, read, write, &c.), on a lovely autumn day, low temperature, and bright sunshine. I think that this wind-up at Pekin was very promising. It is probable that there may be some reaction when the Emperor and the bad advisers whom he has about him return, and even Ignatieff did not choose to remain at Pekin during that moment of reaction. At the same time, it is evident that Kung, who is his brother, has committed himself to the peace policy, and that his intercourse with us has been much more satisfactory to him than he at one time expected. It is probable that the Emperor will for once hear something of the truth. Kung will claim credit for having induced us to remove from Pekin to Tientsin, while the fact that we are still as near as Tientsin will be an in terrorem argument in support of his policy of conciliation. If Kung weathers the difficult moment which he will have to traverse when the Emperor returns, I have hopes that all the benefit which I have expected to derive from our minister's residence at Pekin will be achieved. Our Sinologues are fine fellows. It is refreshing to see their spirit and pluck. Wade, Parkes, and Morrison, all put their services at our disposal, and offered to remain alone at Pekin. My choice, however, fell on a younger man, of whom I have a very good opinion, and who has been with me as assistant-interpreter.[12] I thought it better, for many reasons, to leave a person who had smaller pretensions than any of those I have named. The gossip is that the Emperor is occupying his time at Jehol by marrying a fourth wife (a rather expensive proceeding) and getting tipsy. I am afraid he is not much worth; although, if the papers in the vermilion pencil, which we found in the Summer Palace, are his writing, he is not such a fool as people suppose. ... Frederick brought with him your letters to September 10th. I pray that you may now be rejoicing in the belief that Bruce is getting on well and happily at school.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.] [Sidenote: Its climate.]

Tientsin.—November 14th.—Here I am again in the house which I occupied two and a half months ago, and which is by far the nicest Chinese house I have seen, and its exposure to the sun is now most agreeable. The climate is at present charming. If nothing else had been done by these recent proceedings, the fact of placing our troops and embassy here, instead of in the south of China, would have been almost worth the trouble. It is also a much drier climate than that of Shanghae. We have had about seven days of rain in all, since I left Shanghae in July. Frederick had nineteen days consecutively just before he left Shanghae. He was not well himself then, but he is all right now. His ride to Pekin—eighty miles in thirty hours—set him up again. I found the Admiral very cordial. ... Gros is not yet come, and I do not like to depart from here without seeing him.

He was detained at Tientsin for several days, arranging a variety of matters of detail; and it was not till the morning of the 26th of November that he found himself once more afloat on the Gulf of Pecheli, on board the 'Ferooz,' homeward bound.

[Sidenote: Results of the mission.]

The general results obtained by the mission thus happily terminated cannot be better summed up than in the words of the despatch in which the Foreign Minister, Lord J. Russell, conveyed to Lord Elgin Her Majesty's 'full approbation of his conduct in the various particulars' above described.

'The convention,' he wrote, 'which you concluded with the Prince of Kung on the 24th of October is entirely satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. It records the reparation made by the Emperor of China for his disregard in the previous year of his Treaty engagements; it sets Her Majesty's Government free from an implied engagement not to insist in all particulars on the fulfilment of those engagements; it imposes upon China a fine, in the shape of an augmented rate of indemnity; it affords an additional opening for British trade; it places on a recognised footing the emigration of Chinese coolies, whose services are so important to Her Majesty's colonial possessions; it relieves Her Majesty's colony of Hong Kong from a source of previous annoyance; and it provides for bringing generally to the knowledge of the Chinese the engagements into which the Emperor has entered towards Great Britain.

'These are all solid advantages; and, coupled with the provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin, they will, it may be hoped, place the relations between the two countries on a sound footing, and insure the continuance of peace for a long period to come.'

[1] Captain Roderick Dew had been engaged at the capture of Canton in December, 1857, and also in May, 1858, at the taking of the Taku forts.

[2] The new Plenipotentiaries were Tsai, Prince of I., a cousin of the Emperor, and Muh-yin, President of the Board of War: with whom was joined Hang-ki, a member of the previous commission.

[3] 'A prisoner taken on the 21st of September, in the course of conversation, volunteered the remark that the fighting was all the doing of Sang-ko-lin-sin, who was as anxious for it as Prince Tsai was opposed to it. This accords with other reports.'—Mr. Wade's Memorandum.

[4] In view of the tragic events which followed, the reflection will naturally arise that, if this party had not been thus sent forward in advance of the army, those events would not have occurred. On the other hand it must be borne in mind, (1) that it was a matter of necessity that some one should go forward to arrange with the Chinese authorities as to the place where the Allied armies were to encamp; (2) that the practice of sending one or other of the Chinese scholars within the enemy's lines had long been habitual, having been followed, with the best results, on many occasions, not only in this but in former expeditions; and that the Chinese, whatever might be their faults, had never shown any disposition to disregard a flag of truce; (3) that, accordingly, no one concerned appears to have had any idea that there was danger to be braved; and that, putting aside Lord Elgin, Baron Gros, and Sir Hope Grant, the readiness of Mr. Parkes, not only to go himself—that in one who 'knew not what fear was' proves nothing—but to take with him several friends who were not called by duty, shows that, in the judgment of a man of great shrewdness and unrivalled knowledge of the Chinese character, who was moreover fully cognisant of all the circumstances, there existed no ground for apprehension; (4) lastly, that all the evils that followed were due, so far as it is possible now to judge, to a circumstance which no one could have foreseen at the time, viz. to a change of policy and of party within the Chinese Government.

[5] 'Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China,' 1860. By Henry Brougham Loch, Private Secretary to the Earl of Elgin.